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Introduction to the Year of Russia Special Issue 
 
Dan Paracka 
 
Kennesaw State University’s (KSU) Year of Russia program provided an in-depth 
opportunity for our campus community to learn about Russia at a very important 
point in time. The program featured more than 30 events including a robust lecture 
series, special courses focused on Russia, a symposium on U.S.-Russia relations, 
and a faculty and student interdisciplinary seminar that traveled to Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. These different elements were intentionally organized to create 
synergistic opportunities for sustained intercultural exchange. For example, Dr. 
Tom Rotnem’s POLS 4449: Russian Foreign Policy class conducted eight Skype-
enabled classroom discussion sessions with Russian counterparts (faculty and 
students) from Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Topics 
for the discussion sessions included: 1) NATO/Russian relations; 2) Ukraine; 3) 
Syria; 4) Russia’s global economic status; and 5) Russia’s developing relationship 
with China. Later, a delegation of the MGIMO faculty and students attended the 
symposium on KSU’s campus and then KSU faculty and students visited MGIMO 
in Moscow. 
The U.S.-Russia Relations Symposium, co-hosted by KSU and the Georgia 
Institute of Technology, attracted 140 people including presenters from six different 
countries (Brazil, Japan, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United States). There were 
representatives from three different Russian universities and there was also a 
delegation of 11 students from Campbell High School and 17 students from the 
University of Central Florida in addition to the KSU and Georgia Tech participants. 
Overall, across all of the Year of Russia events, more than 3,300 KSU faculty and 
students participated in the program. 
Many of the articles in this journal were first delivered at the conference. The 
articles examine a wide range of both historical and contemporary issues in Russia, 
its international relations, and unique position in global affairs from diverse 
perspectives. Topics include: Soviet-American economic relations at the end of 
World War II; the tragic consequences of the Soviet experiment with socialism; 
historic influences of Russian and American ideologies on foreign policy; Russian 
foreign policy as anchored in the restoration of world power status; an analysis of 
Ukraine’s strategic geopolitical position; political homophobia as a state strategy in 
Russia; the danger of rhetoric that promotes United States adversarial policy 
towards Russia; an improving Sino-Russian relationship particularly in the Arctic 
region; and the application of Konstantin Stanislavsky’s acting lessons on life, 
leadership and international relations.  
For the past 10 years, with the help of many colleagues, I have written an 
introductory essay focused on the country of study at the beginning of each year to 
serve as a starting point for student inquiry and understanding. What follows is an 
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adapted version of the essay. I hope it will also provide a useful introduction to the 
issues examined in this volume. 
Russia’s story consists of both tragic suffering and tremendous 
accomplishments that have helped shape the character of its people, making them 
resilient and proud. At the same time, Russian society and geography are too 
complex, too diverse, and too large for a single culture to serve as the national 
heritage (Figes, 2002, p. xxviii). Russia, situated in the middle of Eurasia, is both 
Eastern and Western and it is this ambiguity, this pull in two directions, which has 
helped make Russians skilled diplomats and negotiators. Having experienced 
invading forces from both directions, it has also made them wary and put them on 
guard. For this reason and “as a general rule, Russia has pursued balance-of-power 
policies” (Donaldson, Nogee, & Nadkarni, 2014, p. 4). Moreover, “Russians have 
traditionally had a deeply ingrained fear of anarchy and the centrifugal forces that 
tug at the unity and stability of their vast state … [which] has made Russians prize 
order and security” (Smith, 1976, p. 251). Unfortunately, the efforts to build a 
strong state have, at times, led to “subverted institutions and personalistic rule” 
(Kotkin, 2016, p. 4). This view, a type of Russian exceptionalism, where Russians 
are seen as having suffered under oppression for centuries and subjected to 
continuous external threats and harsh political realities, emerged first during the 
enlightenment period and was amplified as the Red Scare and Cold War emerged 
(Pate, 2016). However, Russia, in continuous relationship with its neighbors, 
influencing them and influenced by them, is not so different from the rest of the 
world.  
Notably, the United States’ views of Russia have often been biased tending 
towards such negative interpretations due, in part, to limited direct interaction and 
staunch ideological differences. Characterized by Cold War acrimony and 
antagonism, there has been far too little collaboration between the two countries.  
 
Moscow as the Third Rome 
 
The early history of Russia consisted of a collection of principalities. The Viking, 
Rurik of Rutland, defeated the Slavs at Novgorod in 862 becoming ruler of Northern 
Russia and his successor Oleg conquered Kiev. According to legend in 988, “after 
considering and rejecting Judaism and Islam, Great Prince Vladimir of Kiev 
embraced the Christian faith and established it as a state religion” (Taruskin, 2009, 
p. 156). Nicholas Riasanovsky (2005) has asserted that adopting Orthodox 
Christianity is the single most important event shaping Russian identity. One of the 
first cities to establish broader control and establish itself as a center of trade was 
Kiev, which flourished between 882 and 1125. Moscow was founded in 1147 by 
Yuri Dolgoruky (a monument in his honor stands in front of the city hall). The cities 
of Kievan Rus with the exception of Novgorod and Pskov were completely 
destroyed in 1240 by the vastly superior military of the Mongols (also known as the 
Tatars). The Mongols indirectly ruled the territory from the 13th to the 15th century. 
It should be noted that the Mongol Empire brought many advances, not only in 
military technology but also in trade, taxation, and administrative systems 
(Weatherford, 2004, p. xxiii). 
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Christianity came to Russia through Constantinople but ties were severed when 
the Ottoman Turks took control of Constantinople in 1453. The patriarchate of the 
Russian Orthodox Church transferred north to Moscow. After Kievan Rus was 
shattered by the Mongols, there was no large Rus state until one was reconstituted 
by Muscovy. Muscovy’s strength gradually grew under Ivan the Great and it was at 
this time that the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome was firmly established, 
making Muscovy an heir to the older Byzantine and even Roman classical 
civilizations and the origins of Christianity. Historically, Russia has tried to set itself 
apart from its Asian neighbors by emphasizing its Christian nature although many 
of its people follow Muslim, Buddhist, or Shamanic traditions. In this regard, it is 
important to distinguish between “Russian” as an ethnic identity from the broader 
community of peoples who make up the Russian state. 
According to Orlando Figes (2002), “the entire spirit of the Russian people, 
and much of their best art and music, has been poured into the Church, and at times 
of national crisis, under the Mongols or the Communists, they have always turned 
to it for support and hope” (p. 297). Under Christian theology, poverty was at times 
cast as a virtue among Russia’s peasants, and excessive wealth was viewed as a sin. 
The liturgy in Russian Orthodox Church services is always sung and the chants and 
choral songs of the church are known for their beauty. However, instrumental music 
was long banned by the church and sacred compositions were not played in concert 
halls until Pyotr Tchaikovsky’s Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom was performed in 
1878 (Figes, 2002, p. 298).  
 
Imperial Russia and the Rise of Colonial Nationalism 
 
As both Russia and Western Europe grew and consolidated, Peter the Great, who 
ruled Russia from 1689-1725, took on an immense project, the construction of a 
new capital, St. Petersburg. He led the effort to Westernize/Europeanize the empire 
and his most successful military efforts concentrated on establishing Russia as a 
Baltic Sea power. The transformation was so great that historians tend to mark 
Peter’s reign as the end of one era, Muscovy, and the start of another, the imperial. 
By the time of Catherine the Great, who ruled from 1762-1796, Russian noblemen 
and women were emulating European language, customs, and attitudes, and 
immersing themselves in the secular culture of the French Enlightenment (Figes, 
2002, pp. 55-57). Catherine’s Russia competed with the other great empires of the 
age defeating Sweden again and partitioning Poland. Much of Catherine’s military 
expansion concentrated on establishing Russia as a Black Sea power. The Black 
Sea port of Odessa was founded in 1796, the year of Catherine’s death.  
Alexander I, who ruled Russia from 1801-1825, defeated Napoleon, but he 
never could have done so alone. Alexander needed alliances with other European 
powers especially the Prussians and later decisively the Austrians who switched 
their allegiance away from France. Many have credited geography and climate for 
Napoleon’s failure, but strategic leadership and skillful diplomacy were equally if 
not more important than the cold weather or even Russian patriotism in defeating 
Napoleon. It was a strategy of deep retreat and restrained patience similar to one 
used by Peter the Great against Charles XII of Sweden and by the Mongols to defeat 
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the Russians in 1223 at the Kalka River (Lieven, 2009, p. 132; Weatherford, 2004, 
p. 263). Between 1812 and 1814, the Russian army first retreated from Vilna to 
Moscow and then advanced from Moscow to Paris. In 1815, after defeating 
Napoleon, Alexander I signed what came to be known as the Holy Alliance with 
Prussia and Austria. 
The Napoleonic Wars accompanied rising European nationalism where British 
sea power had confined French imperialism to mainland Europe, while Russian 
imperial interests lied primarily southwards towards the Ottomans and Persians. 
The Portuguese monarchy escorted to Brazil and rescued by the British from 
Napoleon opened the entire Portuguese Empire to British trade, indicating the 
importance of collaborative alliances to compete globally. Russia’s defeat of 
Napoleon also served to embolden and strengthen British imperialism, thereby 
increasing competition between Britain and Russia.  
Interestingly, the War of 1812 seems to have served as both a glorious imperial 
victory of salvation and a watershed moment in Russia’s movement towards 
national liberation (Figes, 2002, p. 138). The leaders of the 1825 Decembrist 
uprising were influenced greatly by soldiers and officers who had returned from the 
Napoleonic battlefield. It was the first attempt ever to overthrow the imperial 
political system. Nobleman had witnessed side-by-side the sacrifices of peasants on 
the battlefield who more than proved their worth as patriots. Russia mobilized over 
230,000 men for the war effort, most of them serfs. Returned officers hoped to 
establish a new constitution that every man could understand, protect, and defend 
but their plans were ill-conceived and poorly timed, choosing to revolt at the 
swearing in ceremony for Tsar Nicholas I, whose royal soldiers were also assembled 
and who dealt harshly with the mutineers. Five hundred Decembrists were arrested 
and 121 conspirators, including the so-called peasant prince Sergei Volkonsky, 
were found guilty and sentenced as convict laborers to Siberia (Figes, 2002, pp. 83-
90).  
Nicholas I ruled with an iron hand from 1825-1855. He turned his ambitions to 
the Ottoman Empire defeating the Turks in 1828, winning independence for Greece 
and extending Russia’s control over the Caucasus region. Later, when Russia 
assisted the Ottoman Sultan’s call for assistance in putting down a revolt by 
Mohammed Ali in Egypt, Russia was rewarded with the rights to have its warships 
pass through the Turkish straits, but the British and French objected. Encouraged 
by Britain, the Turks declared war on Russia in 1853 and Russia was defeated in 
the Crimean War (Donaldson et al., 2014, pp. 22-23). It was a defeat that the 
Russians would not forget. European competition including Russian ambitions for 
control over the Ottoman Empire and its important sea trade routes would only 
intensify, eventually resulting in World War I. 
Following the death of Nicholas I, Alexander II (who ruled from 1855 until his 
assassination in 1881) signed the treaty that ended the Crimean War and began 
initiating several important reforms, most importantly the Emancipation of Serfs 
(1861). The economic imperative calling for emancipation asserted that free labor 
is more productive than slave labor. Militarily, Russia turned to its Eastern borders 
winning territory in the Amur region of China and founding the city of Vladivostok 
in 1860. In 1874, Russia successfully defeated the khanates of Kokand, Bukhara, 
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and Khiva in Turkestan and later Tashkent right up to the borders of Afghanistan 
and British India (Figes, 2002, p. 411). In 1877, Russia renewed its conflicts in the 
Balkans attempting to liberate Bulgaria from Turkish occupation leading to the 
1878 Treaty of Berlin (involving all of the major European powers of the time) and 
an uneasy accord between Russia and Austria. The Treaty of Berlin “created a series 
of Christian nation states in the Balkans and forced a realignment of Muslim 
populations” setting off massive migration movements (Karpat, 2010, p. 48). 
German Chancellor Bismarck also organized the 1884 Conference of Berlin known 
for unleashing the Scramble for Africa as the European powers divided the world 
into spheres of influence and their leaders engaged in a dangerous chess match of 
shifting allegiances and self-serving treaties. 
Following the Berlin Conference, Germany increasingly saw itself vying with 
France, Great Britain, and Russia for predominance, and therefore looked to the 
Ottoman Empire as an important sphere of influence and potential ally. The Young 
Turks reformist movement also saw in Germany a successful, rapidly 
industrializing country able to help protect them from Russian expansionism 
(Fromkin, 1989, p. 66). German railroads connected Berlin with Istanbul.  
It is during this period in the 19th century of rising nationalism and competing 
colonial empires that Russia expands and solidifies its rule into the Caucasus, 
Central Asia, and East Asia regions. Russian nationalism, like that of other 19th 
century nationalisms, was brutal in its treatment of minorities. It has long been 
argued that since Russia itself was a frontier society, its borders were relatively 
undefined and under-fortified contributing to expansionist tendencies. Perhaps for 
these reasons, Russia had also become quite adept at using local elites to promote 
its imperial agenda long before the British attempted to do the same in India. 
Russia’s frontier colonialism also had much in common with the United States’ 
frontier subjugation of native peoples especially in its promotion of a Christian 
civilizing mission. In addition, “the need to transform pasturelands into agricultural 
colonies and industrial enterprises kept the [Russian] government on a 
confrontational course with its nomadic neighbors” (Khodarkovsky, 2002, p. 222). 
At the end of the 19th century, the so-called “Great Game” in Asia pitted the world’s 
two most powerful nations of the period, Britain and Russia, on a collision course 
for control over the Middle East (Fromkin, 1980, p. 936). 
 
Serfs, Slavophiles, Artists, and Intellectuals 
 
Following the emancipation of serfs, groups like the narodniki (populists) as well 
as many intellectuals, artists, and writers increasingly celebrated and romanticized 
the peasant as a heroic figure capable of withstanding great suffering with human 
dignity (Figes, 2002, p. 220). There was a new found fascination with a rural life 
little known or understood by the ruling classes of the urban centers. These artists 
and intellectuals viewed peasants as oppressed and in need of liberation, and 
increasingly advocated for all Russians to adopt the collectivist, in some ways 
quasi-socialist form of organization, that prevailed in peasant villages.  
At the same time, Europe was also increasingly viewed by Russians as a 
morally corrupting influence̶decadent, materialistic, superficial, and egotistical, and 
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it was portrayed this way in many of the works of Russia’s literature. This reflected, 
in part, what came to be known as the Slavophile movement calling for a 
rediscovery of Russian roots and values, and where history might belong to the 
people (Figes, 2002, pp. 65, 135). Morality, spirituality, and social justice were core 
themes in their works. In general, the Slavophiles tended to be political 
conservatives, while the populists were revolutionaries. Both groups generally 
opposed those advocating for greater Westernization which was also a prevalent 
view at the time. 
Artistically and intellectually, what began in the 1830s as largely a romantic 
view of the beleaguered peasant, by the latter half of the century began to challenge 
the received truths linking Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationalism under Romanov 
rule, and by the 1930s became an almost blind faith in progress under Communist 
state control eventually giving rise to more outspoken dissidents after World War 
II.  
 
The Trans-Siberian Railroad and East Asia 
 
The development of railroads was a central aspect of infrastructure development in 
Russia at the end of the 19th and throughout the 20th centuries. Railways, a symbol 
of modernity, attracted people to towns and brought growth, replacing the old world 
of rural Russia with a new more urban context. Birth rates also increased 
dramatically during the second half of the 19th century with the population rising 
in Russia from 50 to 79 million. As more and more land was farmed (primarily in 
the southern regions) soil quality declined along with agricultural and livestock 
production, resulting in shortages and eventually famine (Figes, 2002, p. 258). 
Overall, less than 15% of Russian land is fit for agriculture as the tundra is a treeless 
plain with poor soil and little precipitation, while the taiga region, over half of the 
nation’s land mass, has cold winters, hot summers, leached soils, and is covered in 
forest. 
In 1898, China granted Russia a 25-year lease over the Liaotung Peninsula and 
Russia completed the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1903. In 1904, Japan, concerned 
about losing its trade privileges with China due to Russian expansion, launched a 
surprise attack on the Russians at Port Arthur. Japan’s substantial military victories 
against Russia (the Russian navy was defeated at Tsushima and the army lost 80,000 
men at Mukden) resulted in concessions of Manchurian territories to Japan and 
contributed to revolutionary fervor throughout Russia. The 1905 Revolution in 
Russia was fueled by striking workers, peasant unrest, and military mutinies, which 
led to the creation of the State Duma, a multiparty system and a Constitutional 
Monarchy in 1906. The 1905 Revolution largely failed to create real change in the 
political power of Tsar Nicholas II and it would not be until the middle of World 
War I and the additional suffering placed on the nation that a more complete 
revolution would occur. 
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The Russian Revolution and World War 
 
Russian losses during World War I exceeded 3 million people and caused great 
hardship. In 1917 in the middle of the war, Russia experienced two revolutions, 
revolutions that were a reaction to over 300 years of monocratic rule. The 
Bolsheviks led by Vladimir Lenin came to power during the second revolution in 
October 1917 and promised to end Russia’s involvement in World War I. They 
signed a peace treaty with Germany in 1918 but continued to face incursions by 
Allied forces, especially Polish forces. They signed a peace treaty with Poland in 
1921 ceding parts of the Ukraine and Belorussia to Poland. Conditions in Russia 
continued to deteriorate. At least 5 million Russians died of starvation and disease 
during the famine of 1921 and the Bolsheviks had no choice but to accept foreign 
assistance. Three million Russians fled their native land between 1919 and 1929 
(Figes, 2002, p. 528). In 1921, “Lenin’s answer to the crisis was the New Economic 
Policy which represented a retreat from socialist economics. The peasants were 
given greater freedom, and private trade and private ownership of small businesses 
were again legalized” (Donaldson et al., 2014, p. 51).  
Lenin also revised Marxist thought to emphasize its international dimension 
highlighting how imperialist nations exploited their colonies exacerbating the 
problems of class struggle. He believed that Russia would lead a worldwide 
movement of liberation from the oppression of bourgeois capitalism. Lenin’s death 
in 1924 resulted in a divisive power struggle with Joseph Stalin emerging as the 
leader, ruling from 1929-1953. He immediately created large state-run farms to 
collectivize agricultural lands, expand industrial output, repress religion and close 
churches, and purge all opposition. It is estimated that as many as 10 million people 
died during the manmade famine of 1932-34, and an additional 7 million people 
were killed and 8-12 million arrested during the purges of 1934-38. 
With the onset of World War II, the Soviet Union crippled by Stalin’s Great 
Purge of 1937, having executed or imprisoned many high ranking officers, was 
generally ill-prepared for war and signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. 
They were caught off guard when attacked by Nazi Germany in June 1941. By mid-
September 1941, Hitler’s forces had cut off the city of Leningrad and advanced to 
within a few hundred miles of Moscow. With great sacrifice, the Russians stopped 
the Nazi advance and slowly began to push them back. The siege of Leningrad 
lasted 900 days and as many as 1 million people died of disease and starvation 
before it was broken in January 1944 (Figes, 2002, p. 492). By the end of the war, 
27 million people in Soviet Russia (especially many Ukrainians, Belarusians, 
Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians, and many of the civilian victims were Jews) 
had died but the country emerged with control of vast territory in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Donaldson et al. (2014) stated, “That the Soviet 
Union not only survived but emerged from the War as Europe’s strongest power 
was a tribute to Soviet military valor and diplomatic skill” (p. 62). World War II, or 
The Great Patriotic War as it is known in Russia, mobilized all of Russia’s resources 
including more than 1 million women who served with the Soviet armed forces as 
medics, scouts, snipers, and communication operators, and in combat positions in 
the infantry, artillery, armored tank, and anti-aircraft divisions (Pennington, 2010). 
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Stalinism and the Cold War 
 
Under communism, old aristocratic ideas were abandoned for new proletarian ones 
where science and a mechanized collectivism promised to transform the world, 
where faith in religion would be replaced by scientific progress. Communism called 
for the abolition of private ownership over the means of production, state control of 
everyday life, and subordination of the individual to the power of bureaucracy. 
While the socialist ideal called for equality and the destruction of hierarchy, it 
especially targeted the privileges afforded to both the well-educated and religious 
institutions (Shafarevich, 1974, pp. 44, 53-54). The Soviet economy largely 
operated on plans from above rather than consumer demand from below. While 
very successful as a tool of industrialization, the planned economy did not 
necessarily promote individual initiative or innovation. It has been highly criticized 
for lacking quality and competitiveness. Solzhenitsyn (1974) criticized the 
communist state for usurping land ownership from peasants, political power from 
trade unions, and voice from minority communities (p. 11). 
Following World War II, “both the USSR and the United States perceived 
themselves as heading coalitions struggling for peace and justice against an evil and 
determined rival” (Donaldson et al., 2014, pp. 73-74). Under such a competitive 
nationalistic framework, the United States and Russia viewed compromise and 
accommodation as forms of unpatriotic treachery. Solzhenitsyn (1974) described 
the context thus: “not a single event in our life has been freely and comprehensively 
discussed, so that a true appreciation of it could be arrived at and solutions found” 
(p. ix). He called for the USSR and the United States to find common interests, to 
cease being antagonists, and ensure respect for human rights (Solzhenitsyn, 1974, 
p. 8). He was critical of unfettered freedom devoid of moral responsibility and 
immersed in protecting its own self-interests. He called for both social justice and 
the renunciation of violence, for freewill in joining the social contract.  
After Stalin died, Nikita Khrushchev took over denouncing Stalin in a secret 
speech and released 5 million people from the gulags (forced labor camps that 
housed mainly political prisoners). Khrushchev’s rule saw numerous challenges and 
confrontations including the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956), the Suez Canal 
crisis (1956), Sputnik and the space race (1957), the erection of the Berlin Wall 
(1961), and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).  
The Cold War began with stalemates dividing East and West Berlin and North 
and South Korea, leading to divisiveness in other parts of the world and increases 
in arms sales. The Cold War begins in the Middle East with the Suez Canal crisis. 
In 1955, Gamal Abdel Nasser obtained $200 million dollars of advanced Soviet 
weaponry from Czechoslovakia, a move that angered the United States, which then 
withdrew funding for the Aswan High Dam project leading to the 1956 
nationalization of the Suez Canal and the subsequent British, French, and Israeli 
attack on Egypt (Ahmed, 2011, p. 58). Weapons were the chief export of the USSR 
to the Third World (Donaldson et al., 2014, p. 86). In 1962, Soviet-supported Nasser 
began carrying out a proxy war in Yemen that spread into Saudi Arabia resulting in 
increased military support to Saudi Arabia from the United States (Bronson, 2006, 
pp. 85-88). U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East were to ensure access to oil 
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and prevent any hostile power from acquiring control over this resource. During the 
Cold War the Soviet Union was seen as the primary threat to those interests (Sick, 
2009, p. 295). In 1968, when the British announced their intention of reducing their 
presence in the Middle East, the United States looked to partner with Iran and Saudi 
Arabia in order to counter the threat of Soviet expansion. This Twin Pillars policy 
ignored the issue that both Iran and Saudi Arabia were unhappy with Israel’s 
aggressive stance in the Middle East. For Iran, the United States’ support for Israel 
was untenable; however, “the Saudi leadership considered its geostrategic 
competition with the Soviets and its relationship with the United States more 
important than the Arab-Israeli one, and viewed the United States as its long-term 
central partner in that larger struggle” (Bronson, 2006, p. 120). Saudi Arabia and 
the United States became partners against “Godless” communism. Saudi Arabia 
was the United States’ most important ally during the Cold War, assisting the 
United States to conduct proxy wars in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, 
Yemen, and the Sudan. The U.S.-Saudi partnership helped bankrupt the Soviet 
Union and contributed to its defeat in Afghanistan and losses in Africa (Bronson, 
2006, p. 203).  
Khrushchev was succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev in 1964. During the Brezhnev 
era, the major conflicts and issues included the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia (1968), the Vietnam War, war in Bangladesh (1971), Yom Kippur 
War (1973), SALT I & II ballistic missile agreements, war in Angola (1975), Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan (1979), and the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. 
It was estimated “that from 1950-1970, Soviet per capita food consumption 
doubled, disposable income quadrupled, the work week was shortened, welfare 
benefits increased, consumption of soft-goods tripled and purchases of hard-goods 
rose twelve-fold” (Smith, 1976, p. 58). By 1970, life expectancy reached 70 years 
and the Soviet Union had the highest ratio of doctors to population in the world. 
Furthermore, in 1974, 85% of all working-age women were employed, the highest 
percentage in the industrialized world (Smith, 1976, pp. 72, 130). However, by the 
late 1970s, there were significant signs of trouble. New York Times correspondent 
Hedrick Smith, in his 1976 book, The Russians, reported that the Soviet 
underground economy or black market grew out of the system’s inefficiencies, 
shortages, poor quality, and terrible delays in service (Smith, 1976, p. 86). 
Communism became a patronage system where who you knew and their 
administrative position in the party’s privileged class was decisive to improving 
one’s quality of life (Smith, 1976, p. 29).  
By the early 1980s the costs of war abroad had seriously undermined the Soviet 
economy fueling disillusionment if not despair at home. Between 1982 and 1985 
the USSR had three successive leadership changes. Mikhail Gorbachev was elected 
general secretary by the politburo in March 1985 inheriting dismal prospects̶most 
notably a stagnant economy, poor agricultural productivity, substandard housing, 
declining life expectancy, and rising infant mortality. His first unexpected crisis was 
the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in April 1986.  
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Perestroika and Glasnost 
 
Aimed at restructuring and not dismantling the Soviet system, Gorbachev’s 
perestroika (restructuring) reforms and glasnost (openness) campaigns required 
great courage as they nonetheless challenged the foundations of communist 
ideology. He recognized how military power and expenditures had been generally 
unproductive and that there was a need to shift focus and find a way to empower 
people to become more competitively engaged in the global economy. He was also 
particularly focused on curbing nuclear proliferation and the arms race. In the late 
1980s, Gorbachev began withdrawing troops from conflicts in Angola (1988) and 
Afghanistan (1989), ending military aid to Nicaragua (1989), sponsoring a cease-
fire in the Iran/Iraq war (1987), and encouraging Vietnam to withdraw troops from 
Cambodia (1989). 
The opening up of reforms in Soviet Russia soon spread in unexpected ways 
throughout the region. In the spring of 1989 Poland conducted elections with Lech 
Walesa’s Solidarity labor union winning the majority of contested seats; this was 
followed by a wave of mass demonstrations in Hungary, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, all leading to the ousting of Communist 
Party control and new elections. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and 
the reunification of Germany signaled an end to the Cold War as Gorbachev was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990.  
In 1991, concerned about the slow pace of reforms in Russia and the collapse 
of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, Russia became an 
independent state under pro-democracy President Boris Yeltsin, the first freely 
elected leader in Russian history, and soon thereafter formed the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), first with Belorussia and Ukraine and then adding 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Moldova, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Russia’s first order of business was to negotiate new 
relationships and promote economic integration with the former Soviet republics 
and gain acceptance/membership in organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, there 
were many hurdles and roadblocks to joining these European and global 
institutions, and the CIS proved to be a very loose federation with each of the 
members pursuing their own interests and memberships in these international 
organizations, and each establishing its own currency. Russia offered CIS nations 
below market prices for commodities such as oil and gas, asking in return that these 
countries not enter into external defense treaties or allow foreign military bases to 
be established in the region, but this tactic largely failed and soon Russia was 
increasing prices to assert greater control (Donaldson et al., 2014, p. 178). The 
Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) gained membership in the European 
Union in 2004 along with former Communist bloc countries of Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 
2007 and Croatia in 2013. More concerning to Russia, these countries also all joined 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance originally 
created to prevent a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Notably, Finland, which 
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has as much reason to distrust and fear Russia as any nation, is a member of the 
European Union but not of NATO. 
 
Conflicts in the Balkans and Caucasus Regions 
 
Continued NATO expansion was based on old fears of the potential for Russian 
aggression and was viewed by Russia as a broken promise that limited their 
influence in partnering to resolve regional conflicts. Immediately following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, several conflicts arose in the former republics 
including civil war in Tajikistan, two secessionist movements in Georgia (South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia), the war over Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, and the independence struggle of the Trans-Dniester region in Moldova, 
all of which contributed to these fears and to declining regional trade. The total 
volume of trade between Russia and the former Soviet Republics dropped by half 
between 1989 and 1993. In 1992-93, despite pledges of a $1.6 billion assistance 
package from the United States and a ten-year deferral on debt obligations, Russia 
continued to experience severe economic hardships, hyperinflation, unemployment, 
and reduction in social services (Donaldson et al., 2014, pp. 170, 237-238, 252, 
257). It is estimated that by mid-1993, more than 40 million Russians were living 
below the poverty line.  
The biggest conflicts in the region testing the evolving relationship between 
Russia and the West (NATO) were the wars in the Balkans and the war in Chechnya. 
The West did not question the right of Russia to assert authority over Chechnya but 
it did object to the brutality of fighting forces and the killing of civilians. Russia 
charged that the violations of human rights were being committed by Chechen 
rebels. The two-year war in Chechnya ended in 1994 with a compromise agreement 
providing some local autonomy to the region. However, the failure of Russian 
troops to win the war contributed to a gradual decline in Yeltsin’s popularity as he 
was increasingly viewed as inept and weak, capitulating to Western demands. 
(Indeed, the West was treating Russia this way in its refusal to involve them more 
closely in actions in Kosovo.) Yeltsin was also increasingly seen as undemocratic 
following a Constitutional crisis and legislative power-struggle that included his 
impeachment and bombardment of the Russian White House in 1993.  
Terrorist attacks by Chechen rebels involving over 2,000 hostages at hospitals 
in Budyonnovsk in 1995, and Kizlar in 1996 continued to force the question of how 
to deal with the region. In 1997, Yeltsin and Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov 
signed an agreement that was to extend autonomy, end hostilities, and follow the 
rules of law. Of special note, Chechnya is strategically important because it 
provides a vital link in the flow of oil from Baku, Azerbaijan, to the Black Sea port 
of Novorossik (Donaldson et al., 2014, pp. 240-245, 264). Comparatively, the level 
of concern and regulation over the placement of oil and gas infrastructure between 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico as regards to environmental protection and 
impact studies pales with the security risks and economic competition over the 
placement of oil and gas pipelines in the Baltic, Caucasus, Caspian Sea, and Central 
Asia regions. Throughout the region of the former Soviet Republics, the process of 
controlling oil and gas resources and supply pipelines is highly contested. 
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Oligarchs and a Powerful Petro State 
 
More recently, economic growth was accompanied by the rise of oligarchs, a small 
number of people who gained control of a large share of what had earlier been state 
assets as the Soviet economy privatized. The means by which they gained control 
has also been called into serious question. Jerrold Schecter (1998) noted that “six 
hundred bankers and business people have been killed since the fall of the Soviet 
Union” (p. 13). Some of these oligarchs have treated Russia like their own personal 
property while others invested in building a stronger civil society through 
supporting democratic institutions such as a free press (Gessen, 2012a, pp. 124-
134). A number of high profile corruption and murder cases have emerged in recent 
years including cases involving not just oligarchs but also political dissidents such 
as: the arrests of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, Dmitry 
Rozhdestvensky, Pussy Riot, and Alexei Navalny, and the deaths of Sergei 
Yushenkov, Alexander Litvinenko, Boris Berezovsky, Galina Starovoitova, Anna 
Politkovskaya, Sergei Magnitsky, and Boris Nemtsov. 
Helped by soaring revenues of petroleum exports, the rise of Vladimir Putin 
has been largely ascribed to his success in responding to the “dizzying economic 
decline of the early 1990s [that] produced a profound sense of national humiliation” 
(Donaldson et al., 2014, p. 117). 
In 1999, Chechnya invaded the Dagestan region of Russia and Yeltsin 
appointed Vladimir Putin to put down the incursion. This was followed by several 
terrorist bombings in different cities across Russia including two in Moscow that 
resulted in more than 100 deaths and led Putin to initiate a full-scale war on 
Chechnya producing hundreds of thousands of refugees (Gessen, 2012a, pp. 23-27). 
Later that year, Yeltsin resigned and Putin became his successor. Putin won the 
election for president in 2000.  
Beyond the important policy differences on the wars in Kosovo, Libya, and 
Iraq, NATO enlargement, and attempts to establish U.S. military bases and missile 
defense systems in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Putin has generally been 
supportive of developing good bilateral relations with the United States. This is best 
exemplified through Russia’s support for the war on terrorism. At the same time, 
Putin has insisted that Russia’s role in regional and world affairs be recognized.  
Since he became president, Vladimir Putin has worked to concentrate power and 
eliminate critics and competitors. As one of his vocal critics has observed, “three 
months after his inauguration, two of the country’s wealthiest men had been 
stripped of their influence and effectively kicked out of the country [and] less than 
a year after Putin came to power, all three federal television networks were 
controlled by the state” (Gessen, 2012a, p. 174).  
After 9/11, the war against Chechnya was largely portrayed as part of the 
West’s war on Islamic fundamentalist terrorism (Gessen, 2012a, p. 229). The 2004 
hostage crisis at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, in which 342 mostly children 
were killed was followed by “Putin’s decision to centralize Moscow’s control over 
Russia’s regions by discarding the popular election of regional governors and 
republic presidents” (Donaldson et al., 2014, p. 384).  
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Russia’s growing economic success and Putin’s efforts to take back control 
from the oligarchs was largely touted among the emerging BRIC countries’ 
multipolar world (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) (Gessen, 2012a, p. 243). The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization was another sign of Russia’s attempts to 
develop strong regional partnerships. Putin won a landslide victory for re-election 
in 2004. In 2008, Dmitry Medvedev became president and appointed Putin prime 
minister as he was ineligible to run for a third consecutive term.  
Today, “most economic production is in private hands, the ruble is fully 
convertible, and prices are free to fluctuate with supply and demand” (Donaldson 
et al., 2014, p. 9). Russia also has a large domestic market and well-educated 
workforce. Russia has joined the IMF and WTO but continues to be very dependent 
on oil and gas revenues which have been subject to significant price fluctuations 
effecting economic stability. Gazprom has a near monopoly on natural gas 
production and transport in Russia and about 17% of the world gas production, 18% 
of estimated reserves, and 15% of the global transport network (Donaldson et al., 
2014, p. 150). Unfortunately, Russia has poor protection of property rights, 
relatively high levels of corruption, increasing state ownership, and an 
unpredictable judicial system (Guriev, 2016, pp. 21-22). Prospects for Russia’s 
future economic growth are unclear and will depend largely on the degree of 
improvement in regional trade relations, legal protections, and controlled 
government spending.  
 
Syria and Ukraine 
 
Lukyanov (2016) wrote,  
 
In February [2016], Moscow and Washington issued a joint statement 
announcing the terms of a ‘cessation of hostilities’ in Syria agreed to by 
major world powers, regional players, and most of the participants in the 
Syrian civil war … Even as it worked with Russia on the truce, the United 
States continued to enforce the sanctions it had placed on Russia in 
response to the 2014 annexation of Crimea. (p. 30) 
 
Russia’s actions in Crimea and in Syria represent in part a response to U.S. 
aggression around the world since the end of the Cold War and what it generally 
views as an overly assertive U.S. foreign policy (Lukyanov, 2016, pp. 32-35). Many 
Russians see Putin’s annexation of Crimea “as righting a historical injustice and 
reclaiming Russia’s status as a world power” (Lipman, 2016, p. 44). But Russia 
needs to develop good relations with Ukraine and its other neighbors through 
diplomacy not force of arms. The biggest threats to Russia are not European 
expansionism and certainly not the ambitions of neighbors and important potential 
trading partners like Ukraine; rather it stems from on-going destabilizing conflict in 
the Middle East. In many ways, the West needs a stable Russian military presence 
in Sevastopol (it had a lease agreement through 2042) which makes Russia’s 
aggression in Crimea, the Ukraine, and even Syria all the more troubling. Russia 
has played and can play a productive role in Syria as it did with the removal of 
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chemical weapons. It would be interesting to consider what influence the Moscow 
Patriarchate might have in regards to policies or relief efforts on behalf of Syrian 
Orthodox Christians. Russia’s Middle East relations are critically important in 
resolving conflicts there, especially its relations with Turkey and Iran. Therefore, it 
is critical the United States and Russia come together over strategic policy in Syria. 
There will not be real or lasting security in the region without stable cooperation 
with Russia.  
 
Conclusion 
 
To summarize some of the main points of this introduction, Russia has tended to 
have strong leaders with centralized control. It is a predominantly Christian society 
with diverse ethnic populations and neighbors. It has suffered and sacrificed greatly 
through serfdom, war, and famine but remained very patriotic, hard-working, and 
high-achieving in both science and the arts. It has been very conscious of protecting 
its interests through strategic defense and diplomacy working to maintain a balance-
of-power approach in its foreign policy and international relations.  
The storied history of U.S.-Russia relations over the last century, epitomized 
by the Cold War era, has often been antagonistic resulting in disastrous third world 
proxy wars, a tragic and wasteful consequence. Real collaboration in joint problem-
solving efforts has been lacking, collaboration in space exploration being one 
exception and disarmament another. Direct trade with Russia has also been limited.  
There is a great deal of trauma and tragedy in Russia’s history and current 
context that give cause for caution and concern (the same is true for most countries 
including the United States and its genocide of Native Americans, slavery, Vietnam, 
and Iraq), but these faults and mistakes need not define the future. We must learn 
from such mistakes rather than allowing them to become self-fulfilling prophecies 
where participants become complicit in a never-ending narrative of distrust and 
fear. As noted in this essay, it has been asserted that “centuries of invasion from 
both east and west engendered fear and distrust of the outside world” by Russia 
(Schecter, 1998, p. 26) but such circumstances have also promoted a strategy 
emphasizing a desire to form alliances and mutually beneficial relationships to 
weather such storms. Generally speaking, in global affairs, we should be looking to 
societies’ strengths for answers, not the weaknesses for excuses. A paradigm shift 
from a worldview of competing empires to one of mutual responsibility is critically 
needed.  
Rather than blaming others, people and nations need to recognize the creative 
power of collaboration across communities and cultures. War is costly and wasteful 
but we should not think that building coalitions and relationships is inexpensive or 
easily accomplished. It takes time and patience to develop trust and understanding. 
As this issue goes to publication, investigations continue into the Trump 
campaign and its possible collusion with Russia to influence the U.S. presidential 
election. Regardless of the role of the Trump campaign, there does appear to be 
evidence of Russia’s involvement in trying to influence American voters especially 
through social media platforms. It is not unusual or unheard of for foreign 
governments to try to interfere or influence the outcomes of elections. According to 
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Dov Levin of Carnegie Mellon University, the United States has done so more than 
80 times worldwide between 1946 and 2000 (NPR, 2016). One thing that makes the 
current case different are the new tools available for carrying out such cyber-attacks. 
The use of social media that involves Americans themselves in spreading 
misinformation seems aimed at dividing society against itself. In many ways, we 
should be less worried about whether democrats or republicans win an election (as 
both are American parties that despite differences should have America’s best 
interests at heart), and more concerned about issues of bipartisanship in support of 
the union. When the issue first emerged, Stephen Cohen (2017) wrote,  
 
The allegations are driven by political forces with various agendas: the 
Hillary Clinton wing of the Democratic Party, which wants to maintain its 
grip on the party by insisting that she didn’t lose the election but that it was 
stolen by Russian President Vladimir Putin for Trump; by enemies of 
Trump’s proposed détente with Russia, who want to discredit both him and 
Putin; and by Republicans and Democrats stunned that Trump essentially 
ran and won without either party, thereby threatening the established two-
party system. (n.p.)  
 
More recently, Masha Gessen (2012b) wrote that there is no reason to believe that 
“a tiny drop in the sea of Facebook ads changed any American votes” but a more 
likely explanation is that “a great many Americans want to prove that the Russians 
elected Trump, and Americans did not” (n.p.). The current crisis seems to have more 
to do with the new tools of social media and American divisiveness at home as it 
has to do with foreign affairs. Given the relentless ubiquity of access to the 24-hour 
news cycle on our mobile devices, the American public needs to learn how to 
become more responsible and discerning users of media technology. At the same 
time, these phenomena also underscore just how much we live in a global society 
and how much we have to learn about living cooperatively for the common good in 
such a world. 
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Abstract 
 
In light of newly released archival resources, this article examines the traditional 
historiography of Soviet-American relations focusing on economic relations at the 
end of World War II. 
 
 
The Cold War had an immense impact on the historical development of the world 
in the second half of the twentieth century, and its consequences continue to 
influence international relations. Examining the origins of the Cold War, the role of 
the U.S.S.R., and the United States in waging it remains highly relevant and topical 
today. 
This study reveals the intensions of the Soviet government to participate in 
international economic cooperation at the end of World War II, undermining the 
distorted Cold War view of the 1950s-1980s propagated by both Soviet and Western 
propaganda. This new understanding is partly explained by the fact that the bulk of 
the documents had been for a long time unavailable to researchers.1 Meanwhile, it 
shows that the history of Soviet-American relations and particularly that of the 
period considered is not indisputable. Nor should such studies be limited to the 
political problems that have traditionally been the focus of such scholarship. These 
enduring stereotypes significantly impede an impartial assessment of the current 
state of Russian-American relations. The paper further demonstrates how 
diplomatic missteps, fears, and hesitations contributed to the beginning of a long 
disastrous period in international relations known as the Cold War.  
Economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States in 1944–1946 
cover a significant range of issues: the settlement of deliveries under the Lend-
Lease Agreement; the question of the American loan to the U.S.S.R.; and the 
                                                           
1 A significant bulk of the documents was declassified in 1992 but they are not freely 
available. They are preserved in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation which can be accessed only with a special license. Unfortunately, the researcher 
will not necessarily receive the documents he or she needs but only the documents that the 
keepers find appropriate to serve out. Many documents are still under seal. 
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American initiative to create several international economic and financial 
institutions including the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank, and 
the International Trade Organization, and the Soviet participation in these 
organizations. 
It should be noted that neither the Soviet nor the American leadership had a 
unified position on any of these issues. Within three years, 1944–1946, Washington 
had changed its attitude to the very consideration of the issues listed above: one day 
they were planned to be discussed all together, another day, strictly separately. From 
the beginning of the talks the Soviet Government declared its desire to discuss each 
issue separately, but in the process it agreed to unite some of them into blocks. 
 
Background 
 
During the Second World War the future of international economic cooperation was 
addressed in the Atlantic Charter and the Lend-Lease Master Agreement, but it was 
more precisely taken up only at the Moscow Conference of the Allied powers in 
late 1943. This conference was preceded by exchange of memoranda from both 
American and Soviet sides regarding the necessity to start bilateral confidential 
negotiations on major problems of post-war economic development (AVPRF 624, 
1–2). On November 1, 1943, the Soviet, U.S., and British foreign ministers signed 
a secret protocol containing 10 annexes. The ninth annex was entitled “The bases 
of our program for international economic cooperation” (FRUS, 1943, pp. 763–
766). This program contained a list of issues that the “Big Three” considered the 
most important not only for the normalization of international economic 
cooperation, but also for the success of the post-war system of international 
relations as a whole. The list was topped by the expansion of international trade on 
a non-discriminatory basis and the regulation of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
in goods, as well as the establishment of solid international currency exchange rates 
and the organization of currency exchange. 
The Americans and a lesser extent, the British, took the laboring oar in 
developing draft proposals on these issues. In the Soviet Union the People’s 
Commissariats of Finance (Narkomfin) and Foreign Trade (NKVT), in co-operation 
with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) also worked on the 
Soviet position regarding post-war international economic relations. 
The American proposals regarding the development of international trade led 
to the drafting of the Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). It was 
signed by 53 countries at the UN Conference on Trade and Employment on March 
24, 1948, but never ratified by the United States and, therefore, most of the other 
signatory countries (Minkova, 2006, pp. 118-120). As for the establishment of fixed 
exchange rates and the organization of free currency exchange, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) were founded in the aftermath of the United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 
July 1944. 
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The Settlement of Deliveries under the Lend-Lease Agreement 
 
On May 12, 1945, the Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew sent Soviet chargé 
d’affaires in Washington Nikolay Novikov a note informing the Soviet government 
that "the shipment of supplies under the current program of Lend-Lease will be 
immediately modified in view of the end of organized hostilities in Europe" (FRUS, 
1945, pp. 1000–1001). The Soviet side was completely unprepared for this message 
(the answering note stated that “The note referred to and the discontinuance of 
deliveries have come as a complete surprise to the Soviet Government” (AVPRF 
702, 1), and reacted very negatively. This perception of the situation settled deeply 
both in Soviet/Russian and American historiography becoming the basis of many 
false assumptions. To begin with, this note was considered authentic evidence of 
the abrupt change of U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union after the death of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (Fleming, 1961, p. 269; Herring, 1973, p. 181; Pechatnov, 
2006, p. 328). As a matter of fact the situation was completely different. Firstly, the 
United States was considering a program of post-war assistance to the Soviet Union 
since 1943 (FRUS, 1945, p. 937). Secondly, Washington was determined to fully 
implement its commitments on deliveries in the framework of the Fourth Protocol 
to the Lend-Lease Agreement and negotiate the Fifth Protocol, as State Department 
repeatedly notified the Soviet embassy in various documents (AVPRF 624, 13–14; 
FRUS, 1944, pp. 1032, 1084). Third, the termination of supplies under the Lend-
Lease Agreement stemmed from the wording of the U.S. Lend-Lease Act, 
according to which the deliveries under this program were to be ceased with the end 
of hostilities. 
Further delays in the talks on this issue ended with the signing of the 
“Agreement between the Governments of the US and the U.S.S.R. on the 
disposition of lend-lease supplies in inventory or procurement in the United States” 
(United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, p. 2819–2822) on 
October 15, 1945. The delays were mostly caused by the actions of the Soviet 
leadership which greatly delayed answering notes and other messages in the 
framework of negotiations. In addition, the U.S. side interpreted the Soviet violation 
of the Article III of Mutual Aid Agreement from June 11, 1942, as an inappropriate 
and egregious breach of trust. This article prohibited the Soviet government “to 
transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information, 
transferred to it under the Act of March 11, 1941, of the Congress of the United 
States of America, or permit the use thereof by any one not an officer, employee, or 
agent of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (Mutual Aid 
Agreement). Meanwhile, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow Averell Harriman 
reported to the State Department in March 1945 that Stalin had presented Poland 
with 500 trucks received by lend-lease. Another 1,000 trucks were "donated" by the 
Red Army to Łódź. In addition, Harriman mentioned deliveries of lend-lease flour 
to Poland and sugar to Finland (FRUS, 1945, p. 990). 
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The Negotiations over the U.S. Loan to the U.S.S.R. 
 
The idea of granting the Soviet Union a credit worth several billion U.S. dollars for 
post-war reconstruction emerged in the U.S. Treasury even before an official 
request from the Soviet side. Throughout 1944, Trade Secretary Henry Morgenthau, 
Jr. repeatedly discussed with various U.S. officials the possibility of giving such a 
loan to the Soviet Union (FRUS, 1945, pp. 938-939). 
The official request from the Soviet leadership was set out in the memorandum 
handed to Harriman by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyatcheslav 
Molotov on January 3, 1945. The Soviet Government asked for a $6 billion credit 
for a period of 30 years at a 2.5% interest rate to purchase American industrial 
products and equipment required for the speedy restoration of their war-ravaged 
economy (AVPRF 29, p. 1). The reaction to this request came immediately: on 
January 6, 1945, Harriman wrote to then Secretary of State Edward Stettinius: "It is 
my basic conviction that we should do everything we can to assist the Soviet Union 
through credits in developing a sound economy. I feel strongly that the sooner the 
Soviet Union can develop a decent life for its people the more tolerant they will 
become" (FRUS, 1945, p. 947). At the same time Harriman insisted that 
negotiations on credit came completely separate from the negotiations on the lend-
lease settlement.  
On January 10, 1945, Secretary of Trade Morgenthau sent a memorandum to 
Roosevelt proposing to grant the Soviet Union a $10 billion credit for 35 years at 
2% interest rate (FRUS, 1945, p. 948). Appropriate attention should be given to the 
uniqueness of this situation: the U.S. government, in fact, showed willingness to 
provide the U.S.S.R. with a larger credit on more favorable terms and for a longer 
period than requested! 
However, it is here where the first difficulties emerged. The Soviet side insisted 
on discussing the loan jointly with the settlement of the Lend-Lease Act, 
considering it virtually one question. In the United States the State Department 
began debating on the form of the credit, conditions of its granting and, most 
importantly, on how to make Congress adopt relevant legislation to realize the 
procedure. Unable to find a quick compromise with the Soviet leadership the United 
States suspended deliveries under the Fourth Protocol to the Lend-Lease 
Agreement. Both sides found themselves frustrated. 
If the Soviet Union were to enter the war with Japan it would be in the need of 
supplies under the Fourth Protocol; but until then the State Department could not 
justify the need of their renewal to the Congress. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
Joseph C. Grew communicated this problem to Soviet charge d'affaires in the 
United States Nikolay Novikov in a note dated June 26, 1945 (FRUS, 1945, pp. 
1027-1028). However, the next day Grew sent Novikov another note informing the 
latter about the possibility of delivering to the U.S.S.R. those goods from the list 
submitted by the Soviet side which could be found and prepared to ship by August 
31, 1945. In a note dated July 17, 1945, this period was extended for one month 
(FRUS, 1945, pp. 1029-1030). 
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By this time the balance of power between the Allied Powers shifted 
significantly. The successful nuclear test of July 1945 made the United States and 
its President Harry Truman feel that they now occupied a unique position in post-
war international relations. Being sure that the Soviet physicists would need another 
15-20 years to develop their own nuclear bomb, President Truman began acting 
abruptly. In his famous letter to the U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes, he 
confessed that he was “tired of babying the Soviets” (Truman, 1955, pp. 551–552). 
Hence in any negotiations the American side stopped seeking compromise. The 
question of credit was firmly tied to other problems in the economic relations 
between the two countries. In a memo of General Wesson, Director of the U.S.S.R. 
Branch of Foreign Economic Administration to its Administrator L. Crowley the 
former stressed the need to conclude a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement, an agreement 
on fishing rights in the Bering Sea and around the Aleutian Islands, and to settle 
violations of the Article III of the Lend-Lease Agreement mentioned above. 
Repeated U.S. notes to the Soviet leadership were left unanswered and Moscow did 
not terminate supplies of the lend-lease goods and equipment to third countries 
(FRUS, 1945, pp. 1038-1039). Meanwhile, the protracted negotiations between 
different U.S. administrations left Soviet requests for American credit unanswered. 
Stalin commented on this situation at a meeting with Senator Pepper and other 
American Congressmen in Moscow in September (Kennan, 1967, p. 179). Given 
the urgency of Soviet requests, it is further notable that it was not until August 9, 
1945, that Harriman informed the Soviet leadership on the introduction of the U.S. 
law authorizing the Export-Import Bank to provide loans to other countries 
(AVPRF 669, p. 67). 
The signing of the already mentioned Agreement on lend-lease supplies on 
October 15, 1945, was the last success in the Soviet-American talks on economic 
issues. After that the negotiations stalled despite the persistent interest from both 
the Soviet and American sides. On December 21, Harriman sent James Byrnes a 
telegram stating that “Little information has been received by this Embassy 
regarding our over-all economic policy towards the Soviet Union and particularly 
as it relates to Soviet economic policies .... Since Soviet political policy appears to 
be influenced by economic objectives it would seem that we should give at this time 
greater attention to the concerting of our economic policy with our political policy 
towards the Soviet Union” (FRUS, 1945, p. 1049). 
 
The U.S.S.R. & the Creation of the International Trade Organization 
 
Harriman’s telegram to Washington was well received. The same day, December 
21, Harriman forwarded to Molotov’s deputy A. Vyshinsky “Proposals for the 
expansion of world trade and employment.” Similar texts were sent to 13 other 
countries two weeks prior (AVPRF 47, pp. 137–139). Being the result of an 
exhaustive bargaining between Washington and London, the “Proposals” were a 
clear expression of the American view of the post-war economic order. The Soviet 
Government was asked whether it would agree to participate in the negotiations 
scheduled for March or April 1946. This document caused a major stir in the NKID 
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and NKVT that had already developed their own views on post-war organization of 
international trade. By December 31, 1945, the “Proposals” have been carefully 
studied in several departments of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. 
That day Molotov received a memo “On the US proposals to expand world trade 
and employment” (AVPRF, 700), signed by one of his deputies, Amazasp 
Arutyunyan, and the head of the NKID economic department Vladimir 
Gerashchenko. The letter briefly considered the American proposals for the 
preparation of an international conference on trade and employment, which was 
supposed to convene in the summer of 1946 under the aegis of the UN. In addition, 
the letter contained a summary of the basic principles of the Charter of the World 
Organization Trade and Employment. Arutyunyan and Gerashchenko wrote, “The 
American proposals to expand trade and employment – in particular as regards our 
foreign trade are largely unacceptable for us” (AVPRF 700, p. 3). However, they 
would find it possible to agree to participate in the preliminary discussions in March 
and April 1946 on the issues of world trade and employment, “not being bound, 
however, by any obligations with respect to our participation in the World 
Conference on trade and employment”( AVPRF 700, p. 3). They concluded that 
Soviet participation in the “said preliminary discussion of the US proposals on 
world trade” was advisable “regardless of whether we participate or not in the 
projected global organization” (AVPRF 700, p. 4).  
These officials substantiated the need for the Soviet Union's participation in the 
talks by the fact that even in the case of a decision not to participate in the activities 
of the ITO, it would have been advisable to try removing from its charter provisions 
any aspects disadvantageous for the U.S.S.R., in order to test American, British, 
and other participants’ intentions in the negotiations as well as to examine the 
current state of trade and economic contradictions etc. If, however, Soviet 
participation in the Organization would be recognized in the future as desirable, 
participation in the preliminary discussions of the proposals for the conference, 
which would resolve the issue of the creation of the International Organization on 
Trade and Employment, would be all the more important (AVPRF 700). On January 
3, 1946, Molotov forwarded this letter and the “Proposals” to his other deputy, 
Vladimir Dekanozov with the following note: “Please, present the project agreed 
with Comrade Mikoyan” (AVPRF 700, p. 1). All internal correspondence was 
classified as “secret”. 
During January and February 1946 both NKID and NKVT were actively 
studying American proposals and their potential impact on the Soviet economy, 
Soviet-American relations and the U.S.S.R.'s position in the post-war world. 
However, at that time Moscow did not produce any response to the “Proposals.” 
The consequences were disastrous. On February 21, 1946, Byrnes sent to Soviet 
charge d'affaires in Washington Fyodor Orekhov a note stating that from that day, 
all economic questions between the two countries would only be negotiated 
together. By that time this list of questions included: 
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(1) Claims of American nationals against the government of the U.S.S.R., 
including claims arising from actions of the U.S.S.R. in occupied and 
liberated areas; 
(2) Determining the concerted policy to be followed by the United States, 
U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom in assisting the peoples liberated 
from the domination of Nazi Germany, and the peoples of the former 
Axis satellite states of Europe to solve their pressing economic 
problems by democratic means;  
(3) Arrangements of free, equal, and open navigation on rivers of 
international concern to individuals, commercial vessels, and goods 
of all members of the United Nations; 
(4) Preliminary discussions of a comprehensive treaty of friendship, 
commerce, and navigation between the United States and the 
U.S.S.R., and agreement to enter into negotiations in the near future 
for the conclusion of such a treaty; 
(5) Arrangements to assure the adequate protection of the interests of the 
writers and inventors and other copyright holders; 
(6) Methods for giving effect to the United States “Proposals for 
Expansion of World Trade and Employment” transmitted to the 
Soviet leadership on December 21, 1945 (the date of transmission was 
surely put intentionally to show Soviet unwillingness to co-operation 
in this project of ultimate international importance); 
(7) General settlement of lend-lease obligations in accordance with the 
provisions of the Lend-Lease Agreement on the basis of an inventory 
of lend-lease supplies in the possession of the U.S.S.R. or subject to 
its control at the end of hostilities; 
(8) Civil aviation matters of mutual interest to the two countries; 
(9) Discussion of other economic questions (FRUS, 1946, pp. 828-829). 
 
It took the Soviet side almost a month to work out a suitable reply to that note. 
In his memoirs the then People's Commissar for Foreign Trade Anastas Mikoyan 
sparingly explained the reasons of such delay: “It was to our disadvantage, because 
for credits they wanted us to make concessions on other issues, that we were not 
ready to make decisions on” (Mikoyan, 1999, p. 495). Thus, only on March 15, 
1946, Novikov informed Byrnes that the Soviet government agreed to discuss with 
the following questions: the amount and terms of credit; the conclusion of a treaty 
of friendship, commerce, and navigation; methods for giving effect to the provisions 
of Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement; and the question of lend-lease 
supplies. As for other issues, the Soviet Government did not consider it “expedient 
to connect the discussion of any other questions with the discussion on credit” but 
expressed its willingness to discuss them at a time and place to be agreed upon by 
both parties (FRUS, 1946, pp. 829-830). 
This time it was the U.S. leadership that took over a month to reply. On April 
18, 1946, in a note to Novikov, Byrnes welcomed the readiness of the Soviet side 
to discuss the issues listed in the note from March 15. However, Washington 
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considered three matters not included in the Soviet list–that is the claims of 
American nationals against the government of the U.S.S.R; the concerted policies 
for economic assistance for liberated nations and the protection of intellectual 
property–closely connected with the issues that the Soviet Union government has 
already agreed to discuss immediately. He therefore suggested starting negotiations 
on these issues on May 15 in Washington, and on the technical aspects of lend-lease 
supplies–10 days before. Later on Byrnes expressed his pleasure from noticing the 
presence of a Soviet observer in the first meetings of the Boards of Governors of 
the IMF and IBRD, and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would soon 
become a member of these organizations and participate in their activity (FRUS, 
1946, pp. 834–837). 
The Soviet experts from NKVT took about a month to finalize the answering 
note. On May 17, Novikov communicated to the Acting Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson a note repeating almost word for word the text of the Soviet note of March 
15. The only exception was the date–the Soviet side agreed to begin negotiations in 
May that year (already late for a few days to the date proposed earlier by the 
Americans)–and the addition of the question of navigation on the rivers and civil 
aviation to the discussion agenda. As for other issues of American concern, the 
Soviet leadership repeated its position that they had not been directly connected to 
key issues it agreed to discuss, but again expressed its willingness to start a 
preliminary exchange of views on an agreed date (FRUS, 1946, pp. 841–842). 
On May 23, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs W. Clayton 
received from the Office of Financial and Development Policy a memorandum 
containing new measures for the response to the Soviets. It proposed two scenarios 
for further actions: 
 
1. To make use of the phrasing in the Soviet notes, and to suspend the 
negotiations on credit; and 
2. To defer discussions of a larger loan in the Congress until there is a 
guarantee of the successful completion of negotiations with the 
U.S.S.R. while providing the Soviet Union with a minor credit of $ 
250-500 mln from free sums of Export-Import Bank (FRUS, 1946, pp. 
842–843). 
 
The United States’ response followed in another month arriving only on June 
13. Byrnes still insisted on the simultaneous discussion of all economic issues and 
appointed a new date for the commencement of negotiations–July 10, 1946 (FRUS, 
1946, pp. 844–845). At the very bottom of the note it was stated that the U.S. 
government would be grateful for a quick response–a very clear allusion to the fact 
that there had been no progress in negotiations for six months. Meanwhile, 
representatives of 19 countries had already been actively working out the draft 
Charter of the ITO, the discussion of which was due to begin on October 15 in 
Geneva (Minkova, 2006, p. 111). 
At the end of June 1946, the U.S. State Department prepared a draft of a new 
lend-lease agreement that the United States had hoped to discuss with the Soviet 
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Union and sign in a short time. However, no reaction to the note from June 13 
followed from the Soviet side until early September. By then the State Department 
had to admit the need to offer Moscow separate talks on the Lend-Lease Agreement 
to get it off the ground and achieve at least some kind of positive result. William 
Clayton sent the corresponding note to Fyodor Orekhov on September 14, 1946. In 
addition, U.S. officials regarded these negotiations as a means to win back three 
American icebreakers transferred to the Soviet Union by lend-lease. Instead of 
being returned to the United States after the end of hostilities, these vessels were 
illegally held by the Soviets in violation of all agreements. 
Clayton’s note remained unanswered. On December 31, 1946, the U.S. 
ambassador to the U.S.S.R. W. B. Smith had to “remind” Molotov about it (FRUS, 
1946, p. 865). 
It should be stressed that in reality the Soviet attitude to the American proposals 
was by no means so indifferent as it may seem from the correspondence discussed 
above. It is true that in accordance with Anastas Mikoyan recollections the Lend-
Lease Agreement did not represent any interest to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet 
leadership did everything possible to hold up talks on this issue (Mikoyan, 1999, p. 
495). However, Moscow regarded an invitation to participate in the negotiations on 
the ITO as extremely important. The American “Proposals” had been carefully 
studied in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, and approximately 
since the end of May 1946 the Ministry of Foreign Trade started developing detailed 
guidelines (“directives”) for the Soviet delegation to participate in working out the 
draft Charter of the ITO. Beside a very detailed analysis with a separate conclusion 
on every paragraph of the “Proposals for the expansion of world trade and 
employment,” and a draft of the ITO Charter in its version from December 1945, 
these guidelines contained positions on all the economic issues listed in the note 
from February 21. These directives had even been approved by a special resolution 
carried by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) 
(RGASPI 28, 68–173). Another proof of the great desire of the Soviet leadership to 
take an active role in multilateral talks could be found in the renaming of the 
Council of the People's Commissars to the Council of Ministers and the People's 
Commissariats to the Ministries in March 1946 in order to conform to international 
standards (Law on Transformation, 1946). Some groups within the American 
leadership and academia had also been confident about the potential participation 
of the Soviet Union in the post-war economic cooperation, especially in the 
activities of the IMF and the ITO talks. This attitude survived Churchill’s famous 
Fulton speech and lived up to mid-1947. In May 1947, the respected journal The 
American Economic Review published an article authored by a famous American 
historian and economist Alexander Gerschenkron (1947) entitled “Russia and the 
International Trade Organization.” This article analyzed in considerable detail the 
applicability of each article of the draft ITO Charter to the economic and political 
situation in the U.S.S.R. In conclusion, Gerschenkron (1947) expressed confidence 
that Soviet participation in the ITO would contribute to “laying the basis of peaceful 
economic collaboration between different economic worlds” (p. 642). 
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The Participation of the U.S.S.R. in the IMF and World Bank 
 
In early 1944, active talks were held between the Soviet and American experts 
regarding the basic principles of the IMF. Although almost every amendment 
proposed by the Soviet side had been declined by the Americans, in the middle of 
March 1944, the latter made counter-proposals for virtually all the points in 
question: the ruble exchange rate; the discount in contribution in gold for the 
countries severely damaged by war; the amount of basic economic information to 
be presented to the Fund; and the executive force of the Fund’s decisions. However, 
at that stage of the talks the Soviet experts concluded that the Soviet Union would 
not get any economic gains from participation in the IMF, which would have only 
political importance for securing Soviet influence in international affairs (AVPRF 
171, 10). 
The Soviet leadership was eager to play a major role in the post-war economic 
and political order. This made Moscow agree to some clearly disadvantageous 
concessions to remain on board of economic negotiations. It is my belief that Stalin 
was not fully aware of all the complexity of the big economic and political game 
between the United States and Great Britain, which gained momentum in 1943. 
While the latter was struggling to save the remnants of its empire and was 
bargaining madly for credits vitally important for its survival, the former were 
clearly demanding the role of a world leader. For example, no Soviet documents 
show any hint of the Soviet understanding of the role of Canada in this bargaining, 
though in 1944 negotiations with Canada on economic issues were clearly more 
important to the United States than those with the U.S.S.R. Thus, in American 
documents the concern over the terms of the British-Canadian bacon contract 
outranks the Soviet-American discrepancy in the basic principles of the IMF 
activity (FRUS, 1944, pp. 50, 60, 78, 89).  
In July 1944, Soviet representatives attended the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, where the Soviet delegation made some 
further concessions to the American proposals by agreement with the Kremlin. On 
July 22, 1944, the chair of the delegation Mikhail Stepanov signed the Final Act 
along with the delegates from other 43 Allied Nations. Immediately after the 
Conference, the Soviet delegation submitted detailed observations on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the Soviet Union's membership in these 
organizations to the NKID, NKVT, Narkomfin, and the State Bank (Gosbank). 
Apparently, this question was consistently mooted in the NKID, NKVT, 
Narkomfin, and Gosbank throughout the entirety of 1945 (AVPRF 197, 1–4, 10–
18; AVPRF 194, 196–205).  
Documents deposited in the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation 
suggest that the U.S.S.R. was about to join both the IMF and International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) until December 31, 1945. In particular, 
the collection includes a draft Resolution of the Politburo “On accession of the 
U.S.S.R. to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development,” and the findings of a special commission 
authorized by a decree of the Council of People’s Commissars from March 5, 1945, 
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to develop proposals regarding the possible participation of the U.S.S.R. in the 
International Monetary Fund and the IBRD. This commission concluded its work 
on November 27, 1945, with recommendations to the Soviet leadership to join the 
IMF before December 31 as the entry conditions after that date were to be 
determined by the Fund (AVPRF 194, 200). 
However, during 1945 the position of the Soviet government to joining the IMF 
changed dramatically. Rapidly worsening relations with the United States made 
Stalin feel at a loss. The necessity to completely review his foreign policy led him 
to make some poor decisions. The decision to postpone the Soviet Union accession 
to the IMF might well be one of these poor decisions. Urged by both the Soviet and 
American officials to make a statement on the Soviet policy regarding joining the 
IMF, on December 29, 1945, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs 
Vyatcheslav Molotov communicated to Harriman that “the Soviet government 
considered it impossible at that time to sign the draft agreement drawn up in Bretton 
Woods ... the Soviet Government found it necessary to subject the issues raised by 
these projects to further study in the light of the new conditions of postwar economic 
developments” (AVPRF 704, 8). 
This was obviously a difficult decision. A week earlier, on December 21, 1945 
(the day when the “Proposals for the expansion of world trade and employment” 
were communicated to Vyshinsky), Molotov got another report on the IMF from 
his staff. This report presented weighty considerations from the Soviet Union to 
take part in the work of the IMF and the World Bank. In particular, it was believed 
that “the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the membership of the International Monetary 
Fund would be considered by the United States and other United Nations as a proof 
of its desire to participate in international economic cooperation. On the contrary, 
the Soviet Union's refusal to participate in the international monetary organizations 
would play into the hands of reactionary elements in US and British financial circles 
opposing the post-war cooperation between the main countries in the maintenance 
of postwar peace and order” (AVPRF 194, 8). Two days before Molotov’s refusal 
to sign, the United States ratified the IMF agreement thus making it come into force. 
No doubt following the example of Great Britain, the Soviet Union hoped to 
barter its signature on the IMF agreement in exchange for guarantees of a large 
credit from the United States (Pollard, 1985, pp. 67–68). Since by the end of 
December 1945 the issue of the loan still remained unresolved (Van Dormael, 1978, 
p. 192), the Soviet Union turned out to be a prisoner of its own aspirations–signing 
the agreement without getting the loan could be considered both in the United States 
and Great Britain as a clear evidence of the political and economic weakness of the 
Soviet Union (Gaddis, 1972, p. 23). It would be fair to say that this viewpoint has 
never been proved, but the bulk of documents and literature studied on the subjects 
makes very high the probability that the Soviet Leadership was motivated by these 
considerations. 
The Western countries and the United States, in particular, met the refusal of 
the Soviet leadership to join IMF in 1945 with mixed reaction. Opponents saw it as 
another proof of the dictatorial aspirations of the Soviet leadership, who did not 
want to make any compromises with its former allies. Proponents of more liberal 
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positions reminded policymakers that the Soviet Union was not the only country 
that had not signed the IMF agreement on December 31, 1945. The list of these 
countries included, for example, Australia and New Zealand. 
In effect, Molotov’s statement was not an empty excuse and really did not mean 
the final rejection by the U.S.S.R. to joining the IMF and the World Bank. 
Otherwise, it is doubtful that Moscow would have allowed Czechoslovakia and 
especially Poland to become IMF members (Lavigne, 1990, p. 25). In addition, in 
March 1946, the Soviet Union took part in the first meeting of the IMF Board of 
Governors Fund as an observer (Brabant, 1991). Due to the anticipated entry of the 
Soviet Union in 1946 it was decided at this meeting to extend the period for 
acceptance of new members on the initial terms until the end of that year (Hexner, 
1946, p. 640). 
However, 1946 brought drastic changes to the character of the U.S.–Soviet 
Union talks on the issues of economic cooperation. As mentioned before, the Soviet 
membership in the IMF was no longer a separate question; it had become part of 
the whole complex of economic problems of multilateral and bilateral nature, which 
Washington agreed to consider only in tandem. The directives for the Soviet 
delegation prepared in May 1946 for the talks on the ITO still contained a few 
phrases concerning the Bretton Woods institutions. In particular, the document 
stated: “If the US government agrees with our proposals and will sign an agreement 
on granting a loan, the full and final settlement of the Lend-Lease, the delegation 
may declare the readiness of the Soviet Union to join the International Monetary 
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization” (RGASPI 28, 70). 
The documents discussed in this study present us with a completely new picture 
of Soviet-American relations in 1944–1946. The Soviet leadership appears more 
open to international cooperation, at least in the economic sphere, than traditionally 
believed. Accordingly, the perception of 1946 as the first year of the Cold War takes 
a completely different hue. As we can see, in 1946 the Soviet leadership was still 
willing to participate in international affairs and did not seek isolation. However, 
its decision to take some time out to watch how the events would develop and 
consider from outside all the benefits and dangers of an active participation in 
international affairs proved to be a fatal mistake. The push-back and foot-dragging 
of late 1945–early 1946 turned fatal for Moscow, as the Soviet Union was cut off 
from the work of major international institutions, causing significant damage to its 
own national interests. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the economics and politics of the tragic Soviet experiment with 
socialism. Beginning with the period of “War Communism” between 1917 and 
1921, the Soviet government’s attempt to implement socialism failed to achieve its 
stated objectives, namely to create social harmony, eliminate class struggle, and to 
unleash advanced material production. It attempted to achieve these ends by 
abolishing private property and market prices in the means of production, 
eliminating the incentives and information necessary to guide production in an 
efficient manner. The unintended political and economic results were disastrous, 
leading to tyranny, famine, and oppression. Failing to achieve its stated objectives, 
after 1921 the Soviet Communist regime continued to survive only by changing 
the meaning of socialism. De jure socialism in the Soviet Union continued to mean 
the abolition of private property and market competition of the means of 
production. However, de facto, this meant the monetization of political control 
over resources, via black market exchange, in a shortage economy, and competition 
for leadership in the Communist Party to control such resources. As a result, the 
Soviet political system failed to achieve the ideals of socialism on its own terms, 
not only because central planning eliminated the institutional conditions necessary 
to allocate resources productively, but also because central planning created the 
institutional conditions by which the worst men, those most able and willing to 
exercise force in a totalitarian environment, got to the top of the political hierarchy.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The old saying goes that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. After 100 
years since the Bolshevik Revolution, there is no mistake that socialism has been 
an immense failure everywhere it has been attempted. The consequences in the 20th 
century of collectivism in the Soviet Union was drastic not only in terms of 
economic performance, but also for overall human welfare. To say that socialism 
wrought deprivation and death in the Soviet Union is an understatement. R. J. 
Rummell (1994) estimates that between 1917 and 1987 the Soviet Union was 
responsible for 61,911,000 deaths at the hands of the government. Is this because 
human beings are imperfect, and therefore failed to live up to the ideals of socialism, 
or did socialism as a doctrine fail to live up to the demands of humanity? To put it 
another way, did socialism fail because the “wrong people” were in charge, or did 
socialism fail because it generated the very conditions for the wrong people to 
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become in charge? This question is as timely as ever, not only because of the 
centennial anniversary of the October Revolution, but also because of the recent 
resurgence of socialism in Venezuela. As Steve Hanke (2014, n.p.) writes,  
 
Despite frequent references to the late Hugo Chavez’s ‘Bolivarian’ 
revolution, the [Nicolas] Maduro playbook is nothing more than a 
rehashing of Marx and Engels’ ten-point plan. This was laid out in the 
Communist Manifesto–a crystal-clear road map of where they wanted to 
take their adherents. Once you reflect on the Manifesto’s ten-point plan, 
you realize that Maduro (and many other politicians elsewhere) aren’t very 
original.  
 
Among these ten points, socialism included, as its fundamental basis, the abolition 
of private property and, by implication, money prices, which are vital in both 
delivering the incentives and indirectly providing the information necessary to 
allocate scarce resources and generate social harmony among the plans of millions 
of individuals.  
  The Soviet experience with socialism was the largest social experiment of 
the 20th century, influencing both directly and indirectly the rise of other socialist 
regimes throughout Europe, Africa, and Asia. In this paper, we will explore the 
economic history of the Soviet Union to understand the institutional arrangements 
under which the Soviet economy operated. 
As we discuss in Section II, both in theory and in practice, socialism in the 
Soviet Union, as first implemented by Vladimir Lenin between 1917 and 1921, was 
an immanent failure, meaning it failed to live up its own goals as first outlined by 
Karl Marx and followed by Lenin, namely to abolish scarcity by superabundant 
material production and thus create social harmony among classes. Just like his 
predecessors in political economy going back to Adam Smith, Marx shared the goal 
of delivering the least advantaged of society from poverty. His dispute, however, 
was not with the ends of classical political economy, but with the means by which 
to fulfill such ends, namely the abolition of private property in the means of 
production. Between 1921 and 1928, Lenin and the Soviet regime abandoned 
socialism in practice, retreating from its original theoretical outlines, and 
substituting it with the New Economic Policy for the promise of socialism in the 
future. However, this future was never realized. 
In Section III, we explore how, after 1928, the Soviet government claimed to 
be upholding the practice of socialism, but only by changing the original meaning 
of socialism. In reality, what socialism came to mean was the political allocation of 
monopoly privileges to cronies of the Communist Party and the Soviet Planning 
Committee, known as Gosplan. To quote economist and Sovietologist, G. Warren 
Nutter (1968), markets without property is a grand illusion. Socialism de jure meant 
the abolition of private property and markets, but only to resurface de facto in 
politics as monopoly rights acquired through the use of personal influence, for the 
purpose of monetizing these rights in the Soviet black market; this practice became 
known in the Soviet Union as blat (Boettke, 1993, p. 168; Levy, 1990, p. 218). 
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Section IV discusses Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to reform the Soviet 
economy after 1985, similar to Lenin’s New Economic Policy. In practice, however, 
Gorbachev’s reforms represented only a reshuffling of patronage appointments 
within the Soviet political system, not of the overall system itself. Under the guise 
of reform, Gorbachev only changed the “players” holding political rights to allocate 
resources in the Soviet economy. By not changing the rules that govern economic 
activity within the Soviet economic system, the Soviet economy continued to 
experience shortages, bribery, and corruption as it had before Gorbachev rose to 
power. Section V concludes. 
 
From Marx to Lenin: The Implementation of Socialism and the New 
Economic Policy in the Soviet Union 
 
As John Reed (1985) reported in Ten Days that Shook the World, at his first 
appearance before the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution of 1917, Vladimir 
Lenin took the podium, stared out into the cheering crowd and simply said, “We 
shall now proceed to construct the Socialist order” (p. 129). Their plan of social 
construction after the revolution was not a by-product of improvisation. Moreover, 
it cannot be interpreted as simply an unavoidable consequence of the Russian Civil 
War between 1919 and 1922 (Boettke, 1990b, pp. 16-21). The notion that the 
Bolsheviks had begun to collectivize property and devalue the currency through 
inflation due to the necessities of war is merely an ex-post rationalization. For 
example, the economist Maurice Dobb and the historian E. H. Carr argued that 
given the necessity for the Bolsheviks to fight the civil war, inflation was used as a 
forced tax on the moneyed bourgeois class. Once money became worthless, it 
became necessary to abolish private property by confiscating resources by force for 
the war effort. 
This ex-post rationalization is fundamentally flawed in two respects. First, even 
though the civil war influenced the way that policies were implemented, the war 
itself had little or nothing to do with what fundamentally motivated the policies. 
The socialist project would have failed even if no civil war took place, precisely 
because socialism as it was understood was inconsistent with the goals of delivering 
a post-scarcity world of advanced material production, namely by eliminating the 
wastes of capitalism. Secondly, Lenin and the Bolsheviks possessed a concrete 
ideological intention of constructing a socialist order along Marxist lines prior to 
the outbreak of the Civil War. The period now known to economists and historians 
as “War Communism” (but at the time simply known as Communism), refers to a 
series of policies which constituted the economic program of the Bolsheviks from 
1917 to 1921 (although for purposes of exposition it is perhaps more accurate to 
place the beginning of this program as December 1917 or January 1918, when the 
Supreme Economic Council was formed and the nationalization of industry began). 
As indicated in Table 1, the deliberate march towards socialism had already been 
outlined and begun to be implemented before the beginning of War Communism. 
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Table 1: Major Economic Decrees and Resolutions Passed by the Bolsheviks 
during the Period of War Communism 
 
Dates (Western calendar)   Decrees and resolutions    
8 November 1917   The Council of People’s Commissars is formed 
 
8 November 1917  Decree on Land abolished the landlords’ right 
of property and called for the confiscation of 
landed estates 
 
27 November 1917   Decree on Workers’ Control over Production 
 
15 December 1917   Supreme Economic Council is established 
 
27 December 1917   Declaration of the Nationalization of Banks 
 
15 January 1918  Dividend and interest payments and all 
dealings in stocks and bonds are declared 
illegal 
 
16 January 1918  Declaration of the Rights of the Working and 
Exploited People abolished the exploitation of 
man by man 
 
10 February 1918   Repudiation of all foreign debt 
 
22 April 1918    Nationalization of foreign trade 
 
1 May 1918    Abolition of inheritance 
 
9 May 1918  Decree giving the Food Commissariat 
extraordinary powers to combat village 
bourgeoisie who were concealing and 
speculating on grain reserves 
 
9 June 1918    Labor mobilization for the Red Army 
 
28 June 1918  Nationalization of large-scale industry and 
railway transportation 
 
2 November 1918  Decree on the Extraordinary Revolutionary 
Tax to support the Red Army and the 
International Socialist Revolution 
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22 March 1919  The Party Programme of the Eighth Party 
Congress; called for increased centralization of 
economic administration 
 
29 March to 4 April 1920  The Outstanding Resolution on Economic 
Reconstruction is passed, calling for increased 
centralization of economic administration to 
insure the unity of the plan necessary for the 
economic reconstruction after the civil war and 
foreign intervention 
 
29 November 1920  Decree of the Supreme Economic Council on 
the nationalization of small industrial 
enterprises; all enterprises with mechanical 
power who employed five or more workers, 
and all enterprises without mechanical power 
who employed ten or more workers, were 
nationalized 
 
March 1921    The Kronstadt Rebellion 
 
8–16 March 1921  Resolution on Party Unity abolishing 
factionalism within the Party is accepted 
 
23 March 1921  The Tax in Kind is established and the New 
Economic Policy is introduced 
 
Source: Boettke, 1990a, p. 122. 
 
 
The socialist utopia that Lenin wished to construct was based on works of Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels, who argued that the market economy–based on private 
property, money prices, and production for exchange–was not only unjust, but also 
wasteful. The original Marxian paradigm saw rivalry, or what Don Lavoie (1985a) 
refers to as “the clash of human purposes” (p. 22), as an inherent aspect of the 
market economy and the price system. For having this rivalrous attribute, Marx 
condemned capitalism as being anti-social and alienating to the proletariat, since he 
regarded all of the surplus value of commodity production to be derived solely from 
labor. Moreover, Marx’s critique of the market economy is that the antagonistic 
mode of capitalist production, based on market exchange, was an unnecessary waste 
because all of social production was not rationally planned in advance. From a 
Marxian perspective, capitalism expresses an internal contradiction between, on the 
one hand, the widening and deepening interdependence of producers upon one 
another and, on the other, their antagonistic struggle in the market. Because 
capitalism involves the simultaneous pursuit of conflicting plans by separate, 
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“alienated” producers, he wished to eliminate alienation and the wasteful circulation 
of goods and services between consumers and producers through buying and 
selling. Instead, Marx wished to eliminate such commodity production for market 
exchange and pursue commodity production for direct use under a single, 
deliberate, and unified plan, as if all production in the economy was organized like 
one immense factory. Marx viewed central planning as a way of facilitating social 
harmony and eliminating class struggle by pre-coordinating productive plans in 
society.  
Although Marx said little directly about the nature of socialism, in Das Kapital 
he described its fundamental attributes by clarifying its antithesis–capitalism. To 
put it another way, “where Das Kapital offers us a theoretical ‘photograph’ of 
capitalism, its ‘negative’ informs us about Marx’s view of socialism” (Lavoie, 
1985a, p. 30). Implicit to Marx’s view of socialism was the abolition of the 
institutional prerequisites of rivalry in the market economy, namely private property 
in the means of production and money prices. In other words, the abolition of private 
property, the negation of capitalism, would abolish rivalry and therefore 
exploitation of the proletariat with it (see Marx & Engels, 1988, p. 198). It was this 
Marxian vision that Lenin wished to construct, with the Bolsheviks leading the way. 
However, in an article titled “Economic calculation in the Socialist 
Commonwealth,” Ludwig von Mises (1975) argued why this project was 
predestined to fail. Given the stated ends of the socialists, namely to deliver 
advanced material production, to eliminate the wastes and alienation characteristic 
of capitalism, and create social harmony, Mises argued that abolishing private 
property and money prices as a means to achieve this end would make economic 
calculation impossible. “Where there is no free market,” Mises argued, “there is no 
pricing mechanism; without a pricing mechanism, there is no economic calculation” 
(1975, p. 111). To put it differently: 
 
1. Without private property in the means of production, there will be no 
market for the means of production.  
 
2. Without a market for a means of production, there will be no monetary 
prices established for the means of production.  
 
3. Without monetary prices, reflecting the relative scarcity of capital 
goods, economic decision-makers will be unable to rationally 
calculate the alternative use of capital goods (Boettke, 1998, p. 134). 
 
His argument was not a normative assessment of the goals of the socialists. Rather, 
his indictment of the socialist project was a positive analysis of the means they 
wished to use to achieve their goals. In the world in which we live, economic 
decision-makers are confronted with an array of technologically feasible production 
projects. What economic calculation provides is a means to select from among an 
array of technologically feasible projects those that employ resources in an 
economic manner, meaning that they are employed according to consumers’ most 
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highly-valued uses. Moreover, in order to illustrate the crucial point of his 
argument, Mises granted as assumptions the best-case scenario in which the 
socialists are regarded as completely benevolent and possessing all the available 
technological knowledge about different production processes. Even in this best-
case scenario, central planners would still would not know how to economically 
allocate resources, precisely because the economic knowledge required to make this 
decision is contextual: it is knowledge that is embodied only in an institutional 
context of private property rights. That is, it is only through the act of exchange that 
the relative and subjective valuation of scarce resources are translated into 
economic knowledge. Whereas on the one hand, central planners are precluded from 
access to such contextual knowledge, as Mises (1975) states clearly, “[t]he property 
owner on the other hand himself bears responsibility, as he himself must primarily 
feel the loss arising from unwisely conducted business. It is precisely in this that 
there is a characteristic difference between liberal and socialist production”1 (p. 
122). 
 The utopian aspiration under socialist production, however, resulted in a 
nightmare by early spring of 1921. In all areas economic output fell far below pre-
war levels. In 1921 the Soviet Union, as Stephen Cohen (1980) has pointed out, lay 
“in ruins, its national income one-third of the 1913 level, industrial production a 
fifth (output in some branches being virtually zero), its transportation system 
shattered, and agricultural production so meager that a majority of the population 
barely subsisted and millions of others failed even that” (p. 123)2. Never thereafter 
did the Soviet Union attempt to implement socialism in its purest form.  
The Bolsheviks were forced to retreat from their attempt to implement Marx’s 
utopia and instead re-introduced market relations of exchange and production with 
                                                           
1 Although Mises had directed his theoretical critique of central planning at actual attempts 
at “war planning” in Austria and Germany and “war communism” in Russia, his argument 
applies no less to a mixed economy, which attempts to combine the market mechanism, based 
on private ownership, with non-comprehensive planning in the production and allocation of 
resources. Moreover, the actual practice of socialism in the Soviet economy was “mixed” if 
we include the use of black markets and world market prices to allocate resources alongside 
central planning. However, government officials by definition did not legally own the capital 
value of the resources over which they are responsible, even though they had de facto control 
over their use. More specifically, whether bureaucrats direct the allocation of resources 
through direct ownership, taxation, regulation, or government lending, under a “mixed” 
economy, they do not directly bear the costs and benefits of their decision-making in terms 
of owning the appreciation or depreciation of the capital value of such resources in alternative 
uses at the time of their decision (Alchian, 1965, p. 822; see also Rothbard, 1962, pp. 828-
829 and Boettke & Coyne, 2004). Costs for the decision-maker only have economic 
significance at the moment of choice (see Buchanan 1969/1999). This contextual knowledge 
simply does not exist outside the context of exchangeable private property, whether planning 
is comprehensive or non-comprehensive. For “the knowledge problem” under non-
comprehensive planning, see Lavoie (1985b, pp. 52-57).  
2 Similarly, economic historian Alec Nove gives similar estimates of the tragic 
consequences of War Communism. See Nove’s An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. 
(1969/1984, p. 68). 
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the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the spring of 1921. This “mixed system” 
produced varying results over its lifetime (1921-1927), with the high-water mark of 
economic recovery coming in 1925. The relative freedom of exchange and 
production produced a drastic recovery from the catastrophe of war communism, 
particularly through the entrepreneurial activity of middlemen, known as Nepmen. 
These entrepreneurial middlemen acted on discrepancies in prices between state-
owned trusts and private cooperatives to exploit opportunities for profit, generating 
a more efficient allocation of resources.  
 However, the NEP did not dismantle the institutional infrastructure within 
which production took place. Thus, the NEP that was implemented with incentive 
incompatibilities, failing both economically and politically. For example, the 
cornerstone of the NEP was the substitution of the tax in kind for the grain 
requisitioning of “War Communism.” Peasants, though, with the war communism 
period still fresh in their memories had to be convinced that arbitrary requisitioning 
was not a policy option. The ideological commitment of the leading figures of the 
Communist Party, not only Lenin, but also Nikolai Bukharin and Leon Trotsky, 
prevented them from fully adopting the institutional prerequisites of a market 
economy under the rule of law. Thus, without the government making a credible 
commitment to maintain the NEP, peasants could not feel secure in their possession 
of their grain. As a result, by the end of the 1920s (i.e., 1928) peasants no longer 
had an incentive to market grain surplus. While industrial production was 
reorganized such that by 1923, of the 165,781 enterprises accounted for in an 
industrial census 88.5% were owned by private persons, 8.5% were state owned, 
and 3.1% were cooperative enterprises. Although these private enterprises 
amounted to 88.5% of the total enterprises, they employed only 12.4% of the total 
number of workers employed in industry, while the state-owned enterprises, which 
comprised only 8.5% of the total enterprises, employed 84.1% of employed 
workers. Thus the state was freed from administrating small enterprises, while at 
the same time holding fast to the industrial base of Russian society. The 
"commanding heights" of industry remained state property. The NEP saw a great 
recovery from the cataclysm of the communist experiment with economic planning, 
but the system itself was a massive interventionist system possessing its own 
dynamic (Boettke, 1990b, p. 116). 
Moreover, the NEP did not result in any political liberalization. The adoption 
of NEP was an admission that the task of centrally planning an economy was 
beyond the ability of the Bolsheviks. But, by moving to market methods of 
economic organization, Lenin inadvertently threatened the political survival of the 
Communist Party. So at the same time that Lenin re-introduced market mechanisms 
he outlawed all political factions within Soviet politics, including factions within 
the Party. Thus the political monopoly of the Bolsheviks was maintained and 
solidified. That was the political system that Stalin inherited and manipulated in his 
struggle for succession after Lenin’s death in 1924 and his subsequent consolidation 
of power in the late 1920s. With Stalin in power, the NEP was abandoned in 1928. 
The NEP failed not because of the partial liberalization of the Soviet economy. 
Rather, the internal contradictions of the NEP led to an ever-increasing bias towards 
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political intervention into the marketplace. Since no credible commitment could be 
made towards market or political liberalization, the only logical alternative for the 
Communist Party was to reassert authoritarian control over the economy. 
 The failure of the experiment with pure socialism, the subsequent failure 
of the NEP, and the rise of totalitarian rule under Stalin, cannot be explained by 
having malevolent individuals in charge of planning the economy. As Mises argued 
above, the institutional conditions of socialism precluded central planners from 
achieving their objectives even under the best of intentions. However, what must 
also be understood is that the rise of totalitarianism like Stalin is a consequence of 
socialism, not its cause (see Hayek, 1944).3  
The rationale behind this tragic consequence can be understood by Adam 
Smith’s notion that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. In 
the marketplace, as the extent of voluntary exchange increases, individuals are 
encouraged to exercise specialization in production to a greater degree in order to 
increase to their ability to buy goods and services for consumption. In an 
environment such as the Soviet Union, as resources became increasingly allocated 
by central planning, the extent of the market must contract at its expense. In the 
context of central planning, the type of specialization that emerges differs radically 
from markets. As the extent of central planning increases, the incentive structure 
within this political context will select leaders who are willing and able to specialize 
in the use of force over other men. To put it metaphorically, “success” in this 
institutional context is judged by the ability to treat people like pawns on a 
chessboard, treating them as a mere means to serve the “common good.” The 
complexity of centrally planning an economic system implies that that planners 
must be granted almost unlimited discretion in order to respond to its unintended 
consequences. As a consequence, we should expect that only those that have a 
comparative advantage in exercising discretionary power will survive. 
Totalitarianism is neither a consequence of “corruption” nor “historical accident,” 
but rather a logical consequence of the institutional incentives of the attempt to 
centrally plan an economy (Boettke, 1995).  
 
The Institutional Nature of the Soviet System  
 
Having retreated from the Marxist utopia of socialism after 1921, the textbook 
model of socialism, namely abolition of private property in the means of production, 
no longer applied to understanding how the Soviet economic and political system 
operated. Although the Soviet Politburo continued to invoke the abolition of the 
injustice of market competition through central planning as its legitimating rhetoric, 
Soviet-style socialism in reality was best understood as a monopolistic, rent-seeking 
society (Anderson & Boettke, 1997), one in which property rights over resources 
                                                           
3 On a related note, it is important to recognize that a communist political regime will 
continue to significantly impact a society even after its fall. Negoita (2011) addresses this 
issue in the context of Romania in recent decades. 
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were acquired through political competition, rather than untrammeled market 
competition (Kasper, Streit, & Boettke, 2012, p. 44; see also Tullock, 1967).  
Why is this an effective model to understand the Soviet economy? First, given 
the Soviet economy’s inefficiency in terms of delivering economic prosperity to the 
masses of the population, it explains the political logic by which the Soviet system 
was able to last so long. This logic was to concentrate benefits on those in power 
and disperse costs on the masses of impoverished Soviet citizens. As a result, the 
Soviet system incentivized the creation of a loyal bureaucracy, who benefited 
directly from maintaining the existing system.4  
Secondly, since rent-seeking is simply the non-market manifestation of 
competition for income, derived from political control rights over resources, this 
model seems uniquely well-suited to analyzing resource allocation in non-market 
settings, such as in politics. Rather than abolishing private property and rivalrous 
competition of the marketplace in the name of justice, in reality property rights and 
competition were simply transferred to the political marketplace of patronage, 
known as the nomenklatura system. The nomenklatura refers to a vast political 
cartel of interlocked state monopolies, which worked to provide and protect 
perquisites to those in appointed positions of power, namely by controlling entry 
and competition to these positions. In effect, the nomenklatura enforced a collusion 
among the separate state-owned firms and ministries so that the Soviet system 
operated as an effective political and economic monopoly. Illicit entry and 
competition by one monopolist into the privileged market domain of another state-
sanctioned monopolist was controlled so as not to chisel the value of the latter’s 
monopoly privilege, which came in the form of bribes and perquisites received from 
de facto control of state resources.  
Third, it also provides the rationale behind the persistence of a shortage 
economy and the bias in centrally planned prices throughout the history of the 
Soviet Union (see Levy, 1990 and Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). That is, it explains 
why the incentive was to hold down prices over scarce goods and services, not keep 
them up, in order to perpetuate shortages. Why is this case? In a market economy, 
the entrepreneur who organizes the firm is the residual claimant, or the individual 
who absorbs the profits as well as the losses from his or her decision-making. By 
metering and monitoring of the marginal productivity of individual workers into 
team production, namely by reducing shirking by employees (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972), and by using capital and other inputs in a cost-effective manner, the 
entrepreneur is disciplined to earn profits and avoid losses. 
From a property-rights perspective, we can usefully distinguish between cash-
flow rights, or the ability to exchange resources for money, and control rights, the 
ability to exclude others from the use of resources. The Soviet economic system 
was one where control rights rested to a large degree at the management level of 
state-owned enterprise, but managers did not possess full cash-flow rights. This 
                                                           
4 With this recognition in hand, the effectiveness of Soviet bureaucrats in achieving desired 
outcomes for politically connected elites could perhaps be assessed by developing notions 
of equity similar to the heterodox notions of tax equity defined by Mathews (2015).  
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meant that any losses accrued by firm managers from misallocating inputs 
according to consumer demands were borne by the state, in effect dispersed as costs 
in the form of lower standards of living to the masses of Soviet citizens. As long as 
output targets set by Gosplan, the central planning agency of the Soviet Union, were 
met and everyone received their perquisites due to them, then the firm manager was 
judged as a success. Moreover, any waste incurred in the production process was 
not penalized, since the Soviet bureaucracy was not intending to allocate resources 
in a wealth-maximizing manner for the Soviet citizenry, but in a manner that would 
maximize their own private gain from controlling the allocation of scarce resources.  
In addition, at all levels of the Soviet planning bureaucracy, from the Politburo 
to Gosplan, the state agencies which outlined and administered central planning, set 
output targets, and planned prices, no single individual could legally accrue 
additional profit from increasing output beyond a pre-determined target to meet any 
excess demand by consumers of goods and services. Any additional output that was 
officially reported as produced and sold, in effect, was a 100% tax to the managers 
of the state-owned firms, the benefits of which would go the coffers of the state 
treasury. Moreover, any bureaucrat ordering an increase in the price of a good, so 
as to approach a market-clearing equilibrium, would not accrue the marginal 
revenue from the increased prices of such goods. Unable to legally derive a profit 
from the sale of output, it is in the mutual interest of the firm managers to restrict 
output and for bureaucrats to hold centrally set prices below market-clearing prices, 
which results in shortages (Shleifer & Vishny, 1992, p. 239). Firm managers and 
bureaucrats benefited from creating a shortage by being able to monetize their de 
facto control of goods and services in the form of bribes from consumers, whose 
valuation of such goods and services exceeded the official price ceiling. In essence, 
a state shortage of buns and a state shortage of sausages translates into a black 
market sandwich sold out the backdoor, with a corresponding high price.  
Alongside this shortage economy, there emerged a secondary supply system 
around a special group of middlemen, known as the tolkachi, whose role was to fill 
the gaps in the failure of the state enterprises to fulfill their output targets. Acting 
on behalf of such state enterprises, the tolkachi worked to sell surplus commodities 
on the one hand and to purchase needed products on the other to facilitate 
production. On the consumption side, they attempted to correct for long queues and 
poor quality of consumer goods found in official state stores, namely by 
transforming these non-monetary costs to consumers of obtaining goods into 
economic gains for themselves, via black market side-payments (Boettke, 1993, pp. 
65-66). While Communist Party officials enjoyed queue-free stores, the 
underground economy operated to prop up these missing benefits to the rest of 
Soviet society.  
The centralization of the Soviet economy metaphorically into one big factory 
manifested itself as a divergence between the de jure system of central planning, in 
which property, free pricing, and profit/loss were formally abolished and their de 
facto existence, both externally in the form of black markets, and internally in the 
evolution of informal property rights over state-produced resources, which were 
monetized via exchange on the black market. Rather than produce for direct use, as 
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outlined in the textbook model of socialism, production became divided into two 
categories: production in the state sector of the economy for its own sake (i.e., to 
maintain the illusion of socialism as a legitimizing ideal) and production for 
exchange, which sustained the rest of the population. It is this institutional 
framework that Mikhail Gorbachev inherited when he came to power in 1985.  
 
Perestroika under Gorbachev 
 
When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, he had inherited an economic and political system that had long been 
stagnant and corrupt. Despite the corrupt and stagnant nature of the Soviet state, it 
had proved to be a remarkably stable autocracy from its inception until Gorbachev’s 
succession. However, just as Gorbachev rose to power, the Soviet Union’s 
bureaucracy was undergoing a massive turnover. Given the entrenched interests of 
the Soviet bureaucracy, the claim could be made that, under the status quo, the 
earlier “reform” efforts by Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were 
not possible. However, unlike these previous autocrats, Gorbachev faced a radically 
different situation.  
One of the consequences of Joseph Stalin’s purges during the 1930s was the 
creation of a young and loyal cohort that would control the appointment of Soviet 
bureaucrats for decades. A comparison of the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 
and the Eighteenth Congress in 1939 demonstrates this purge effect. At the 1934 
Congress 80% of the delegates had joined the Party prior to 1920, but at the 1939 
Congress 50% of the delegates were under 35 years old.5 Although Stalin’s purge 
of the “Old Bolsheviks” served, among other things, to create a layer of very young 
and loyal apparatchiks (Boettke, 1993, p. 82), from a political economy standpoint, 
it also created a situation that would later prove to be un-robust and unstable.  
By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union’s aging bureaucracy began to retire or die, 
resulting in a “demographic transition” during this period. With them, these 
personnel took a network of informal contractual agreements that formed the 
cartelizing basis of the Soviet patronage system. This meant that “the transaction 
costs associated with the realignment of rent flows and patronage opportunities 
were rapidly, and significantly, lowered” (italics original, Anderson & Boettke, 
1993, p.110). In effect, positions controlling rent flows went on the auction block 
in the mid-1980s. 
 However, this did not present an opportunity for Gorbachev to be a laissez-
faire reformer of the Soviet economy. His attempts at “reform” under Perestroika 
were not instituted to change the rules of the game within the economy; they were 
                                                           
5 As Michael Voslensky (1984) points out, “In 1930, 69 per cent of the regional and district 
secretaries and secretaries of the central committee of the Union’s constituent republics had 
joined the party before the revolution. In 1939, 80.5 per cent had joined the party only after 
1924, i.e., after Lenin’s death. Of the 1939 secretaries, 91 per cent were under forty; in other 
words, they were adolescents at the time of the revolution. The figures for the secretaries of 
regions and towns are similar. In 1939, 93.5 per cent had joined the party only after 1924, 
and 92 per cent were under forty” (p. 61). 
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not attempts to institute a market economy, fundamentally based on well-defined 
and exchangeable property rights. Indeed, the word perestroika in Russian means 
“restructuring,” but this only implied a restructuring of political appointments with 
the Soviet political system, not a restructuring of the system itself. Upon closer 
examination, the succession of Gorbachev in general and the perestroika reform 
program in particular closely resembled other Soviet government policy 
adjustments which followed shifts in the top leadership. Perestroika did not emerge 
as a central plan to end central planning and introduce a market economy, but rather 
represented the “Gorbachev” distribution of patronage perquisites, couched in 
liberalization rhetoric. Any real attempt to reform the institutional infrastructure of 
the Soviet economy would run contrary to the logic of political decision-making, 
which is to concentrate benefits on well-organized special interest groups, and 
disperse the costs of such policies on the masses of the population. 
The most dramatic evidence of “reform” under the Gorbachev regime was the 
alleged relaxation of controls on private economic activity. From 1985-1991, 
Gorbachev introduced at least 10 major policy packages for reform under the name 
of perestroika, yet not a single one was implemented fully. An example of these 
half-measured attempts at reform were two key legal components of perestroika, 
which included the Law on Individual Enterprise of 1986 and the Law on State 
Enterprises of 1987.  
 The Law on Individual Enterprise allowed individuals to engage in 
activities which previously had been deemed illegal, the intent of which was to 
encourage individual economic enterprise and market experimentation. Family 
members of state employees or individuals such as students, housewives, and 
pensioners were allowed to work full-time if they desired. But in order to do so, 
individuals had to apply for a license granted by local authorities and pay either an 
annual income tax or a fee, which in particular cases was required where it was 
difficult to monitor income, such as driving a taxi. For example, the fee for a private 
taxi, in 1987, was 560 rubles, which meant that a worker who was “moonlighting” 
as a taxi driver had to earn the equivalent of three months’ wages before driving the 
taxi would cover its costs (Boettke, 1993, p. 101). Given these prohibitively high 
licensing fees, the unintended consequence of this policy was the persistence of a 
black market: very few if any of the Moscow chastniki (private taxis) were 
registered and, therefore, official. The Law on Individual Enterprise, in effect, 
amounted to simply regulating and taxing an activity that had gone on “unofficially” 
for years.  
An even more fundamental problem with the law on private economic activity 
was the existence of the campaign against unearned income. The campaign required 
individuals to have appropriate documentation explaining how they had made their 
money, the unintended consequence of which was the emergence of an illicit market 
in documentation. The attitude of the regime conveyed by the campaign simply 
reinforced the lack of trust citizens possessed concerning the commitment of the 
government to reform. Without a credible conveyance of commitment to market 
reform, farmers, workers and so on, did not have any incentive to invest in the 
above-ground market. 
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The intended effect of the Law on State Enterprises was to reintroduce self-
accounting, self-financing, and self-management of state enterprises. However, 
given the Soviet Union’s commitment to full employment, there was no credible 
commitment to reintroduce true residual claimancy analogous to a firm in a market 
economy, in which the firm owner absorbs both the profits and losses of his 
decision-making. Despite whatever announcement made about self-financing, there 
was no precedent in previous reforms, not even from the New Economic Policy, 
regarding this. Given the expectation that Gorbachev would later renege on full 
liberalization of profits and losses, what incentive do firm managers have in this 
uncertain context? As long as there was a credible commitment to full employment, 
enterprise managers faced a “soft budget constraint,” meaning they would not bear 
any losses, they would not be allowed to go bankrupt, and they would continue to 
be subsidized by the state. As a result of the contradictory goals, firm managers 
increasingly monetized their discretionary power by approving wage increases. In 
other words, they were privatizing the benefits of the law, but socializing the losses 
onto the rest of the economy. As a result, the Soviet Union ran increasingly large 
budget deficits and resorted to monetization of its debt in order to pay it off. 
The inability for Gorbachev to convey any kind of commitment to reform 
sealed not only the fate of perestroika, but also the fate of his own political career. 
The reforms simply could not get the economy going, and the situation in the Soviet 
economy continued to deteriorate. The political instability of failed reforms, 
alongside deflated expectations on the part of the population, produced a highly 
troublesome situation for Gorbachev, not only costing him his credibility with his 
more liberal allies in the Communist Party, but also with hardline conservatives. 
When hardliners in the Party failed to reassert control through “constitutional” 
means, they resorted to an attempted coup d’état in 1991. It was the failure of 
perestroika that in fact led to the attempted coup, the unintended by-product of 
which led to the official unravelling of the Soviet Union as a political entity on 
December 26, 1991. Although the transition from Mikhail Gorbachev to Boris 
Yeltsin was peaceful, and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet 
Union ended without firing a shot, the collapse of the Soviet Union took with it a 
horrific legacy of poverty, famine, tyranny, and murder.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The terrible consequences of the Soviet experience with communism were not a 
behavioral failure, but an institutional failure. The Soviet economy failed to achieve 
economic prosperity and social harmony not because the Soviet people and its 
leaders were self-interested and inhumane, but because the institutional rules by 
which the Soviet economy was organized failed to channel the self-interest of 
individuals in a socially beneficial, humane manner. Rather than craft a set of 
institutions within which bad men could do least harm, it only created the very 
conditions for such a tragic consequence. Its failure was not its attempt to achieve 
an idealistic end, but its attempt to choose a particular set of means that were 
inconsistent with the demands of humanity. The abandonment of private property, 
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money prices, and profit/loss signals under a socialist utopia only led to the 
abandonment of our ability to cooperate in a peaceful and productive manner via 
exchange. With this abandonment came the embrace of the most inhumane coercive 
efforts to destroy the aspirations, and most unfortunately, the lives of millions of 
individuals, all to serve the interests of a governing elite under the justificatory guise 
of a unified, central plan that would supposedly deliver a just, post-scarcity world. 
The Soviet experience with Communism is a lesson of economic history that we 
must never forget, not just for pedagogical reasons, but for the sake of posterity, so 
as to prevent its return.  
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U.S. - Russian Relations:  
Dissonance of Ideologies 
 
Elena Glazunova 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines Russian and American ideologies and their influence on the 
foreign policies of both countries in historical retrospective and today. The paper 
especially illustrates the role of ideology in Russia and U.S. relations during 
different periods with different intensity. In the relatively “calm” periods of 
history ideology was not that noticeable. However, at other times, Russia and the 
United States have engaged in a clash of ideologies that provided a powerful 
impulse to the formation of new models of international relations. Despite the 
post-Cold War hope that there would be less ideology in international relations in 
recent decades the role of ideology seems to have increased.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The current foreign policy of the Russian Federation, to a significant extent, is a 
historical legacy formed by tremendous calamities and immense triumphs. The 
Russian Empire played a major role in thwarting Napoleon’s relentless expansion. 
The Soviet Union subverted Germany’s advanced war machine during the Second 
World War and came to dominate the world scene just two decades later 
(Shevchenko, 2015). But during its more than 1,000-year history, Russia has had 
four catastrophic events which crushed it as a state: the 13th century Mongolian 
invasion, the 17th century “Time of Troubles” (Smuta), the Bolshevik Revolution 
of 1917 (after which Russia became a battlefield for civil war and foreign 
interventions), and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (which was 
accompanied bу a series of civil wars in post-Soviet space, a catastrophic 
economic downturn, and the unprecedented geopolitical breakdown of the 
country). This collective history helps to explain key specifics of Russian 
idiosyncrasy–the sense of vulnerability, the very painful reaction to any foreign 
influence and foreign ideological “experiments,” and the struggle to preserve not 
only her territories and statehood itself, but her moral values also. 
The notion of “statehood” (derjavnost) has become very important in the 
contemporary political discourse within Russia. This is different from the notion 
of “state,” which mainly refers to administrative, managerial, law-enforcement, 
and judicial functions. The notions of derjava (power) and samoderjavie 
(autocracy) point to sovereignty, full self-sufficiency, independence, and the 
significance of the country in international relations. Furthermore–they connote 
the spiritual and moral mission of the Russian state–resisting evil in the world. 
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That is why the first Russian political ideology, which was formulated in 
1833 by the Secretary of Education Count Sergey Uvarov, included these notions. 
The so called Uvarov’s Triad– “Orthodoxy, Autocracy (samoderjavie) and 
Nationality”–also known as the Official Nationality–was a Russian national 
version of an international European ideology of restoration and reaction (Yanov, 
2013). Since 1833, and to the present time, this triad remains the best way to 
explain the specifics of Russian historic conservatism and its modern incarnation.  
In contrast with universal and international ideologies like socialism and 
liberalism, conservatism has always represented a national phenomenon. Like K. 
Leontiev, a 19th century philosopher, wrote, “each nation has its own protective 
ideology: the Turks have Turkish one, the Englishmen–English, Russians–
Russian; and liberalism is everyone’s” (Leontiev, 1885). While liberalism has not 
tended to find much expression within Russian identity, conservatism has. 
Each time when Russia lost “statehood,” it cost her people blood, suffering, 
misery, fear, and humiliation. The most fresh, and for several generations a still 
unhealed wound, was the first post-Cold War decade which resonates with defeat, 
the loss of identity, and subservience to the West. Russians throughout society 
were inclined to blame the “de-ideologization” of Yeltsin’s failed policies for all 
of their disasters.  
 
The Importance of Ideology to Guiding Social Action 
 
Today most Russian specialists in political science (including the author of this 
essay) would probably characterize themselves as “inertial Marxists” (Bogaturov, 
Kosolapov, & Chrustalev, 2002; Manykin, 2009; Pechatnov & Manykin, 2012, 
Setov, 2010). To apply this term to the theory of international relations, most 
Russian scholars share the views of the realist paradigm which has a lot in 
common with Marxism (material interests are basic, ideas are “superstructure” 
etc.). It is interesting to note that this statement applies not only to specialists who 
received their education in Soviet times, but also to the younger generation of 
Russian scholars who embrace this theoretical position. The liberal or 
constructivist approaches have not yet taken strong roots in the current Russian 
academic community. The classical definition of ideology given by the French 
philosopher of 18-19th century Antoine Destutt de Tracy as “a science of ideas” 
(Kennedy, 1979) seems to be too broad for contemporary challenges of scientific 
analysis. In this circumstance, Russian scholars tend to include Marxist precepts 
as an element of their methodology of the study of ideology.  
The key Marxist position about ideology (expressed in his famous German 
Ideology in 1846) is that it is just a “reflection” of socio-political reality: “. . . The 
production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear 
at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior . . .” (Marx 2000, p. 8). 
Nevertheless, we also cannot miss another famous Marx thought, expressed in 
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1844: “Ideas become a material force when [in the] possession of the masses” 
(Marx, 2000, para7). 
Why is ideology so important? In contrast with philosophy that seeks to explain 
the universe, but does not offer concrete actions, the main function of ideology is 
to provide human beings with guidance for social actions. Ideology supplies 
motivation for the long-term purposes of political behavior and the methods of 
gaining them - as Russian eminent specialists in international relations theory point 
out (Кosolapov, 2002, pp.234-235; Voytolovsky, 2015). However, not all ideas can 
become so influential. In order to become influential, they must resonate with and 
address the aspirations of the masses. This “connection” best occurs in very 
particular circumstances and conditions of human life. Such a situation can be 
illustrated by examples of U.S.-Russian relations in the 18th and 19th centuries.  
 
Ideology in Russia and United States Relations  
in the 18th and 19th Centuries 
 
Ideology became a significant element of international relations at the end of the 
18th century. The turning point was the French Revolution and the wars of 
Napoleon. This statement is generally accepted in both Russian and Western 
literature. However, by accepting this point we risk overlooking a very important 
fact: the birth of the United States as a new country in the Western hemisphere. 
Appearing as a first “practical” result of the Enlightenment, this new state carried a 
powerful ideological charge - and well before the French Revolution, it challenged 
the European “ancient regime.” 
Alan Cassels (1996) in Ideology and International Relations in the Modern 
World writes, “Behind the revolt of the thirteen American colonies in 1776 lay 
political theories regarding a ruler’s obligation under a social contract and the 
iniquity of absolute monarchy or despotism” (p. 15). The phrase “we the people of 
the United States …” officially confirmed the principle of popular sovereignty two 
years before it was included in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen. This could not have been to the liking of Catherine the Great. Thus, 
the ideology of the United States of America a priori had the potential for conflict 
with Russian autocracy. However, conflict did not develop. Just the opposite 
occurred: Catherine the Great in fact chose to help American patriots in their fight 
with Britain, first refusing to honor the request of British King George III to send 
Russian troops for the suppression of the uprising colonies, and later initiating the 
League of Armed Neutrality (1780-1783) to protect trade between neutral states 
and the countries which were involved in the war.  
The Russian Empress, being an adherent of the traditional 18th century 
European balance of power policy, tried to weaken Britain. There were also 
ideological considerations. For example, several years later Russia, while actively 
trading with the young American Republic, was steadily waging war with 
revolutionary France. The explanation for this perhaps puzzling choice is that 
Catherine the Great did not take American free-thinking and sedition as a serious 
practical threat to the Russian regime. Moreover, the reason is not only the 
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distance involved–the American revolutionary contagion, of course, was much 
further away than the French Revolution. The American Revolution also did not 
look that bloody and radical. In comparison with the French “Peace to the shacks! 
War on the palaces!” the American “Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” 
seemed pretty harmless. The concept “pursuit of happiness,” upon closer 
examination, turned out to be much closer to the John Locke's triad of “life, 
liberty, and property” than to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of property, 
which became even more radicalized by the French Revolution. The personality of 
the Empress also mattered: Catherine the Great was known for her fascination 
with the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which she skillfully used to disguise 
the most unsightly features of Russian autocracy, and for improving the image of 
the throne.  
Meanwhile, the former colonies had to decide how to deal with the rest of the 
world. The founding fathers encountered a serious dilemma. Should the young 
republic concentrate its efforts on creating a “City upon a Hill” which would be a 
superior model and a lighthouse for humankind? Alternatively, should the country 
share its unique experience with the Old World? In many ways, making the first 
choice implied isolation and not adopting the idea of a noble mission, whereas 
making the second choice would be to step into the morass of involvement in 
eternal European wars and conflicts.  
In 1796 in the famous Farewell Address, President George Washington laid 
out the route for future America foreign policy: “The great rule of conduct for us 
in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with 
them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed 
engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. 
Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none or a very remote 
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of 
which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise 
in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her 
politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities” 
(Washington, 1796, para 38.). Thus, the decision was made to reduce involvement 
in any conflicts outside the American continent. This reduced the risks for 
Catherine the Great and her successors, who already had too much engagement in 
Europe.  
The French Revolution was also a revolution in international relations. Before 
the revolution all European states were monarchies, so any diversity of concepts 
could not exist in principle. Afterwards, it was very different. The Jacobins 
revolutionary wars and later the Napoleonic military campaigns, in fact 
represented a struggle for a new “social project,” the spread of new liberal values 
and ideals. This circumstance demanded adequate countermeasures from the 
European autocracies. The military victories over Napoleon were not enough–
powerful liberal ideas could not be stopped just by military methods.  
Russian Tsar Alexander I articulated the fundamental principle of the new 
international system through the Holy Alliance of European monarchs which was 
created on September 26, 1815, with the purpose of preserving the social order. In 
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1820, Alexander I invited the countries - participants of the European “concert”– 
to sign a protocol that proclaimed the right to suppress revolutionary unrest in any 
country even without agreement of its government. Austria and Prussia 
consolidated their position with that of Russia. France and Great Britain refused to 
join.  
At the beginning of the 19th century, the ties of Russia and the United States 
began to strengthen. The common interest was the protection of the rights of 
neutral shipping and active trade during blazing European wars (Bolkchovitinov, 
1966, p. 336). There was mostly no place for ideology in U.S.-Russian relations 
throughout the 19th century. America was not even a part of an international 
system of that time while Russia was a member of “The Great Powers' Club,” one 
of the most significant actors of the multi-polar and mainly Euro-centric world. 
Ideologically, Russia remained a bulwark of autocracy and conservatism. 
Sometimes considerations of ideological solidarity even prevailed over Russian 
national interests; for instance, in 1848-1849 Tsar Nicolas I helped Emperor Franz 
Joseph to suppress the Hungarian rebellion.  
In general the Vienna model of international relations as well as the previous 
one, the Westphalian model, was based on the principle of national sovereignty, 
which did not require any country to have a particular type of governance or social 
order. European states mainly acted according to these models. In Russian-
American relations, this was manifested very brightly with the outbreak of the 
American Civil War. The autumn of 1862 marked a most dramatic point of 
cooperation between Russia and the United States. In a critical time for the Union, 
Russian Emperor Alexander II made a very risky decision–he ordered two 
squadrons of the Russian Navy to sail to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the 
United States. Neither Russian nor American historians have reached a consensus 
on the motivations behind the dispatch of the Russian fleets to both the Atlantic 
and Pacific Coasts of the United States (Bolkchovitinov, 1996; Saul, 1991, p. 339-
354). The story was not as romantic as it may appear after reading enthusiastic 
reviews of American federal newspapers of the time. Helping President Lincoln 
and the cause of the North was not the first priority for Alexander II. The decision 
to dispatch the fleet came in the midst of a very tense time in the relations between 
Russian and European countries, primarily Britain and France. In January 1863, 
an uprising of national liberation began in the territory of “Russian Poland” (the 
territory Russia got after the Third partition of Poland in 1795 and Vienna 
Congress in 1815). After Russian troops started to suppress the rebellion, Britain 
and France presented to the Russian government a series of diplomatic notes 
demanding independence for Poland. Britain and France also demanded the 
convening of a European conference on the Polish question in order to discuss the 
future structure of the Polish state. Russia was just recovering from the Crimean 
War and a threat of a new European anti-Russian coalition was very serious. 
Emperor Alexander II declined to agree to the demands of the powers. He ordered 
Prince Gorchakov to answer with a firm “no” and protest against interference in 
the internal affairs of Russia. At the same time St. Petersburg did not want a new 
war. The difficulty of the situation in Russia was exacerbated by the fact that the 
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Russian fleet was much weaker than the united Anglo-French naval forces. In the 
event of war, Russia was vulnerable to the maritime operations of the European 
allies. In addition, there was a high probability that the Russian fleet would be 
blockaded inside the Baltic Sea. In this situation, the manager of the Marine 
Department, Admiral N. K. Krabbe, offered an exit - sending the fleet out of 
harm’s way as a preventive measure.  
The second intention at the time was to threaten to disrupt British sea trade. 
Russia's plan was implemented, and the calculation was accurate: the anti-Russian 
coalition completely collapsed. There is every reason to believe that the results of 
the visit of Russian naval squadrons to the United States exceeded the initial 
calculations and expectations of the naval ministry. Russia was able to solve the 
complex problems of both a political and a military-strategic nature. The mere 
presence of Russian warships in the U.S. ports forced England and France to 
abandon their intentions to intervene in the Polish question, helped to change the 
situation in the U.S. Civil War in favor of the North by siding with the Lincoln 
government, and demonstrated that the Russian fleet had once again become an 
effective force in international politics (Bolkchovitinov, 1994). At the same time it 
is important to highlight that Alexander II did not hesitate about which side of the 
American Civil War to support. The endorsement of the government of Abraham 
Lincoln was based on principles of sovereignty and legitimacy. Commenting on 
British-French intrigues and their plans for intervention against the Lincoln 
government, Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs Prince Alexandre Gorchakov 
wrote to his American colleagues,  
 
“You know the sentiments of Russia. We desire above all things the 
maintenance of the American Union as one indivisible nation. . . . 
Proposals will be made to Russia to join some plan of interference. She 
will refuse any intervention of the kind. . . . You may rely upon it, she 
will not change. But we entreat you to settle the difficulty. I cannot 
express to you how profound an anxiety we feel — how serious are our 
fears” (Taylor, 1862, p.764).  
  
For Russians a dilemma about whom to support in this war did not exist. For 
the British it definitely did. Both conflicting American parties proclaimed ideas 
that mattered for the British liberal conscience. The Confederacy claimed the right 
of self-determination–the same as German, Italian, and other liberals had 
advanced in 1848. At the same time, Southerners in the United States also 
advocated for the institution of slavery, which was incompatible with liberal 
values. William E. Gladstone personified this liberal dilemma. Early in the war he 
was decidedly sympathetic to the Southern right of self-determination. It was at 
the worst time for the North–in the fall of 1862–that the British and French were 
planning intervention against Lincoln (Jones, 2011; Tarpley, 2011). Sending fleets 
to the American coasts was a signal to the British and French that the United 
States would not stay without allies if European powers make a decision to 
intervene in support of the “Southern insurgency”. Perhaps this partly led to the 
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fact that “by the close of 1865 Gladstone had been converted . . . to regard slavery 
as the key moral issue at stake and to switch his allegiance to the Union cause” 
(Cassels, 1996, p. 68). The contrasting positions of Russian solidarity and British 
equivocation could not be more clear. By the time Gladstone came to support the 
Lincoln government the Civil War was reaching its conclusion.  
In the 19th century, ideology was not a primary factor in international 
relations. The situation radically changed in the 20th century when the struggle for 
the minds of people became a constant part of world politics. That is why the 20th 
century has been called the “century of ideology.” Different periods of this 
century were marked with uncompromising conflict between various ideologies. 
Each of them (whether the liberal-democratic internationalism of Woodrow 
Wilson, or the Bolshevik project of world revolution, or Nazism, or the Soviet 
version of Marxism-Leninism) not only proposed new types of social systems 
inside the countries which they represented, but sought to establish a New World 
Order based on their particular ideology. The wars of the 20th century were wars 
for “new social projects.”  
 
Communist Internationalism vs. Liberal Internationalism 
 
The first “phase” of the U.S.-Russian ideological contest in the 20th century 
started during World War I. Before the war, the idea of “Manifest Destiny” was 
limited within the Western Hemisphere. During the war, the United States broke 
free from the clutches of isolationism. For the first time in history, the United 
States tried to project a global dimension. Woodrow Wilson, the 28th president of 
the United States, eventually tried to realize Thomas Paine’s (1776) vision that “a 
cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind,” written in the 
introduction of his famous Common Sense (p.68). By the beginning of the war, the 
United States had become an economic giant, but primarily remained a minor 
player in global politics. 
Relying on the growing power of his state, while preparing the United States 
to go to war, President Wilson, who was perceived in Europe as an idealist, 
formulated a new American approach to international relations: “We insist upon 
security in prosecuting our self-chosen lines of national development. We do more 
than that. We demand it also for others. We do not confine our enthusiasm for 
individual liberty and free national development to the incidents and movements 
of affairs which affect only ourselves. We feel it wherever there are people that try 
to walk in these difficult paths of independence and right. . . . In this we are not 
partisans but heralds and prophets of a new age” (Wilson, 1915, para 10).  
For Europeans the most striking idea was that the American goals in war were 
formulated not as much in the national interest but to make “the world safe for 
Democracy” (Wilson, 1917, para 18). A stunning result was that the nation 
accepted this idea. However, having said that in April of 1917, the president could 
not have foretold that six months later his revolutionary approach would meet a 
not less powerful ideological competitor on the other side of the globe. In 
November of 1917, Russia offered the world another social project: the new 
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Soviet leadership declared its intention to spread the Bolshevik Revolution beyond 
the borders of Russia.  
It is well known that President Wilson’s Fourteen Points allowed Germany’s 
new chancellor, Prince Maximilian, to end the war on dignified terms and to reach 
an armistice without admitting defeat. This American plan also became the basis 
of the Versailles peace settlement. But it is not widely known that Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points actually were an answer to Lenin’s most thundering 
proclamation–the Decree on Peace: “The workers' and peasants' government, 
created by the Revolution of October 24-25 and basing itself on the Soviet of 
Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, calls upon all the belligerent peoples 
and their government to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace” 
(Lenin, 1917, para 1). This was the appeal of the new Russian leader to the entire 
world. This looked like the Bolsheviks, whom Wilson deeply despised, had seized 
the initiative from the country that had just declared itself the leader of the liberal 
world. Paradoxically, Lenin and Wilson were campaigning for the same goals–
democratic peace, open diplomacy, national self-determination–but the ways of 
achieving them were totally antithetical.  
The American vision, based on the principles of a liberal-democratic 
interventionism, was presented in Wilson’s style–grandiloquently and in the 
abstract:  
 
What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. 
It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it 
be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes 
to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice 
and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and 
selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in 
this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice 
be done to others it will not be done to us. (Wilson, 1918, para 2.)  
 
Lenin’s goal was much more concrete: “The workers' movement will triumph and 
will pave the way to peace and socialism” (Lenin, 1917). Both nations proclaimed 
a crusade. This ideological standoff predetermined not only the character of the 
bilateral relations, but also the nature of two international models–the Versailles-
Washington and the Yalta-Potsdam (or bipolar) models. 
Within a short period of postwar “Wilsonianism” (before America returned to 
isolationism) the United States managed to realize in practice a crusade of ideas. 
Notwithstanding the negative position of the War Department, Wilson responded 
to the request of France and Great Britain and sent American troops to Russia. 
The American Expeditionary Force was under the command of Major General 
William S. Graves. It was called Siberia, and consisted of 7,950 officers and 
enlisted men. Despite its stay in the Russian Far East from August of 1918 until 
April of 1920, the Siberia force did not take part in any battles, but the 
involvement of the United States in the Russian Civil War is an indisputable 
historical fact (McMaster, 2014).  
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Collective security, President Wilson’s most cherished concept that found 
embodiment in the League of Nations, became the foundation of the new Versailles-
Washington world order. From the moment of its creation, the Treaty of Versailles 
was doomed. The Senate of the United States never ratified it. Its distinct anti-
German and anti-Soviet character - Soviet Russia was not invited to the Paris 
Conference; and Germany was declared the main and only culprit of the war (Peace 
Treaty of Versailles, 1919) - led humankind to World War II.  
The specificity of this conflict for the first time since the end of the 18th 
century consisted of ideology in addition to the more traditional complex of 
factors (geopolitical, economic, etc.). The Axis powers fought not only for 
territories and resources–they strived also to impose on the world a certain manner 
of life and a distinct system of values.  
There were a variety of reasons why most major Western democracies and 
the Soviet Union became allies in this war. First, of course, they united in their 
efforts to stop the attempts of the Nazi revisionist powers to establish world 
dominance. But there was also an ideological factor: communist internationalism 
with its preaching of the equality of working people all over the world had the 
same humane charge as the liberal system of values–freedom and equality 
dovetailed with it better than with the misanthropic racism of Nazi Germany and 
Japanese militarism. 
 
The Cold War Paradox 
 
Following the defeat of Germany and of fascist ideology the world entered into a 
new epoch–so called “bipolarity.” On one hand, the Cold War seemed to represent 
the quintessential and most complete form of the U.S.-Russian ideological 
conflict. The military power and “soft” power of both states were called upon to 
serve the spread of moral values, the world-views, and the legitimacy of the two 
“superpowers.” In the big picture this represented a rivalry between two social 
systems and alternative ways of life–capitalism and socialism. The ideological 
component of international relations was acknowledged even by the pillars of 
realistic theory. Hans Morgenthau, by way of example, argued that “. . . the 
struggle for the minds of men” needed to be added to “the traditional dimensions 
of diplomacy and war” (Morgenthau, 1966, Preface).  
 There has been no period in the history of international relations when such 
number of ideological conceptions, doctrines, and theories were invented From 
George F. Kennan’s “containment” to Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire,” from the 
proclamation of Marxist-Leninist ideology with the reference to the old 
Bolsheviks’ principles of proletariat internationalism to Mikhail Gorbachev’s new 
political thinking with its priority of universal values over class, national, religion, 
etc.–all this diversity fitted into 45 years of the bipolar confrontation. 
On the other hand, in the worst period of bilateral relations–the Cold War - 
ideological disputes were not that meaningful. During the almost half century of 
bipolar confrontation each of the two countries tried to stick to rational approaches 
to bilateral relations. It meant balancing interests with values and avoiding 
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extremes. Of course there were periods when the ideological messages in the 
rhetoric of both countries dominated. For instance, during the Eisenhower years, 
United States foreign policy seemed to be highly ideological. But in practice the 
famous John Foster Dulles concept of “immorality and short-sightedness of 
neutrality” - countries had to take sides in the ideological struggle because 
neutrality was not a moral option - had to be implemented in concert with the 
geopolitical and geostrategic interests and intensified American involvements in 
Third World countries with the purpose to change uncomfortable regimes or vice 
versa–to support “the right” ones (Dulles, 1956). By way of example, cooperation 
between the United States and the most odious Latin American dictatorships 
continued throughout the Cold War. While the priority task of Soviet foreign 
policy in the Third World remained the support of “friendly regimes,” the decisive 
criterion for making decisions to grant aid (military, economic, technical) was the 
amount of practical and geostrategic benefit that the U.S.S.R. could obtain.  
It is also hard to say whose foreign policy was more ideological–the 
American or the Soviet. Shortly after World War II, despite the flows of 
ideological rhetoric, Josef Stalin approached foreign policy from the point of view 
of balance of power. For him, Eastern Europe belonged to the Soviet sphere of 
influence. Ideology was not his priority. Even if at the beginning of his 
revolutionary activity he shared the belief that working masses in their hearts are 
internationalists, the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 convinced him otherwise. The 
Polish proletariat and peasants did not support Lenin’s idea of overthrowing the 
bourgeois government and the “sovietization” of Poland. Stalin built his foreign 
policy on the principles of raison d’état and political realism. He did not support 
Greek communists, in fact leaving Greece for the Western sphere of influence. 
After 1947-48, when early post-war hopes that communist parties in Europe 
would strengthen their positions disappeared, Stalin started to enhance the 
“security belt” along western borders of the U.S.S.R., increasing the pressure on 
Eastern European governments. One of the measures to get their loyalty was 
“sovietization.” However, the determining factor of this politics was, of course, 
the presence of the Red Army. Stalin’s successors mostly continued this policy. 
For instance, Nikita Khrushchev rhetorically supported China’s claims to the 
islands of Taiwan but rejected any military action. Sometimes ideological rhetoric 
practically disappeared from the dialogue of both countries. This occurred when 
the opportunities for mutually beneficial partnership overpowered ideology–like 
in the first half of 1970s, during the détente era. Leonid Brezhnev, in spite of 
widespread opinion, did not give real assistance to the government of Salvadore 
Allende in Chile because he did not want to overly upset détente with the United 
States. A little detail can illustrate the Soviet approach: the cost to the Chilean 
government for leasing its Moscow Embassy was actually increased. Brezhnev 
too cherished the détente to expose it to risk for the sake of supporting the 
socialist experiments of the government of a distant Latin American country 
(Glazunova, 2017).  
Generally, the Americans accepted these rules and played mostly the same 
game: not to challenge the vital interests of the other. Thus, American reactions to 
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events in Hungary in 1956 and during the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact Invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 were not more than diplomatic protests and verbal 
condemnations. The same was true for the Soviet reaction to the American 
invasion of Grenada in 1983. Only once were the rules of this game roughly 
violated–in the fall of 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis could have resulted in a 
nuclear catastrophe, but at the same time it paved the way for the future détente.  
The ideological aspect of the Cold War was more noticeable in the 
superpowers competition over the Third World. The term itself had very deep 
ideological connotations: in 1952 French sociologist Alfred Sauvy used it to refer 
to the former colonial countries, comparing them with the third estate of French 
society on the eve of the 18th century revolution - unfairly exploited and 
potentially revolutionary (Sauvy, 1952). As Odd A. Westad (2007), one of the 
founders of the “new Cold War history concept,” wrote, that it also assumed “the 
refusal to be ruled by the superpowers and their ideologies, the search for 
alternatives both to capitalism and Communism . . .” (p.2). But this alternative 
was difficult to achieve. The Third World became an arena of ideological and 
geopolitical competition. During almost five decades of “Cold War” American 
administrations–Republican and Democratic - both “officially took the view that 
adherence to Marxism-Leninism not only made governments internally repressive 
but also–through their presumed subservience to Moscow–a threat to the global 
balance of power” (Gaddis, 1992, p. 13). John Gaddis (1992) argues “there was 
never very good evidence to support this claim” (p. 13).  
The U.S.S.R. did try to use ideology to gain its objectives in so called 
“developing countries” of Asia and Africa. Both Moscow and Washington experts 
identified these areas as containing “vital” interests - security, strategic, economic, 
and political. Both the United States and the Soviet Union aspired to be a global 
power, with influence and presence across the globe as benefits a superpower. As 
former Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko used to say: there is no question 
of significance that can be resolved without the Soviet Union (Saivetz, 1989, p. 
211). Furthermore, the Third World served as a testing ground for both sides for 
their competing ideas about the nature and direction of historical changes. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked a new 
historical crossroads of international relations and the beginning of a new era. In 
comparison with the Cold War’s “clarity,” the post-war transitional phase seems 
to be much more muddled, dangerous, and unpredictable. To a large extent, this 
complexity can be explained with the growing role of the ideological factor in 
world politics. The present main confrontation between liberal ideas of a universal 
world and increasingly conservative antiglobalistic tendencies give a powerful 
impetus to the process of formation of a new international model. It is clear that 
U.S.-Russian relations in the present continue to be a testing ground for any global 
system.  
Present U.S.-Russian relations are surviving hard times. European and 
American media blame Russia. Putin’s Russia is called revisionist, aggressive, 
nationalistic, authoritarian, etc. Experts (mostly Western, but a few Russian also), 
trying to understand the overwhelming support and popularity of President 
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Vladimir Putin in Russian society, sometimes make conclusions having nothing to 
do with reality. For example, in 2015 Senior Associate and Chair of the Carnegie 
Moscow Center A. Kolesnikov published an article titled “Russian Ideology after 
Crimea” (Kolesnikov, 2015), where he expressed his distinctive opinion:  
 
Following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Russian public 
has embraced an increasingly conservative and nationalistic ideology. . . . 
The new ideology is based on a deliberate recycling of archaic forms of 
mass consciousness, a phenomenon that can be termed the sanctification 
of unfreedom. Confined to a besieged fortress, surrounded by external 
enemies, and faced with a domestic fifth column, the people of Russia 
have begun to experience Stockholm syndrome and have thrown their 
support behind the commander of the fortress, President Vladimir Putin. . 
. . This sacralization of unfreedom gives birth to militarism.  
 
In this long citation there are only two words which are supported by evidence: 
“conservative and nationalistic.” The rest of the judgements–especially the 
existence of the “Stockholm syndrome” and the “sacralization of unfreedom”–are 
groundless assessments. 
Conservatism (in both meanings–as a system of moral values, and as a 
political ideology) definitely dominates in Russia today. In 2016, among 75 
registered political parties (Spisok, 2016) about 20 directly declared conservative 
values and principles. At least another 15, according to their program rhetoric, can 
be named “near-conservative.” Two of the four parties represented in the Duma 
openly declare their adherence to conservatism (United Russia) and nationalism 
(the Liberal-Democratic Party). A third party in the Duma–the Communist Party 
of Russian Federation–also appeals to historical traditions and cultural roots–the 
views that are the main definition of all kinds of conservative thoughts. The 
ideological credo of the Russian President is expressed by the notion 
“conservatism.” A favorite concept of Premier Dmitry Medvedev is “conservative 
modernization” (Shirinyants, 2014). To paraphrase Russian philosopher 
Konstantin Leontiev, one can say that being a severest conservative in Russia 
today is profitable and easy like it was in the 1990s to be a liberal (Leontiev, 
1885). 
“Conservative-preservative” thinking, which shapes current Russian foreign 
policy, did not appear after Crimea. Practically all experts conclude that it is a 
product of the shaping of several hundred years. However, there is not enough 
attention to the role of the more recent period of Russian history–the 1990s. There 
is no doubt that the current way of thinking in Russia emanates from the top. 
Nevertheless, a most important and interesting consideration is not this 
circumstance, but why there is such a strong request for it from the bottom. Why 
are Russians ready to sacrifice their well-being to support President Putin’s 
politics, in particular his anti-Western and anti-American course? 
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Examining the First Post-Cold War Decade 
 
The answer to why Putin is supported by the Russian people is found by 
examining the first post-Cold War decade following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the disastrous consequences for the people of Russia. A frame for this 
ill-fated period of time is the negative attitude within the country to what was 
perceived widely as the “de-ideologization” and “Westernization” of Yeltsin’s 
domestic and foreign policies. 
Of course the “de-ideologization” of Yeltsin’s foreign policy is only a myth. 
The ideological credo of Yeltsin’s first foreign minister, A. Kozyrev, was 
expressed very clearly: “Our choice is . . . to progress according to generally 
accepted rules. They were invented by the West, and I’m a Westernizer in this 
respect–the West is rich and we need to be friends with it. . . .” (Stent, 2014, 
p. 24). Throughout the 1990s Washington’s policy toward Russia was 
conducted out of a traditional conviction that the internal socio-political 
regime shapes the international behavior of a country. In the view of 
American experts, Yeltsin was a guarantor of liberal and democratic reforms 
in Russia, and of not returning to some kind of totalitarian or authoritarian 
regime that could jeopardize U.S. interests. So the West had to support it 
financially. Money was given in the format of “structural adaptation”: Russia 
had to provide the conditions for democratization of its internal life, and to 
follow the rules that were dictated by the single “superpower”–the United 
States–in its foreign policy. Throughout the first half of the decade Russia was 
obedient, accepting the status of America’s junior partner and subsequent 
moves towards NATO expansion, cooperating with NATO in the Balkans, and 
listening to Western criticism of the Chechen war. 
Yeltsin's American honeymoon did not last long. Вy the middle of 1990s, 
many Russian people already perceived that Yeltsin's domestic and foreign 
policies were a betrayal of the national interest. At the beginning of 1996 
Yeltsin's popularity was at a historical low point, with only an 8 percent 
approval rating. He was in fifth place among presidential candidates, while the 
Communist Party leader G. Zyuganov was ahead with 21 percent. It compelled 
new Russian oligarchs, scared about the looming prospect of a communist 
victory, to join together their financial resources in order to re-elect the 
incumbent President (so called semibankirshcina–seven bankers). Still, 
Yeltsin’s victory would not have been possible without American support. In 
February of 1996 the International Monetary Fund, urged on by the United 
States, granted a $10.2 billion loan to Russia (Russia and I.M.F., 1996). These 
huge sums not only allowed Yeltsin’s team to pay off long-owed wages and 
pensions to millions of Russians shortly before the June election, but also 
deploy a massive “black arts” campaign against Zuganov. American political 
technologists played an important role in the re-election.  
Yeltsin’s victory, however, did not change public assessment. The period 
of 1996-1999 was characterized by growing domestic criticism of Russia’s 
weak and defeatist foreign policy and leading to the more nationalistic mood. 
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In 1990s, listening to endless speeches about democracy, freedom, etc., and in 
reality observing misery, crime, cheating, major corruption, and the aggression of 
a cheap mass culture, Russians realized that notorious “common human values” 
do not mean much in the absence of “freedom from need” and “freedom from 
fear.” In this time frame several generations of Russians, including very young 
people, got a very strong vaccination against the liberal system of values, Western 
ideology, and Western culture. The “syndrome of the 1990s,” which created a 
fertile soil for the growth of conservative ideology, did not mean disease. On the 
contrary, for many Russians, it meant recovering. 
The first bright manifestation of this “recovering” related to the U.S.-Russian 
interactions was the famous “Primakov loop” in March of 1999. Russia’s new 
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was on his way to Washington, D.C. to 
negotiate with Vice-President Albert Gore the next tranche of IMF monetary aid. 
After being informed about the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia, which was to 
commence a few hours later, Primakov ordered the government official plane to 
return to Russia. This case went down in history under the name "Primakov's 
loop". This choice of action by Primakov was not just a gesture–it was the 
beginning of a new foreign policy consensus within Russia. “Primakov loop” 
had several key messages: Russia is a partner, not a client of the West; Russia 
is in a unique position being both a European and an Asian country, and its 
national interests lie between those two worlds; Russia is a competent actor in 
a multipolar, not a unipolar world; and in foreign policy Russia values realism 
(real deals), not some abstract ideas and dogmas.  
 
Putin’s Russia and Prospects of U.S.-Russian Interactions 
 
By the time of Putin’s coming the public mood in Russia was quite different 
from what it had been a decade before. Clinton’s policy facilitated an anti-
Western and anti-American mood within Russia. Outwardly benevolent and 
friendly, it was in fact anti-Russian, especially because it supported NATO 
expansion. In the eyes of the Russian people by “expanding democracy” in 
Russia the United States actively supported the creation of a new 
socioeconomic regime of “criminalized capitalism.” In general, the experience 
gained from dealing with different American administrations brought Russians 
to the conviction that it was easier to find a common language with 
Republicans than with Democrats. Russians considered Republicans less 
dogmatic and more maneuverable. They used to be closer to the realpolitik 
concept, which is closer in turn to Russian conservatism. Republicans are 
more inclined to prefer equilibrium in world politics. Democrats are more 
exposed to the influence of ideology and strive to pursue reforms, 
transformations, and crusades.  
According to Henry Kissinger (2005), “This is why crusaders have usually 
caused more upheavals and suffering than statesmen” (para 13). During the last 
years of President Reagan’s administration, and during the presidency of George 
H. W. Bush, American policy toward Russia was generally cautious. Then 
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Democrats came to the White House and started a policy based on liberal-
democratic ideas coupled with a reformist activism. First, came Yugoslavia and 
the 1999 NATO expansion, then more active involvement in post-Soviet space–all 
this Russia at first was watching in silence, but gradually became more and more 
wary. To paraphrase Prince Gorchakov’s famous words: “Russia was not only 
concentrating. Russia was getting angry” (Glasser, 2013, para 1.). Russia was 
preparing to counter-attack. 
Putin understood this public mood very well. It corresponded with his 
own convictions. The period of Russian-American partnership that was shaped 
after 9/11 was short. Soon Putin announced his opposition to the U.S. "war on 
terror.” Russians viewed American criticism of the wars in Chechnya and 
human rights policies as an interference in its internal affairs. That 
deterioration of relations occurred because of at least two big issues: the use 
of military force to effect regime change in Iraq, and the illegitimacy of 
Western military intervention without UN sanction. At the same time, 
Americans became more and more disappointed in Russia’s lack of 
democratic reforms. Meanwhile, rising oil prices strengthened the Russian 
economy and the socio-political situation within Russia became more stable. 
The Kremlin needed Washington less and less. Moscow increasingly accused 
Washington of undermining a systemic balance, be it via NATO’s eastward 
expansion or via humanitarian intervention into countries formerly known as the 
Third World. 
In 2005 in his Second Inaugural Address, President George W. Bush 
stressed that in order to protect the American people and defeat terrorism 
America had to spread its values to other countries: “The best hope for peace in 
our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world” (Bush, 2005). The Bush 
Freedom Agenda was just another reincarnation of liberal internationalist 
ideology. Moscow perceived it as a justification for any American 
involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. In contrast to the United 
States, Russia firmly advocated the principle of noninterference. 
In 2003, and again in 2005, Washington supported “color revolutions” in 
the Russian “backyard.” Ukraine was the most sensitive for Russians. Angela 
Stent (2014) identified the magnitude of support for the “Orange Revolution” 
by referencing the fact that Ukraine had become the third largest recipient of 
U.S aid after only Israel and Egypt (p. 111). This approach inflamed U.S.-
Russian relations. The result of this ideological confrontation was Putin’s 
legendary Munich Security Conference speech of 2007. The Munich speech 
marked a new phase in Russia’s relations with the United States and the 
world, which is continuing until the present. The basic construct of Putin’s 
Munich speech was the idea of “sovereign democracy,” which refers to a 
“form of political life where political power, the authority from which power 
is derived, and decisions are taken by a diverse Russian nation for the purpose 
of gaining material welfare, freedom and fairness for all citizens, social 
groups and nationalities and for the people that formed it” (Surkov, 2006). Of 
course the key word of the construction was “sovereign,” not “democracy.”  
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There were several core ideas in the speech: neither the United States (nor 
any other nation) can teach Russia about democracy; Russia would no longer 
accept an agenda dictated in Washington; and Russia’s political system meets 
the needs and expectations of the Russian people. The concept was more than 
just an ideological response to Bush’s Freedom Agenda: it challenged the 
universality of the Western value system and proved that Russia’s ideology 
and policy choices are derived from its own unique history and are as 
legitimate as that of the United States or Europe. Strong 
“conservative/preservative” evocative appeals to ideological and political 
traditions became dominant in Russian domestic and foreign policy theoretical 
discourse and practice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the 19th century Uvarov’s triad did not become an official ideology. At the 
time it was not understood and rejected. It cannot be said that the creators of 
today’s Russian ideology understand it better, but it is impossible not to see them 
attempting to revive all three postulates and adjust them to current reality. As 
Uvarov denied the godlessness of the 18th century and its mockery of faith and 
church, today Russia seeks to reverse the atheism of the Soviet era as well as the 
dissoluteness and permissiveness of the liberal 1990s. According to the revived 
ideology, the authority of the state must be based on the dominant religion, and 
only by being sanctified in the beliefs of people will it be strong and legitimate. 
As Uvarov preferred constitutional monarchy over a republic form of government, 
today Russia is promoting Putin’s model of a “strong state” which is based on the 
idea of “managed democracy.” The most complicated element of the triad–
nationality–is also very relevant for today’s political tasks. Like Uvarov counter-
posed this notion to the French revolution’s fraternité (which has international 
meaning declaring that all people are brothers), modern Russian conservatism 
appeals to nationalism to oppose globalism which implies Western, primarily 
American, dominance.  
Crimea became the culmination of implementation of these concepts. In 2014 
Putin returned national pride to the Russian people. For this, most of them are 
ready to forgive him shortages of his domestic politics, the falling standard of 
living, and the deterioration of the Russian image abroad. The degree of his 
popularity in society is still high (Reitingi “Edinoy Rossii” i Putina dostigli 
maksimuma. (2017). The “Crimea consensus” is a very important factor of 
Russian political life. And it is going to stay this way in the 2018 election. 
The Crimea annexation and following Russian participation in the war in 
eastern Ukraine ultimately damaged relations between Russia and the West, in 
particular with the United States. In this period, we have been watching probably 
the most serious split between the ideological mainstreams of the two countries in 
the history of their relations: Russian “conservative/preservative” ideology versus 
American “liberal globalism.” This confrontation is being aggravated by the fact 
that the Russian internationalism of the 20th century - in all its forms – is now 
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changed to nationalism. One can say that the same trend is visible in America 
today. But it is clear that nationalism in the United States does not have fertile soil 
since it is a country of immigrants. Today’s rhetoric of nationalism may be 
considered as an ideological deviation, which will not live very long.  
Despite the divergence of ideologies Russia and America have several key 
concerns that demand cooperation. One example is fighting Islamist terrorism. At 
this time one should not overestimate President Donald Trump’s sympathies to 
Russia and his aspirations for cooperation. Even if he has such aspirations, the 
American system of checks and balances will not let him act alone. Therefore, the 
question of the future of U.S.-Russia relations may well depend upon broader 
social views of practical well-being and moral ideas, ideologies that both 
countries, at different times and with different intensity, have shared in common. 
In the longer term, it is more likely that both countries will come to see that, 
in this globalized interdependent world, there are few great problems that can be 
solved without their active cooperation. And their national interests compel it.  
 
References 
 
Bogaturov, A., Kosolapov, N., & Khrustalev, M. (2002). Ocherki teorii i 
metodologii politicheskogo analiza mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy. Moskva.: 
NOFMO. (Богатуров А.Д., Косолапов Н.А., Хрусталев М.А. Очерки 
теории и методологии политического анализа международных 
отношений. Москва.: НОФМО, 2002).  
Bolkchovitinov, N. (1966). Stanovlenie russko-amerikanckich otnoshenii. 1775-
1815. (Болховитинов Н.Н. Становление русско-американских 
отношений. 1775-1815). Retrieved from 
https://www.booksite.ru/fulltext/russ_america/pdf/205/text.pdf 
Bolkchovitinov, N. (1994). Istoriki v poiskakh istiny: Vizit russkogo flota v SSHA 
v 1863-1864 gg. (Н.Н. Болховитинов. Историки в поисках истины: 
Визит русского флота в США в 1863-1864 гг.). Retrieved from 
http://america-xix.org.ru/library/bolkhovitinov-russian-fleet/ 
Bolkchovitinov, N. (1996). Russkiye eskadry v SSHA v 1863-1864 gg. 
(Н.Н.Болховитинов. Русские эскадры в США в 1863-1864 гг.). Retrieved 
from http://america-xix.org.ru/library/bolkhovitinov-russian-squardon/ 
Bush, G. W. (2005, January 20). President Bush's Second Inaugural Address. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4460172 
Cassels, A. (1996). Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World. 
London, England: Routledge.  
Dulles, J. F. (1956, June 10). Text of Dulles Speech Explaining U.S. 'Peace 
Insurance Policy'. The Cost of Peace Special To The New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1956/06/10/archives/text-of-dulles-
speech-explaining-us-peace-insurance-policy-the-cost.html 
 
65      Elena Glazunova 
 
 
Gaddis, J L. (1992). The United States and the End of the Cold War. Implications, 
Reconsiderations, Provocations. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Glasser, S. (2013, April 29). Minister No. Sergei Lavrov and the blunt logic of 
Russian power. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/minister-no/ 
Glazunova, E. (2017). Vrajhda no ne v otkrytujy: vmeshatelstvo SSHA vo 
vnutrennie dela Chili (1970–1973)/ Novaj i Noveishaya istoria, № 1. Pp. 38-
56. (Глазунова Е.Н. Вражда, но не в открытую: вмешательство США 
во внутренние дела Чили 1970-1973/ «Новая и Новейшая история», № 1. 
2017. С.38-56. 
Jones, W. (2011). Britain's Surrogate War Against the Union, 1861-65. Schiller 
Institute. Retrieved from  
http://schillerinstitute.org/strategic/2011/us_civil_war.html 
Kennedy, E. (1979). Ideology from Destutt De Tracy to Marx. Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 40(3), 353-368. 
Kissinger, H. A. (2005, May 12). Realists vs. Idealists. The New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/12/opinion/henry-a-
kissinger-realists-vs-idealists.html 
Kolesnikov, A. (2015). Russian Ideology after Crimea. Carnegie Moscow Center. 
Retrieved from http://carnegie.ru/2015/09/22/russian-ideology-after-crimea-
pub-61350 
Кosolapov, N. (2002). Ideoligia i mezdunarodnye othoshenia na rubesze 
tysjacheletii. In A. D. Bogaturov, N. A. Кosolapov, & V. A. Chrustalev 
(Eds.), Ocherki teorii I metodologii politicheskogo analiza mezdunarodnych 
otnoshenii. NOFMO. Retrieved from http://obraforum.ru/Essays.htm; 
(Косолапов Н.А. Идеология и международные отношения на рубеже 
тысячелетий/ В книге: Богатуров А.Д., Косолапов Н.А., Хрусталев М.А. 
Очерки теории и методологии политического анализа международных 
отношений. М.: НОФМО, 2002). 
Lenin, V. (1917). Report on Peace. Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of 
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Marxists Internet Archive. Retrieved from 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/oct/25-26/26b.htm 
Leontiev, K. (1885). Chem i kak liberalism nash vreden? Retrieved from 
http://knleontiev.narod.ru/texts/liberalizm.htm (Леонтьев К.Н. (1885). Чем и 
как либерализм наш вреден? Retrieved from 
http://knleontiev.narod.ru/texts/liberalizm.htm 
McMaster, C. (2014). Woodrow Wilson and the American Expeditionary Force to 
Siberia, 1918-1920. Inquiries, 6(4), pp.1-2. Retrieved from 
www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/889/2/woodrow-wilson-and-the-american-
expeditionary-force-to-siberia-1918-1920  
Marx, K. (2000). A Critique of The German Ideology. Part I. Feuerbach. Online 
Version: Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org). Retrieved from 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_The_German
_Ideology.pdf 
 
Journal of Global Initiatives      66 
 
 
Marx, K. (2000). Abstract from The Introduction to Contribution To The Critique 
of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Marxists Internet Archive. Retrieved from 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/df-jahrbucher/law-abs.htm 
Manykin, A. (Ed.). (2009). Osnovy obshchey teorii mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy. 
Moskva: Izdatel'stvo MGU. (Маныкин А.С. (ред.). Основы общей теории 
международных отношений. Москва: Издательство МГУ, 2009. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1966). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace (4th ed.). New York, NY: Knopf. 
Paine, T. (1776). Common Sense. The Writings of Thomas Paine. Retrieved from 
http://www.calhum.org/files/uploads/program_related/TD-Thomas-Paine-
Common-Sense.pdf 
Peace Treaty of Versailles. (1919). Articles 231-247 and Annexes. Reparations. 
Part VIII. Reparation. Section L. General Provisions. Article 231. Retrieved 
from http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versa/versa7.html  
Pechatnov, V., & Manykin, A. (2012). Istoria vneshney politiki SSHA. Moskva: 
Mejdunarodnyye otnosheniya. (Печатнов В.О., Маныкин А.С. История 
внешней политики США. Москва: Международные отношения, 2012). 
Reitingi “Edinoy Rossii” i Putina dostigli maksimuma. (2017). (ВЦИОМ: 
рейтинги «Единой России» и Путина достигли максимума). Retrieved 
from http://izvestia.ru/news/668152; Levada-Tzentr. Fevral’skie reitingi 
odobrenia i doveria. (Левада-Центр. Февральские рейтинги одобрения и 
доверия). Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/2017/02/22/fevralskie-
rejtingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya-6/ 
Russia and I.M.F. Agree On A Loan For $10.2 Billion. (1996, February 23). The 
New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/23/world/russia-and-imf-agree-on-a-loan-
for-10.2-billion.html 
Saivetz, C. R. (Ed.). (1989). The Soviet Union in the Third World. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press.  
Saul, N.E. (1991). Distant Friends: The United States and Russia, 1763-1867. 
Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas. 
Sauvy, A. (1952, August 14). Trois Mondes, Une Planète. L'Observateur. 
Retrieved from http://www.homme-
moderne.org/societe/demo/sauvy/3mondes.html 
Setov, R. (2010). Sovremennyy miroporyadok i gosudarstvennyye interesy Rossii. 
Moskva: Tri kvadrata). (Сетов Р.А.Современный миропорядок и 
государственные интересы России. Москва: Три квадрата Москва, 
2010). 
Shevchenko, N. (2015). Three historical principles of Russian foreign policy for 
Washington. Russia Direct. Retrieved from  http://www.russia-
direct.org/opinion/three-historical-principles-russian-foreign-policy-
washington 
Shirinyants, A. (2014). Konservatizm i politicheskie partii v sovremennoy Rossii. 
(Ширинянц, A. Консерватизм и политические партии в современной России). 
Retrieved from 
67      Elena Glazunova 
 
 
http://4pera.ru/news/analytics/konservatizm_i_politicheskie_partii_v_sovremennoy_ro
ssii/  
Spisok zaregistrirovannych politicheskich partiy. (2016). Retrieved from 
http://minjust.ru/ru/nko/gosreg/partii/spisok (Список зарегистрированных 
политических партий. (2016). Retrieved from 
http://minjust.ru/ru/nko/gosreg/partii/spisok 
Stent, A. E. (2014). The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the 
Twenty-First Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Surkov, V. (2006, November 20). Natzionalizatzia buduschego. In Expert 
№ 43(537). (Сурков, Владислав. 2006. Национализация будущего/ Эксперт, 
№ 43(537). Retrieved from 
http://web.archive.org/web/20061205211300/http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2006
/43/nacionalizaciya_buduschego/  
Tarpley, W. G. (2011, April 25). U.S. Civil War: The US-Russian Alliance that 
Saved the Union. In Voltairenet. Retrieved from 
http://www.voltairenet.org/article169488.html 
Taylor, B. (1862). Bayard Taylor to Secretary Seward (1862, October 29); U.S. 
Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1864, Part II.  
Voytolovsky, F. (2015). Ideologicheskaya refleksia mirovoi politiki. In 
Mezdunarodnye processi, tom 13, # 1(40). Janvar-mart. (Войтоловский, Ф. 
Идеологическая рефлексия мировой политики/Международные 
процессы, том 13, № 1 (40). Январь-март 2015. Retrieved from 
http://www.intertrends.ru/fifteen/004.htm 
Washington, G. (1796). Washington's Farewell Address. Yale Law School. 
Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp 
Westad, O. A. (2007). The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the 
Making of Our Times. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.  
Wilson, W. (1915, December 7). Third Annual Message. XXVIII President of the 
United States: 1913-1921. Retrieved from 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29556  
Wilson, W. (1917, April 2). Wilson’s War Message to Congress. Woodrow 
Wilson, War Messages, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. Senate Doc. No. 5, Serial No. 
7264. Retrieved from 
https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson's_War_Message_to_Congress  
Wilson, W. (1918, January 8). President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. 
Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp 
Yanov, A. (2013). Golden Age of Russian Nationalism. Institute of Modern 
Russia. Retrieved from https://imrussia.org/en/society/462-qgolden-age-of-
russian-nationalismq  
 
 
 
 
 
Yuliya Brel 
 
Journal of Global Initiatives 
Vol. 12, No. 1, 2017, pp. 68-83. 
 
 
 
Russia’s Fight for the “Globe” 
 
Yuliya Brel 
 
Abstract 
 
The foreign policy of Russia in the near abroad is the continuation of its domestic 
policy, which includes the consolidation of the population around a leader by 
means of creating an image of an enemy, especially at times when the economic 
situation in the country is deteriorating. When interpreting the inner processes in 
the country, political scientists usually apply the decomposition of the totalitarian 
Soviet regime as a framework. This paper suggests a broader framework through 
an analysis of historical structures anchored in Russian civilization. The key to 
understanding Russia's foreign policy, I argue, is rooted in the imperial syndrome 
associated with the country’s history, whether one considers the tsarist, Soviet, or 
post-Soviet periods. At present, Russia’s desire to restore its status as a world 
power, as in the past, requires it to develop a foreign policy secured by control of 
its nearest neighbors. For centuries, it purchased their loyalty and fealty with 
natural resources. When this routine was disrupted, for example with a drop in the 
market prices of raw materials, another practice developed where, in order to 
maintain its hegemony, Russia used aggression against its nearest neighbors. This 
approach is sustained by endorsement from the general public that seems oblivious 
to conditions of unparalleled income inequality in Russia. For them there is 
nostalgia for the restoration of a super power status for the country. The chief 
outcome of the study is Russian policies of self-isolation and hybrid wars against 
its nearest neighbors, which is a contemporary means used to prolong the life of an 
imagined empire. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On November 30, 2016, the United States House of Representatives approved the 
Intelligence Authorization Bill. Title V of the bill (Matters Relating to Foreign 
Countries) specified the creation of an interagency committee “to counter active 
measures by the Russian Federation to exert covert influence over peoples and 
governments” (Civic Impulse, 2017, p. 53). The matter concerned the disclosure of 
disinformation and forgeries, funding agents of influence, assassinations, terrorism, 
and other activities of the kind “carried out in coordination with, or at the behest of, 
political leaders or the security services of the Russian Federation” (Civic Impulse, 
2017, pp. 53-54).  
Clearly, a full 180-degree turn in the Russian-American relations was not an 
instantaneous event. Initially there was little portent of going back to the active 
phase of the Cold War in U.S. relations with Putin’s Russia. After September 11, 
2001, Putin was the first to call American President George W. Bush to express his 
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condolences and to declare his readiness to render assistance in fighting terrorism. 
Shortly after that, following the announcement by President Bush of the United 
States’ intent to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (Arms 
Control Association, 2002), and the International Security Conference in Munich 
in 2002 (Schwartz, 2002), relations began to take a turn for the worse. Five years 
later, at the Munich Security Conference of 2007 Putin announced that the unipolar 
model of the modern world was unacceptable for Russia. He emphasized that Russia 
“[was] a country with more than a millennial history, and [that] it almost always 
enjoyed the privilege of conducting an independent foreign policy” (Putin, 2007). 
Although Russian leadership might perceive NATO membership as consistent with 
a unipolar vision, in March 2009, Radoslaw Sikorski, the Polish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, talked about his desire to see Russia among the NATO member-nations 
(Gołota & Wroński, 2009). In spite of numerous reservations, such a possibility was 
also left open by Dmitry Rogozin, the Permanent Representative of the NATO 
Response Force, in April 2009 (Rogozin, 2009).  
 The seeming point of no return in the Russian-American relations was 
passed in March 2014 after the annexation of the Crimea by Russia. In light of 
perceived United States support for the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych, the prospects of an anti-Russian government in Ukraine, and the 
potential loss of Crimean ports for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Putin justified the 
actions of Russia as a necessity to protect the population of the Crimea from the 
repressions and reprisal raids of the Ukrainian radicals (Putin, 2014). According to 
independent analysts and political writers, such a U-turn in Russia’s foreign policy 
was inevitable (Gudkov, 2016; Klyamkin, 2014). These analysts regard the change 
as a resort to traditional means, i.e. the use of aggression and conducting hybrid 
wars against the nearest neighbors, for solving internal problems. 
In this article, I will first explore the idea that in its development Russia goes 
through the cycles of reforms and counter-reforms, which help preserve the 
historical status quo in Russian society. I will also consider how the consolidation 
of Russian society is attained by creating the perpetual image of an external enemy. 
This image appeals to the people’s perception of the country as an imperial nation 
and a world power. “Splendid little wars” against real or imagined enemies give the 
Russian authorities an opportunity to distract the population from the internal 
problems. The economy is a major part of this argument. The question of “whether 
Moscow will be able to handle [this] strategic over-extension, which entails the use 
of considerable resources while its economy is in bad shape” looms large (Scimia, 
2017). Arguably, economic problems in Russia occasionally stem from its 
intermediate geopolitical and cultural position between the West and the East that 
at times have impeded trade relations.  
Utilizing primarily web-based sources from Russian scholars in order to 
provide readers with easily accessible references (many of these works are also 
published in printed form), I will also examine how the characteristics of the 
cultural core of the Russian civilization that have contributed to its survival for 
millennia, actually stymie creativity in the 21st century. By reviewing the theories 
of Russian historians, philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists, and by 
Journal of Global Initiatives      70 
 
 
analyzing the outcomes of public opinion polls, as well as statistical and economic 
data, I show that when change does come, it is derivative. This tendency to adapt 
from external sources bears the seeds of its own destruction due to the persistence 
of reactionary forces against change in the society. I will conclude with some 
thoughts about how Russia compensates for its inability to exert “soft power” on its 
nearest neighbors, and what the country’s current development prospects are.  
 
Literature Review 
 
One of the explanatory models of social transformations in the history of Russia is 
the theory of the “civilizational pendulum” or “cyclic recurrence of history” offered 
by Bagdasaryan (2010). According to the model, “the direction in which 
development moves at a particular historical stage is determined by the combination 
of the innovational and traditional potentials” (Bagdasaryan, 2010, p. 61). When the 
former potential prevails (often inspired by external forces), the system becomes 
transformed. Innovations, however, incite rejection and set the countermove of the 
pendulum mechanism in motion. In this sense, crises can be regarded as the 
maximum swing points of the pendulum. Thus, “when the maximum of the 
innovation amplitude has been reached, the vector of the social development 
inevitably gives way to the opposite one,” which leads to the periods of counter 
reforms in Russia (Bagdasaryan, 2010, pp. 61-62).  
The idea that in its development Russia goes through cycles of reforms and 
counter-reforms is supported by the sociologist Vladimir Lapkin and the political 
scientist Vladimir Pantin (2007). Their work connects the problem of Russia’s 
image with reactionary domestic and foreign policies developed by the authorities. 
Policies that the authors single out emphasize the “intermediate,” “borderline” 
geopolitical and cultural position of Russia between the West and the East, whereby 
“the image of Russia inside and outside the country somehow bifurcates and 
fluctuates” (Lapkin & Pantin, 2007, pp. 1-2).  
Lapkin and Pantin (2007) further argue that during the periods of liberal 
reforms, Russian society and the state “primarily consider themselves closely 
connected to European culture, and more broadly to the West,” signaling their 
equality with the “civilized world” (pp. 2-3). At such times, the West tends to 
perceive Russia as not posing any real threats, though “lagging behind” the civilized 
world. On the contrary, when the Russian state goes through periods of anti-liberal 
counter reforms, its “separate identity” and civilizational differences from both the 
West and the East begin to be emphasized. These are also the times that tend to 
accentuate Russia’s “greatpowerness, uniqueness, imperial might” as well as its 
“special messianic role in the world process (Lapkin and Pantin, 2007, p. 3). At 
such moments the West sees Russia “largely as an independent, but hostile and 
unpredictable nation whose political and economic life is significantly different 
from life in western countries” (p. 3). Relatedly, Bagdasaryan (2010) highlights a 
set of indicators that directly lead to an increase in external aggression. Those are 
the level of national focus versus the level of cosmopolitism; the etatism paradigm 
(the popularity of the strong state concept); the propaganda actualization of the 
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external enemy image (the West), and the nature of defining Russia’s historical 
mission, among others (Bagdasaryan, 2010, p. 64). 
The historian Alexander Akhiezer (1995) regarded Russia as having an 
intermediate position between liberal and traditional civilizations (p. 4). In its 
historic development Russia stepped over the bounds of a traditional civilization 
characterized by static reproduction, i.e. the type of reproduction under which 
quantitative changes in society and culture are possible only at the expense of 
attracting additional resources. However, Russia did not manage to become a full-
fledged part of Western liberal civilization where the dominant position is held by 
intensive reproduction fueled by innovation. Situated between such forces, societal 
dynamics acquired a conflict-ridden, self-destructive character which Akhiezer 
(1995) called “cleavage” (p. 6).  
Cleavage is “a pathological condition of society” characterized by a vicious 
circle, which means that if progressive values in one of the two parts of the cleaved 
society are activated, in the other part traditional forces are brought into action, and 
vice versa (Akhiezer, 1995, p. 6). Akhiezer (1995) argues that the two opposing 
parts in the cleaved society (progressive values vs. traditional values) act in the 
opposite directions and thus paralyze and disorganize each other (p. 6).  
In a cleavage-based society any attempts to substitute alternative decisions for 
those just taken may form the so-called “lame decisions” (Akhiezer, 1995, p. 32). 
The latter are characterized by simplification–a tendency to solve not what needs to 
be solved, but what can be solved according to the understanding of the authorities 
(Akhiezer, 1995, p. 34). This tendency coincides with Herbert Simon’s idea of 
“satisficing.” Satisficing refers to making decisions, which are just good enough in 
terms of some criterion (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2009, p. 348). Lame decisions make 
the authorities “pursue a ‘satisficing’ path, a path that will permit satisfaction at 
some specified level of all of [their] needs” (Simon, 1956, p. 136). The project 
Novorossia envisaging the creation of a confederative union of the unrecognized 
Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics may serve as an example in this case. At 
the initial stage (May 2014), it was actively supported by the Kremlin. However, 
having encountered resistance on the part of the West and the impossibility of 
spreading the Donetsk-Lugansk experience over the contiguous regions of Ukraine, 
the project was closed a year later.  
According to the Russian historian Nikolai Berdyaev (2007), the immense 
space of Russia subjugates the “Russian soul” instead of emancipating it (p. 115).  
Organization of the vast space into the greatest state in the world was paid for by 
over-centralization, “submission of life to the state’s interests, and suppression of 
any independent forces, personal as well as public” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 114). 
Berdyaev (2007) wrote the collection of articles, The Destiny of Russia (1914-
1917), before the end of World War I. He hoped that the war would lead to “a radical 
change in the consciousness of the Russian people” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 120). They 
would disengage from the power of space, and instead get control over it. This 
would allow them to radically change their attitude to the state and culture. Instead 
of being their master, the state should become “the inner power of the Russian 
people” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 120). As for culture, in the opinion of Berdyaev (2007), 
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it was supposed to become “more intensive” (p. 120). Without such a change “the 
Russian people cannot have a future … and the state is exposed to the threat of 
disintegration” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 120). The philosopher’s hopes were not 
destined to be realized. During the 20th century the state disintegrated twice. That 
is why the fight for Russia’s global status still remains a main factor in the process 
of consolidation for an atomized people who never managed (not without the 
assistance of the state) to acquire the skills of collective action.  
The problem of consolidation is pertinent to any society that has transitioned 
from a traditional civilization to a liberal one. However, for Russia which is stuck 
in-between, it is exacerbated by the cleavage or tensions between innovation and 
tradition, between foreign and domestic. To overcome it, it is necessary to reach a 
basic consensus between the conflicting cultures and their bearers, further providing 
legitimacy to the state power (Akhiezer, Klyamkin, & Yakovenko, 2013, p. 45). In 
early states, the legitimacy of the ruling stratum was determined by how successful 
it was at coping with the protection of its subjects from external threats, and by its 
ability to annex new territories. That is why “victories in wars were a powerful 
source of the state power legitimacy” (Akhiezer et al., 2013, p. 44). In the words of 
Akhiezer, Klyamkin, and Yakovenko (2013), “the fall of European monarchies 
(German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian) … during WW I proved that the ancient 
mechanism when power could be legitimized by means of victories and de-
legitimized by means of defeats continued to exist even millennia later” (p. 44).  
These authors also contend that “the state consolidation through the image of an 
enemy–real or simulated–has not been eliminated until now” (Akhiezer et al., 2013, 
p. 44). Therefore, victories in wars gave Russia an opportunity to establish and 
support its notion of imperial might legitimizing the ruling elite.  
Wars, however, could also be “a specific means to obscure internal problems, 
which under the condition of peace reveal[ed] their intractability and insolvability 
… and the hidden cracks of the socio-cultural cleavage” (Akhiezer et al., 2013, p. 
45). Also, the vast expanse of the Russian territory did not require much investment 
from its inhabitants. It has always been possible for the state to secure additional 
resources to enhance production in society making innovation unnecessary or at 
least less attractive. Nevertheless, Russia’s position as an intermediary civilization 
forced the country to go through cycles of reforms and counter-reforms in the course 
of its history. The periods of reforms drew Russia nearer to the “civilized world,” 
i.e. to the Western European culture, whereas the periods of counter-reforms incited 
in the population the ideas of Russia’s uniqueness and aspirations for the country’s 
messianic role in the world.  
 
Analysis 
 
In the remaining part of my article I will show how and why the population of 
Russia currently tends to support the aggressive foreign policy of the Kremlin. The 
following analysis of public opinion polls and of the statistical and economic data 
shows that while previously the Russian authorities ensured support of constituents 
by improving their well-being, the main focus of the current domestic policy is to 
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create an image of an external enemy (or enemies). This helps politicians to distract 
the masses from recognizing that Russia has been unable to create a competitive 
economy. By involving the population in foreign policy endeavors, which propel 
dangerous dreams about the restoration of the country's former greatness and status 
as a world power, elites are trying to divert the people’s attention from the fact that 
the Russian economy is currently suffering from three ongoing crises (Mirkin, 
2017). The first one is the investment crisis; the second is connected with the drop 
in the population’s real income that continues for the fourth consecutive year; the 
third is the overpriced Russian ruble, which may become devalued at any moment. 
In addition, the modern Russian economy is still mostly extractive, which makes 
Russia “a great state of raw materials” unable to compete with either “the Asian 
electronic ‘tigers’” or other developed countries of the world (Mirkin, 2017).  
 
Negative Mobilization 
 
In his book Negative Identity (2004), the Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov noted the 
following, “Consolidation of the Russians happens not on the basis of positive ideas 
… but on the solidarity of repulsion, denial, and demarcation. It is a deep cultural 
circumstance rather than manifestation of an opportunistic potential of collective 
mobilization” (p. 156). Therefore, the most important condition for the reproduction 
of the negative identity is the presence of the image of an “enemy” (an “alien”). It 
affixes wholeness and stability to the national identity. Gudkov provides a useful 
theory about how negative mobilization forms. He identifies three conditions 
conducive to the forming of mobilization waves in the Russian society. First of all, 
negative mobilization begins only when the differentiation and sophistication of the 
social system reaches such a degree under which the commanding top begins to lose 
control over what is going on. Secondly, under such conditions the processes of 
structured changes turn out to be blocked by the interests of some influential groups. 
Thirdly, the intellectual elite degenerate since they become little other than 
bureaucrats serving the regime (Gudkov, 2004, p. 484).  
The data in Table 1 help assess the effectiveness of Russia’s aggressive foreign 
policy with respect to the perception of the political elite by the population of the 
country. The coercive annexation of the Crimea had a positive impact on Putin’s 
rating, although many remained relatively low. 
The first column shows the results of the survey which was conducted under 
the conditions of a deep economic crisis five months before the default.1 Public 
opinion perceived the authorities of Yeltsin’s call-out as corrupted (63%) and alien 
to the people (41%). During the “fat” years of Putin’s rule the population’s 
                                                           
1 The sovereign default occurred in Russian on August 17, 1998. The main reasons for the 
default (the inability to service some or all the country’s fiscal obligations) were as follows: 
an enormous state debt; low world prices for raw materials, which made the basis of the 
Russian export; the peanut politics of the state; the establishment by the state of the Ponzi 
scheme, which refers to a fraudulent investing scam; and the meltdown of the Asian 
economies. 
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perception of the authorities improved, but not significantly or in all categories. 
Comparing the data in the last two columns it is necessary to keep in mind that by 
November 2016 the real income of the population had been decreasing for 24 
consecutive months. Nevertheless, the share of Russians characterizing the 
authorities in a negative way substantially decreased. 
Table 1 
Please name the traits that in your opinion characterize the current 
authorities (percentage of the number of respondents)2 
 
 March 
1998 
November 
2012 
November 
2016 
Corrupted 63 52 31 
Bureaucratic 22 30 26 
Legitimate 12 8 23 
Alien to the people 41 32 23 
Strong, firm 2 10 19 
‘Ours,’ habitual 3 4 11 
Authoritative, 
respected 
2 6 11 
Note. Adapted from Levada-Center (2016a). 
 
The figures in the last column support the idea of Akhiezer et al. (2013) about 
wars being a convenient means for the authorities to distract the population from 
internal problems (p. 45). Russian rulers have always skillfully played the strings 
of the people’s “deeply-rooted patriotic sentiment” knowing for centuries that the 
population possessed “a strong resilience to material shortages” (Scimia, 2017).  
Thus, the events in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea turned out to be a 
consolidating factor for the Russian society, at least for the time being. However, 
the countdown of shaping the current mobilization wave should be taken not from 
March 2014 and the annexation, but from the end of 2011 when in response to mass 
protests against rigging the election outcomes, the Kremlin began to renew the 
policy of societal consolidation (in opposition to external threats). The central 
element of the new policy became the anti-West rhetoric.  
                                                           
2 The survey was conducted on November 18-21, 2016, using an all-Russian representative 
sampling of the urban and rural population. The number of respondents equaled 1,600 people 
aged 18 and older. The survey was conducted at respondents’ homes using face-to-face 
interviews. The six answer options given in the table were the most popular ones in 
November 2016.  
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The beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term (March 2012) 
coincided with a sharp slowdown in the economic growth, which served as an 
additional incentive to form an image of an enemy. The dynamics of answering the 
question, “Are things in Russia going in the right direction or are the events leading 
us nowhere?” illustrate the connection between the external “splendid little wars” 
and positive assessments by mass consciousness of the state of affairs inside the 
country (Levada Center, 2016b, p. 33). The two most important peaks of positive 
assessments were recorded in August 2008 (“peace-enforcement of Georgia”), and 
after the annexation of the Crimea in March 2014.  
 
State Cultural Policy 
 
In December 2014, Putin approved Foundations of the State Cultural Policy (FSCP) 
decree. The document consists of 72 pages. The word “civilization” is mentioned 
in it 30 times. According to the authors of the document, Russia is a unique and 
authentic civilization, which reduces itself to neither “the West” nor “the East” 
(FSCP, 2015, p. 30). It is a bridge between the neighbors on “the left” and on “the 
right” (FSCP, 2015, p. 30). Civilizational authenticity is secured by means of 
transferring from generation to generation the traditional values, norms, mores, and 
patterns of the country’s behavior (FSCP, 2015, pp. 26, 44). It is identified as a 
priority of the cultural and humanitarian development (FSCP, 2015, p. 9). At the 
same time, there was no space in the voluminous document to articulate the content 
of “civilizational authenticity” (FSCP, 2015, p. 3). The only exception was Russian 
mentality. Its main characteristic was a pronounced priority of the spiritual over 
material (FSCP, 2015, p. 31). The absence of any detailed description of the FSCP 
characteristics is evidence of the declarative nature of the document that presages a 
propaganda campaign for confrontation with the “other,” specifically Western 
Europe and the United States.  
Thus, a concise wording of the document’s main thesis would be “Russia is not 
Europe” (Bershidsky, 2014). Although Putin has mentioned it many times in his 
speeches that Russia had civilizational differences with the West, according to 
Bershidsky (2014), the FSCP officially enshrined Russia’s “rejection of the 
European path and of universal values such as democratic development and 
tolerance toward different cultures” (n.p.).  
Three factors seem to come into play with respect to “Russia’s non-European 
path” (Bershidsky, 2014). First of all, it is a quest for security from terrorist attacks, 
as well as from internal breakdown, and a perceived threat from the West. Secondly, 
it is Russia’s sense of uniqueness with its growing rejection of Western values and 
the idea that “Russian civilization can develop along the lines of a limited federation 
of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus” (Johnson, 2014). Finally, it is an imbedded 
ideology growing out of Russia’s vastness that centralized governance is necessary, 
accepted, and even preferred, which in turn contributes to greater police powers on 
the part of the state. 
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The Russian Economy 
 
The central idea of the cultural program seems to be accurate–Russia is a separate 
civilization. This distinct civilization has survived over the course of its millennial 
history thanks to this identity. In the article The Clash of Civilizations? Samuel 
Huntington (1993) stated that when the Cold War ended and ideological division of 
Europe disappeared, the region became divided in a cultural way (p. 29). The 
division now was between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam on the other (pp. 29-30) The important dividing line in 
Europe “may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500” 
(Huntington, 1993, p. 30). Thus, the peoples who live to the north and west of this 
line are either Protestants or Catholics. In the course of their history they went 
through the same stages as other Western European countries, i.e. feudalism, the 
Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution 
(Huntington, 1993, p. 30). They were also generally better off than those who lived 
to the east. Therefore, Huntington (1993) predicted that those peoples would “look 
forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the 
consolidation of democratic political systems” (p. 30). The Orthodox and Muslim 
peoples to the east and south of the line “were only lightly touched by the shaping 
events in the rest of Europe; [were] generally less advanced economically; [and] 
seemed much less likely to develop stable political systems” (pp. 30-31). In full 
compliance with Huntington’s logic, the three former Baltic republics of the Soviet 
Union focused on the integration with Europe, and “quickly evolved into genuine 
and, in many respects, liberal democracies” (Diamond, 2008, p. 190). The six 
republics with predominantly Muslim populations reverted to sultanic-like regimes 
with strong individual rulers. The six Orthodox republics proclaimed commitment 
to the principles of democracy on the forefront of the Perestroika euphoria; 
however, they did not manage to realize them consistently in practice. Eventually, 
with the exception of the Baltic States, all other former Soviet republics and “most 
prominently Russia … regressed from democratic possibilities or reestablished 
dictatorship without communism” (Diamond, 2008, p. 190).  
The authors of FSCP, however, consider the cultural peculiarity of Russia as 
the guarantor of the Russian statehood stability and competitiveness (FSCP, 2015 
p. 49). Official economic statistics, on the contrary, do not confirm the presence of 
such competitiveness. Modern Russia, just like the Soviet Union before it, suffers 
from what Larry Diamond (2008) called “the exceptional curse of oil” (p. 74).  
Already the economy of the Soviet Union after the discovery of the oil and gas 
fields in Western Siberia began to sweepingly acquire the structure characteristic of 
a petro-state. Therefore, it is not by accident that “the largest geopolitical 
catastrophe” of the 20th century started in 1985 after an almost six-fold drop in oil 
prices (Putin, 2005). 
The modern Russian economy has been substantially dependent on oil prices 
as well. In the words of the program director of Moscow Carnegie Center Movchan 
(2017), in Russia in 2008 the correlation between the changes in oil prices made up 
between 90% and 95% of the changes in the GDP growth rate, the federal budget 
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income, and the size of reserves (p. 5). According to the Russian Ministry of 
Finance, in 2014, 35.4% of the federal budget revenue came directly from the export 
of petroleum. Value-added tax received from selling imported goods, most of which 
(92%) were paid for with the money received from exporting raw materials, made 
up additional 15% of the budget (Movchan, 2017, p. 7). Also, taxes, levies, and 
payments for natural resources equaled 20% of the budget, with excise and other 
duties on imported goods adding another 13%. Altogether, in 2014, “83.4% of the 
federal budget income was made up by the revenue from the extraction and export 
of raw materials” (Movchan, 2017, p. 7).  
It would be a mistake to think that an increase in the general income of the 
Russian population occurred because the state managed to create a competitive 
industrial sphere. The increase should be first accounted for by the export of oil, the 
extraction of which makes up about 20% of the Russian GDP. Another factor 
explaining the increase in the income is the outpacing consumption growth, which 
is fueled by trade “blown out of proportions due to the huge petrodollars flow of 
import” (Movchan, 2017, p. 6). Citing the data of the Federal Service of State 
Statistics (Rosstat), Movchan (2017) indicated that by 2014 Russia was importing 
from 85% to 95% of production means, and from 50% to 70% of consumption 
goods (p. 6).  
A growth in the income of the Russians during the 2000s did not contradict 
such a roll back as it was ensured mainly at the expense of the raw material rent.  
The latter, however, is threatened today not only by the unfavorable demand-supply 
situation but also by the deepening technological underrun. The methods of oil 
extraction used in Russia are inefficient from the point of view of oil recovery 
factor, which is on average 30% lower today than in the United States and is slowly 
decreasing, whereas in the United States it is slowly growing. The maximum 
possible extraction in Russia will decline and, according to some estimates, will 
dwindle at least two times by 2035 (Poddubny, 2011, pp. 85-103).  
Russia’s rejection of a planned economy and the shift to the market were 
supposed to promote the development of knowledge intensive branches of industry. 
In practice, however, the situation was reversed. According to the data of the 
Russian Machine-Building Portal (2013), for the last 20 years the production of 
processing units in Russia decreased almost 20 times: from 70,000 to 3,000. They 
assert that the decline should be attributed to the political events that led to the 
change in the country’s economic set-up in the 1990s, which “made most of the 
machine-tool building enterprises in Russia bankrupt or put them on the verge of 
bankruptcy” ( Machine-Building Portal, 2013).  
Machine building, however, is the core of modern industry. It is impossible to 
create a modern economy without it. That is why the federal program National 
Technological Base adopted in 2006 and intended for the time frame of 2007-2011 
was specifically earmarked to breathe new life into such an important branch of 
industry (Government, 2007). The program did not produce the expected outcome, 
and could not produce it. This is a direct consequence of Russia’s inability to 
introduce quantitative changes into the economy by means of innovation. The 
situation was also aggravated by the brain drain from the country and the overall 
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low ranking of most Russian universities. According to a report by Russia’s 
Committee of Civil Initiatives, human capital is actively leaving the country, and 
the “quality losses due to emigration that the domestic human capital is 
experiencing are significant and cannot be replenished at the expense of external 
resources” (Vorobieva & Grebeniuk, 2016, p. 25). Only between 2002 and 2011, 
93,000 Russians with degrees emigrated from the Russian Federation (Vorobieva 
& Grebeniuk, 2016, p. 25). This process of washing out the most “educated, 
proactive and motivated” citizens continues (Abramov, 2016). Also, according to 
the 2017 ShanghaiRanking Academic Ranking of 500 world’s top universities, 
Russia’s best university (Lomonosov Moscow State University) ranked 93 
(ARWU, 2017). Its second best higher education establishment, Saint Petersburg 
State University, found itself 400th (ARWU, 2017). Therefore, the absence of a 
competitive industrial sphere and the non-competitiveness of the Russian economy 
were not aided by government policy. Policies that isolate Russia from the world 
community of nations are counter-productive. Over-reliance on natural resources 
and military force are also misguided. Russia’s government and leadership have 
been astute at capitalizing on traditional fears and mistrust of the other, strategies 
that have long been employed in Russia to its own detriment.  
In April 1985, Gorbachev began Perestroika with “uskoreniye,” which can be 
translated into English as “acceleration.” The term refers to the initial stage of 
Gorbachev’s reforms when the Soviet government was trying to expedite the social 
and economic development of the country, thus acknowledging that the USSR had 
been lagging behind the Western countries in that respect. The machine 
manufacturing industry was supposed to play the central role in the process of 
acceleration of the economic development, propelling a quick switch to totally new 
technologies. The outcome of the attempt was illustrated by the examples cited 
above. There is no quick fix and yet people are impatient. Russia’s leadership has 
tended to opt for the expedient low hanging options over the hard work of human 
resource development and partnership building. Twenty-five years of the 
contemporary history of the Russian Federation reflects 25 years of accelerated de-
industrialization. That is why the breakaway from the industrially developed 
countries is growing with every passing year.  
 
Consolidation without "soft power" 
 
The practice of consolidating periphery around the imperial core at the expense of 
redistribution of the natural resource rent is centuries-old. Let us consider the Soviet 
period. In her book To Feed and to Govern: About Power in Russia in the 16th 
through 20th Centuries, Tamara Kondratieva (2006) shows on numerous examples 
how beginning with the Middle Ages, when Russian feudal lords would give their 
noble servants lands “to feed” upon them, the concept of “feeding” emerged (p. 7). 
“Governing” the lands was secondary. Thus, according to the Russian historian 
Kluchevsky, in the Russian history the formation of power relationships happened 
in this order: first came feeding, then governing (Kondratieva, 2006, p. 7).  
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The tradition continued into the modern times when the new symbiotic 
formation of the party-state became the only owner of the country’s riches and 
distributor of the material benefits. The “owner” determined his monopoly power 
at the individual level, in the first place, by means of distributing produce and 
manufactured goods depending on the social status, labor significance, and political 
orientation of citizens (Kondratieva, 2006). After the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the “feeding” practice transformed into purchasing the loyalty of the 
periphery with the help of natural resources by the imperial core. If purchasing the 
loyalty of its nearest neighbors was not feasible, Russia resorted to such pressuring 
means as direct threats and military interventions. Russia has to employ either of 
the options because it simply does not possess soft power, if one understands by it 
“getting others to want what you want” by means of “cultural attraction, ideology, 
and international institutions” (Nye, 1990, p. 167).  
The diverse relations between Russia and its nearest neighbors are examples of 
different degrees of success and failure of the feeding/purchasing practice. Russia, 
for instance, was not able to hold the Baltic States in its sphere of influence by 
means of the pre-dosed “feeding.” That is why the latter opted for NATO umbrella 
to retain their independence. In the cases of Ukraine and Georgia, the refusal to 
exchange one’s loyalty for “feeding” resulted in Russia exercising military power 
to keep the former Soviet republics within its circle of influence.  
The union state of Belarus and Russia may serve, however, as an example of 
efficiency of “feeding.” Its history (founded on April 2, 1997) is first of all the 
history of oil and gas trade “wars” whose essence boils down to the struggle of 
political elites for the “fair” distribution of the resource rent. The last trade war, 
unprecedented with respect to its duration, had started in the summer of 2016 and 
ended only in April of 2017. The reason for noncompliance is self-explanatory. The 
drop in the world prices for energy supply considerably decreased the subsidizing 
abilities of the Russian budget. For Lukashenko, the head of the Belarusian state, 
the present level of subsidies means the loss of social and political stability in the 
country. 
Although Russia is unable to recruit allies from its immediate circle with “soft 
power,” it nevertheless aspires to “the world cultural expansion” (FSCP, 2015, p. 
39). The official civilizational optimism recorded by FSCP finds neither 
understanding nor support from the majority of liberal-minded Russians. They call 
for reforming the state and its base institutions towards more inclusive, empowering 
democratic institutions and market economy. For instance, here are the suggestions 
of the politician and economist Yavlinsky (2017) that he enumerated in his article 
on the outcomes of the latest Gaidar Forum: 
 
• changing the domestic and foreign policy, abolition of repressive 
laws, emancipation of mass media, and fence-mending with the 
nearest neighbors and the rest of the world; 
• emancipation and encouragement of entrepreneurial initiative; 
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• creation of favorable institutional environment for business that would 
presuppose opportunities for business to legally and openly participate 
in the political life of the country; 
• provision of maximally competitive environment in all spheres; and 
• forming of the so-called “development institutes” whose task would 
be to encourage long-term investment, and using for this purpose the 
largest part of the state’s rent income.  
For Yavlinsky (2017), there is “overconcentration of power, [with] its non-
transparency and irremovability, and the absence of political competition, checks 
and balances.” All these obstacles turn the implementation of reforms into mission 
impossible.  
One may, however, argue about the efficiency of such obvious suggestions. 
The overconcentration of the Russian power did not come from nowhere. As it was 
rightly noted by the historian Vladimir Buldakov (2007), power in Russia is “a 
derivative from the people’s ideas about it” (p. 22). The way it is formed is difficult 
to grasp from the sociological point of view (Buldakov, 2007, p. 22). That is why 
any attempts at reforming the Russian state by virtue of direct impact on power are 
a priori doomed to failure.  
 
Conclusion 
 
On the one hand, in its domestic policy Russia puts a premium on the struggle for 
retaining traditional values, which is an unmistakable sign of the loss of the 
historical dynamics, i.e. change. Culture is not static. Russia’s foreign policy, on 
the other hand, is anchored by control of its nearest neighbors. Having gone through 
the disintegration of the empire, the former imperial nation suffers from the 
wounded grandeur complex, which makes it an easy prey for politicians willing to 
draw the people in dangerous foreign policy enterprises. Being unable to exert “soft 
power” on the immediate neighbors, Russia compensates for it in two ways: by 
either purchasing the loyalty of the regimes ready to sacrifice part of their 
sovereignty in exchange for economic subsidies (Belarus, Armenia), or by the direct 
military interference (Georgia, Ukraine).  
The idea of a super power has indeed proved to be much-in-demand for the 
masses. Therefore, one of the country’s prospects is the continuation of the self-
isolation policy (de facto or chosen), coupled with hybrid wars. This policy, 
however, limits Russia’s potential for development by stifling the ingenuity of 
citizens’ entrepreneurial spirit. Although it may help prolong the life of an imagined 
empire, in reality it does not contribute to Russia’s greatness. Another choice for 
Russia could be the transformation into a liberal civilization, which will most 
probably demand a change in civilizational identity, as well as the acceptance of 
universal values such as respect for human rights and dignity, and so on. Time will 
show whether Russia will choose innovation over tradition, or vice versa; and 
whether it will attempt to join the “civilized world” yet again, or will continue to 
lead a wretched existence on the historic sidelines.  
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Abstract 
 
Within the context of a new Cold War between the Western powers and Russia, 
one of the most dangerous hot spots is Ukraine. Since 2014, in fact, the Ukrainian 
army has been engaged in a civil war against Russian-backed troops of self-
proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk Republics. This crisis appears as a new 
geopolitical tool both for Russia and for the United States: for the former, in 
order to contain NATO expansion, for the latter, in order to counteract Russian 
influence and to open the way for U.S. liquefied natural gas exports in Europe, 
reducing European energy dependence on Russia (Chornii, 2015; Marples, 2016). 
The Ukrainian position is strategic: it is one of the main transit routes of Russian 
natural gas to European countries, with three main pipeline corridors. Knowledge 
of Ukraine’s geographic situation is needed in order to better understand the 
evolving crisis in the region. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article maps various data with a GIS tool, in order to point out social and 
political factors underpinning the crisis. It highlights the deep differences between 
Western and Eastern regions of the country in the following aspects: economic 
differences, which will be described using macro-economic indicators in a regional-
scaled map; demographic differences, which will be described through a regional-
scaled map of population distribution by native language, in order to better highlight 
the role of Russia’s influence in national identity; and political differences, which 
will be shown by mapping the 2010 presidential election results (the last vote before 
the crisis) in order to highlight the split among the Ukrainian people in the choice 
between European or Russian spheres of influence. By combining various data, we 
propose an “instability factor,” namely an index composed of the elements with 
highest risk factor in the crisis. Through the “instability factor,” a regional-scaled 
map will highlight the Ukrainian regions with the highest risk for an escalation of 
the Donbas crisis (Kulyk, 2016). 
 
The Ukrainian Crisis (2014 to present) 
 
For the past three years, the NATO-backed Ukrainian army has faced a civil war 
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against Russian-backed troops of the self-proclaimed People’s Republic of Donetsk 
(RPD) and People’s Republic of Luhansk (RPL) (Nicolai, 2017). Overshadowed by 
a more spectacular Syrian civil war, the Ukrainian war is almost ignored by 
mainstream media, despite its importance and risk, especially for the European 
Union (Gaiani, 2014; Sceresini & Giroffi, 2015). 
The current crisis erupted during the winter 2013-14, when violent clashes 
exploded in Kiev following Yanukovych’s decision to halt the country’s process of 
integration with the European Union. The growing clashes forced Yanukovych to 
leave the country (de Ploeg, 2017). Following his flight, a new government took 
power whose first act was the proposal to repeal the bilingualism law that 
recognized Russian as an official language of Ukraine (На Украине отменили 
закон… 2014; White, Feklyunia, 2014). In this way, the “Euromaidan” forces 
seemed to have the intention to exclude the Russian-speaking population, which 
was interpreted as a hostile act against the part of Ukrainian people who speak 
Russian as their first language (Dubin, 2017. cfr. Bocale, 2016).  
During February 2014, armed people, pretending to be popular militia occupied 
regional government buildings in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and replaced 
the Ukrainian flag with the Russian one (Marxsen, 2014). On March 16, 2014, 
following a controversial ballot, the Russian Federation intruded and annexed 
Crimea. Russian-speaking rebels in the Eastern regions of Donec basin followed a 
similar path. In May 2014, Regional Administration buildings were occupied and 
self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic 
(LPR) were established, following a referendum, while in Odessa, far-right 
Ukrainian protesters occupied the Trade Unions house, setting the building on fire 
and killing 46 pro-Russian people and injuring more than 200 (Hyde & Rudenko, 
2014). 
In May 2014, Yulia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko faced off in a 
presidential election, the latter won collecting 54.7% votes, but Crimea and Donec 
basin population had not the chance to vote because of the crisis. One of the first 
acts of the newly elected President Poroshenko was to sign again an association 
agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, overriding the Yanukovych 
decision.  
On the 5th of February 2015, People’s Council members of the People’s 
Republic of Donetsk issued a memorandum from which it is possible to find some 
elements that enable a better understanding of the aims of the self-proclaimed state. 
The document titled “Memorandum of Donetsk People's Republic on the principles 
of state-building, political and historical continuity” reads, in part, as follows:  
 
We, members of the People's Council of Donetsk People's Republic of 
the first convocation, elected by universal democratic and free elections 
on November 2, 2014, taking into account the principles of international 
law, embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, proclaim the 
Memorandum on the principles of state-building, political and historical 
continuity. Based on the will of the people of Donbass, expressed in the 
referendum of May 11, 2014, in the Act of the proclamation of state 
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independence of Donetsk People's Republic, the Declaration of 
Sovereignty of the Donetsk People's Republic from April 7, 2014, 
understanding of the need for the progressive development of law-making 
and state-building process, we affirm the historical connection of the state 
formations of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic and Donetsk People's 
Republic (…). 
We, members of the People's Council of Donetsk People's Republic, 
recognizing our responsibility to the past and paving the way to the future: 
- declare the continuation of the traditions of Donetsk-Krivoy Rog 
Republic and declare that the state of Donetsk People's Republic is its 
successor; 
- call for cooperation and uniting efforts to build a federal state on a 
voluntary contractual bases of all the territories and lands, that were part 
of Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic. (Donetsk Republic Memorandum…, 
2015). 
 
Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic (DKR) was a Republic founded in February 1918 
by the IV Congress of Soviets of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog basin, following the 
Russian Revolution (Донецко-Криворожская советская республика… 1969-
1978). The Republic comprised of the territories of Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, 
Kherson, Odessa, Nikolaev, Crimea, and Don Host oblast (область). According to 
DPR and LPR memorandum, Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic never formally ceased 
to exist, despite the German occupation, war, and other social disasters, and “its 
ideas lived on in the hearts and souls of millions of people” (Donetsk Republic 
Memorandum…, 2015). 
By solemnly affirming the historical continuity of DPR with the Soviet 
Republic of Donetsk-Krivoy Rog, a state created in February 1918 in order to 
integrate Donec e Krivoy Rog river basins, representatives of self-proclaimed 
Donbas Republics confirmed their wishes to extend control over the entire territory 
of the former Soviet Republic. A similar press release, published on 6th of April 
2015 on a Russian website, claimed the reconstitution of Odessa Soviet Republic, 
a state proclaimed in 1918, then occupied by Germany until the end of the war. 
Such press releases had no concrete results but are useful to understand pro-Russian 
projects in the Ukrainian civil war. 
This article aims at analyzing geographical elements of Ukraine’s territory, in 
order to provide evidence related to the geopolitical situation of the country, 
studying critical elements and foreseeing potential consequences. The point is to 
highlight geographical elements useful to predict potential spread of conflict in 
other regions of the country. 
Since “geography matters” (Massey & Allen, 1984), knowledge of 
territory is needed for every geopolitical analysis, in order to counteract the so-
called “geographic banalization,” namely the loss of geographical knowledge due 
to popularly available information tools (Borruso, 2010, p. 243). Without 
geographical knowledge, it is impossible to understand geopolitical issues (Battisti, 
2002). Geopolitics is the “dynamic stage” of political geography (Massi, 1931), and 
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requires deep analysis of mapping (Boria, 2007; Boria, 2008) varied complex 
factors within and across territories, in order to understand the relationships among 
economic, social, and political data.  
 
Ukraine and the Energy Market 
 
Ukraine is a key territory both for the European Union and for Russia. Due to its 
geographical position, Ukraine is a transition area for natural gas supply coming 
from Russia towards Europe (Semenenko, 2015). European import of 
hydrocarbons from Russia represents 39.3% of the total for natural gas, 33.5% for 
oil, as well as 6% of total European energy consumption (Eurostat, data, 2013). 
The European Union is the main export market for Russian natural gas, with an 
export of 161.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) (Gazprom, export data, 2013). The 
whole hydrocarbons market is 15% of the Russian Federation’s GDP (World  
Bank Group, data, 2013).  
Figure 1. Ukraine Territory, with main cities and Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) 
Zone. Source: created by author. 
 
The European Union, mainly pushed by former Warsaw Pact states, has, for 
many years, tried to reduce energy dependence from Russia and to break free from 
the supply control that serves as a Russian pressure tool on European national 
governments.1 The strategy of Gazprom, a Russian state-controlled company for 
natural gas mining and distribution, is the use of prices as a control tool on former 
                                                           
1 Mainly Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. 
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Warsaw Pact states. This strategy became evident during the crisis between Russia 
and Ukraine, in the winter 2008-09, when Gazprom used natural gas supply (as well 
as threats to block it) to stop the leaning of Ukraine towards the European Union 
and NATO (Kandiyoti, 2015). 
During the winter 2013-14, when the current crisis started, price policy was 
openly used to sustain or to counteract policies of the Ukrainian government. In 
November 2013, after Yanukovych stopped the process of association and free trade 
with the European Union, Gazprom implemented a radical cut of hydrocarbons 
prices to Ukraine. In the same way, in February 2014, after Yanukovych escaped 
from the country, Gazprom punished the “Euromaidan” coup d’état by raising 
prices by 81%.2 
A dense pipeline network (Figure 2) shows how all the natural gas and oil 
exported from Russia to Europe passes through two hubs: Ukraine and the Baltic 
Sea. The Nord Stream Pipeline runs through the Baltic bypassing Poland to reach 
Germany. The Belarus branch of pipeline passes through Ukrainian territory before 
reaching Europe, thus dependent on the relationship between Kiev and Moscow. 
Market access for the main Russian state-company depends on stability and 
capacity of these two hubs. 
Instability in Ukraine has pushed Russia to try to open new paths for pipelines 
with three main projects. These are: (a) Nord Stream 2 project against which former 
Warsaw Pact countries are protesting and that would expand pipeline capacity from 
33 bcm to 55 bcm; (b) South Stream projected pipeline that would bypass Ukraine 
from the south passing through the Black Sea with a 63 bcm flow (hindered by 
European Union); and (c) Turkish Stream pipeline that would pass through Turkey 
and whose completion closely depends on many factors such as the Syrian crisis, 
instability of Turkish regime, and difficult relations between Ankara and the 
European Union (Paolini, 2014). The issue of building a new pipeline bypassing 
Ukraine involves many European countries, like the former Warsaw Pact states, 
which are trying to halt new pipeline projects from Russia in order to avoid Moscow 
cutting off the Kiev gas market. Western countries are also trying to take advantage 
of every opportunity to improve their national energy security. 
A real arm wrestling match took place in the European Union among Italy 
(pushing for the building of South Stream, in which Italian State-company ENI is 
involved), Germany (aiming to reach the goal of doubling Nord Stream Pipeline), 
and Greece (interested in the Turkish Stream project). In the middle, former 
Warsaw Pact European countries, led by Poland, pushed the European Union to 
enforce anti-trust rules against every new Gazprom project (De Maio, 2016a). In 
February 2015, the European Commission approved an Energy Union Strategy, 
following pressure from some Eastern-European countries, a project aimed at 
finding a long-term strategy to “free” European Union from Russian dependence. 
Until now, the result of this competition was the halting of the South Stream project, 
                                                           
2 The issue of Ukraine purchase of Russian gas has its roots in 1991. Being in Russian sphere 
of influence, Ukraine have paid below-market prices until the 2014 crisis. Still today, buying 
Russian gas for Ukraine is quite a bit cheaper than many other energy sources. During 2009 
gas crisis, Gazprom accused Ukraine government of stealing gas from transit supplies. 
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while North Stream 2 and Turkish Stream still remain on the table. 
 
Figure 2. European pipeline network. Source: International Energy Agency, 2014. 
 
In some sense, persistent opposition coming from the European Union to any 
new pipeline project–and in particular from former Warsaw Pact states, wishful to 
preserve the strategic centrality of Kiev–prevents any reduction of energy traffic 
concentration in the Belarus-Ukrainian region. Since any loosening of European 
dependence from Russian gas looks a long way off, Ukraine remains the main 
traffic hub, as well as a geopolitical tension hub. The United States and Eastern 
European countries are trying to pull Ukraine to the European side where the entry 
of Ukraine into the European Union would extend the European rules on energy 
and open the road to liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from the United States, 
hence loosening the ties through which Europe remains linked to Russia. When 
visiting European countries in March 2014, President Obama aimed to propose the 
United States as an alternative supplier for European energy needs, in order to “free” 
Europe from dependence on Russia (European leaders ask…, 2014). This is the only 
concrete project aimed to weaken European energy dependence on Russia, but it is 
still far from realization (cfr. Youngs, 2009). 
On the other side, Russia is trying to keep Kiev in its sphere of influence in 
order to maintain control of a large part of gas and oil trade with Europe, especially 
since Europe is trying to halt the pipeline projects coming from Russia that bypass 
Ukraine. In the meantime, the Ukrainian war is seriously affecting the gas trade, 
harming Ukraine’s economy, stressed by a fast-growing public debt. According to 
President Poroshenko’s speech in the U.N. assembly (September 2015), the total 
amount of war costs for Ukraine is close to $5 million per day. Not just Kiev but 
also Moscow is affected by these significant losses. Gazprom energy exports are 
often halted due to sanctions imposed by the United States and allies following 
Crimea’s occupation. However, Ukraine’s civil war is not just related to energy. 
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There are other geographic, political, economic, and linguistic reasons that need to 
be understood and taken into account. Territory is never a neutral factor in such a 
geopolitical crisis and it is impossible to understand the Ukrainian situation without 
knowing more about its territorial background. For this reason, we need to focus the 
analysis at the regional scale, in order to give place-based evidence to a complex 
situation. 
 
The Ukrainian Situation before the 2014 Crisis 
 
Ukrainian war mainly concentrate within the territory of the Donec basin, straddling 
Donetsk and Luhansk oblast, a territory now partly controlled by the self-
proclaimed RPD and RPL. The Ukrainian government does not recognize neither 
the republics nor the de facto annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation. Kiev 
calls these territories Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone. The zone encompasses 
around 7.5% of national territory (Crimea included), i.e., around 45,000 km2 on an 
over 600,000 km2 national area (Figure 1). 
Ukrainian territory is composed of 24 oblast – an administrative regional level 
corresponding to NUTS 2 level3 – two cities with special status (Kiev and 
Sevastopol) and the autonomous Republic of Crimea.4 By analyzing census 2001 
data, the last available before the crisis, it is possible to observe that the economic 
reality of various oblast is deeply unequal.5 There are many differences amongst 
regions. The first indicator chosen in this research is the regional GDP per capita. 
By mapping this, it is possible to see that regional GDP per capita of Eastern oblast 
is up to three time larger than Western ones, with 13,228 hryvnias produced in 
Chernivtsi against 42,068 hryvnias in Dnipropetrovsk (Figure 3).6 Eastern oblast 
have an industrial infrastructure specialized in iron metallurgy and coal mining.  
                                                           
3 The nomenclature of territorial units for statistics, abbreviated NUTS (from the French 
version Nomenclature des Unités territoriales statistiques) is a geographical nomenclature 
that subdivide the territory of European Union at three different levels (NUTS 1, 2, and 3, 
from larger to smaller).  
4 For a better readability, in the maps realized for this paper, the Kiev data were merged to 
the Kiev oblast data, while Sevastopol data were merged to Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
data. 
5 Except where differently specified, all the data of this analysis are referred to 2001 census. 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/. The aim is to highlight situation of the country before crisis. 
6 U.S. dollar to Ukrainian hryvnia rate is 1=26.9400 (March 2017). 13.228 hryvnias is 
equivalent to around $491, while 42.068 hryvnias is equivalent to around 1.561€. State 
Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2011.  
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Figure 3. Regional GDP per capita in hryvnias, 2011. Source: Created by author 
based on State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2011.  
 
Economic differences among regions are really deep, and they are reflected on 
average wages: people living in Eastern countries earn on average $100-120 more 
than Western countries. The gap between Donetsk oblast and Ternopol oblast reach 
$164 average, showing a situation of dependence of poor regions on richest ones, 
whose economy is based mainly on mines and natural resources. 
There are also many other differences in population distribution in the oblast. 
According to census questions related to mother tongue, a very significant share of 
the population uses Russian language, and not Ukrainian in the home. It is helpful 
to plot this data in a regional map (Figure 5) in order to better understand the 
distribution of this population. The Russian-speaking people are mainly located in 
Eastern oblast and in a coastal strip from Black Sea to Odessa (where it exceeds 
40% of total population), while the Ukrainian-speaking population is mainly 
distributed in the Western and central regions. In addition, urban population 
distribution is unequal, with a distribution similar to that of mother tongue: of nine 
total cities with more than 500,000 people, seven are in the Eastern side, while in 
Western oblast there are just Kiev and L’viv. Therefore, by looking at the maps, we 
can evaluate deep differences–economic, social, demographic–between the Eastern 
and Western Ukrainian regions. The Eastern oblast are on average much richer, 
more urbanized, and with higher percentage of Russian-speaking population than 
the Western ones (Corsale, 2016).  
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Figure 4. Salaries per region in USD, 2013. Source: (И все развалилось… 2014)  
 
Another major difference is related to political beliefs and ideology. The last 
Ukrainian presidential elections before the crisis were held in two rounds in 2010: 
the first round on 17th January, and the second round on 7th February. Eighteen 
candidates competed, but the biggest competition was between Russian-backed 
Viktor Yanukovych and UE-backed Yulia Tymošenko, the representative of 
Orange Revolution movement, which led to the government of Viktor Juščenko in 
2005. 
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Figure 5. Russian-speaking people in percentage, 2001. Source: Created by author based on 
Census data, 2001. 
 
Figure 6. Percentage votes for Yanukovych, first round presidential election, 17th January 
2010. Source: Created by author based on election results, 2010. 
Journal of Global Initiatives      94 
 
 
 
By analyzing the results of this election before the crisis, it is possible to better 
understand the political differences within the Ukrainian population. In fact, this 
data shows the power of two influential spheres, a Russian one and European one, 
on a population deeply divided. During the last few years, debating policies of 
European Union integration represented one of the main reasons for political 
discord between supporters of a Ukraine closer to Europe, and defenders of the 
traditional position of the country, as a Russia strategic ally since the falling of the 
Berlin wall. Through territorialization of electoral data from these first and second 
rounds, it is possible to determine the distribution of supporters of the two factions, 
and then compare the results with socioeconomic and demographic elements. 
The economic and linguistic data we observed between Western and Eastern 
oblast is mostly reflected in electoral results. Russian-backed Yanukovych became 
president thanks to votes collected in the Eastern Russian-speaking oblast. Despite 
the high number of candidates in some Eastern oblast, Yanukovych collected more 
than 50% of votes already in the first round, exceeding 70% in Donetsk and 
Luhansk, and 60% in Crimea (Figure 6). The same pattern for Yulia Tymošenko, 
whose votes were collected for the most part in Western and Northern oblast, 
exceeding 50% in Volyn oblast (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Percentage votes for Tymošenko, first round presidential election, 17th 
January 2010. Source: Created by author based on election results, 2010. 
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During the second round, this difference became more evident: Yanukovych, the 
pro-Russian candidate (winning with a difference slightly lower than 900,000 
votes), dominated in all the Eastern regions, while his rival exceeded half of all 
votes in all Western regions (Figure 8). It is possible to read the vote for 
Yanukovych as a vote for a Russian sphere of influence: following the 2004 Orange 
Revolution, the issue of pursuing pro-European or pro-Russian policies strongly 
influenced the 2010 election campaign, representing the real dividing line amongst 
candidates. 
 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of votes for second round candidates, presidential elections, 
February 7, 2010. Source: Created by author based on election results, 2010. 
 
Votes for Yanukovych mainly came from Russian-speaking population, while 
competitor votes came from the Ukrainian-speaking population. In this case, on a 
quick analysis, the results would appear to be based on ethnicity, or on a linguistic-
based preference reflected in political results. Nevertheless, by comparing the 
presidential election results with the Russian-speaking population data, it is possible 
to discover a different situation: only in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhya 
regions did votes for Yanukovych almost perfectly overlap with Russian-speaking 
data, while within the other oblast this is not the case. In Crimea, the future president 
collected a percentage of votes 15% lower than the Russian-speaking population 
percentage; within Kiev region, this difference was 10%, while in other oblast 
Yanukovych votes far outnumbered the Russian-speaking population (+22% in 
Mykolayiv, +25% in Kirovohrad, even +27% in Western Transcarpathia, on the 
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border with Moldavia). Yanukovych was elected because of this perhaps 
unexpected support. This is a sign of the penetration power of Russian influence in 
Ukrainian-speaking population, and of the general complexity of this political 
situation (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Percentage difference between Yanukovych votes and Russian-speaking 
population. Source: Created by author based on Ukraine Census data (2001) and 
election results, 2010. 
 
The Instability Factor 
 
Through cartographic place evidence, it is possible to highlight some aspects 
of Ukrainian regional situation before the “Euromaidan” crisis. Maps show a 
complex situation, with deep social, economic, and linguistic differences. The 
portrayal of Ukraine as a country with a Europhile population forced under the 
energetic geopolitical pressure of Russia does not fully describe the greater 
geographical complexity of the region. Through a set of data indicators, it is 
possible to highlight some factors of greater influence on this crisis, and useful to 
understand possible future scenarios. 
Starting from analyzed territorial data, it is possible to generate a synthetic 
index called the “instability factor,” which aims to summarize the major indicators 
that lead and sustain the current political crisis: linguistic composition of 
population; Russian-speaking population distribution; Russian political influence 
(counted by percentage of Yanukovych votes in the presidential elections); and 
economic disparity, counted by regional GDP per capita, which often accompanies 
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political tensions. 
The formula for this index is the mathematical sum of the selected indicators, 
expressed in percentage: the Russian-speaking population according to 2001 
census; the result of Yanukovych votes in the last presidential election before the 
crisis (2010); and the regional share of GDP per capita (2011). The author decided 
not to weight differently these indicators in this analysis considering them a simple 
vector of loss of stability in the field of this geopolitical context. Please find the 
composite scores listed alphabetically below by oblast from a scale of (64) to (281). 
 
Table 1: Instability Factor by Oblast in the Region  
Oblast name Instability Factor 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 208 
Cherkasy Oblast 98 
Chernihiv Oblast  98 
Chernivtsi Oblast 71 
Dnipropetrovs’k Oblast   221 
Donetsk Oblast   279 
Ivano-Frankivs’k Oblast  75 
Kharkiv Oblast   193 
Kherson Oblast   281 
Khmel’nyts’kyy Oblast   80 
Kiev Oblast   255 
Kirovohrad Oblast 107 
Luhansk Oblast 228 
L’viv Oblast 81 
Mykolayiv Oblast 163 
Odessa Oblast 183 
Poltava Oblast 158 
Rivne Oblast 74 
Sumy Oblast 104 
Ternopil’ Oblast   64 
Transcarpathia Oblast   83 
Vinnytsya Oblast   82 
Volyn Oblast   72 
Zaporizhzhya Oblast 196 
Zhytomyr Oblast 91 
Source: Created by author based on Ukraine Census data (2001), State Statistics 
Service of Ukraine ,2001 and election results, 2010. 
 
The data are collected from the Election results, 2001 State Census, and State 
Statistics Service of Ukraine, before the deep changes brought by the current crisis, 
and aims to give evidence to territorial elements on a regional basis. Through this 
tool it is possible to understand which territories presented significant critical 
elements before the war and consequently which territories are permeable to an 
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eventual spread of conflict. The higher factor means a greater risk for the region to 
be affected by an eventual spread of the crisis due to the presence of these main 
elements at the outset of the current war.  
Figure 10. Instability factor. Source: Created by author based on Ukraine Census 
data (2001), State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2011 and election results, 2010. 
 
A regional map of this factor allows us to understand how deep are the 
differences in Ukrainian regions; furthermore, through the instability factor, it is 
possible to foresee the potential spread of the current crisis particularly to 
Dnipropetrovsk and Kherson oblast where the index exceeds 200, reaching the 
same level as Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea regions (Figure 10). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The instability factor is useful to understand the major factors on which the 
Ukrainian crisis and civil war are based, and their diffusion in the region. The goal 
of this research is to identify trends that help to understand, examine, and foresee 
the eventual evolution of crisis. This index highlights how risk zone interests 
encompass all Eastern regions and the whole coastal strip of the Black Sea from 
Mariupol to Odessa region. 
This analysis shows that in case of the spread of civil war, these oblast would 
be more permeable to secessionist pro-Russian agenda with the aim to connect 
Russia to the Odessa region. Such an eventual de facto annexation of the coastal 
strip–similar to what happened in Donbas–would cut off Kiev from the Black Sea, 
99     Michele Pigliucci 
 
 
letting rebels to link with Republic of Moldova. In Moldova, a strong pro-Russian 
movement is pushing the country to strengthen ties with Moscow. In the end of 
2016, Igor Dodon, a pro-Russian leader, won the presidential elections in Moldova. 
His first act as a new president was to remove the European flag from the 
presidential building. In this context, the target of a self-proclaimed Republic to be 
recognized as a renewed historical Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Republic, as written in the 
statement published in 2015, indicate a new purpose: to promote the ties between 
Russia and Europe, cutting off Ukraine from its current position as an energy hub. 
In the case of a coastal alliance between Russia and Moldova, Gazprom’s new 
pipeline would easily reach Europe bypassing Ukraine and diminishing its central 
role in the European energy supply. However, access to the pipeline is crucial for 
maintaining the entire Ukrainian economic system, its loss having catastrophic 
consequences for Ukraine (Fasola, 2016). 
The geopolitical situation of Ukraine is quite different from the previous Cold 
War confrontations (cfr. Wilson, 2016). In this case, the likely direct involvement 
of Russian soldiers in fighting, as well as the not-so-secret involvement of U.S. 
intelligence forces in backing Ukrainian Army against DPR and LPR forces, appear 
as evidence for increased possibility of direct conflict 7. The energy issue is an 
economic tool used to strengthen or weaken the ties between former Soviet 
Republics–like Ukraine–and Europe or Russia. The main issue for the United States 
is a kind of a new “Reagan Doctrine”: according to this, the United States is directly 
involved in regime change actions in the key-countries for Russian economy, such 
as Ukraine (Szporluk, 2000). Destabilization of pro-Russian regimes and support to 
anti-Russian movements are crucial actions that are part of strategy in counteracting 
Russia’s attempts to expand influence (cfr. Khrushcheva, Maltby, 2015).8 
Similarly, the main issue for Russia is to keep Ukraine out from Euro-U.S. 
influence, in order to avoid NATO to reach its borders. For Moscow, selling natural 
gas is the best way to keep countries tied to Russian influence, taking advantage of 
their growing energy needs. In this sense, Ukraine’s key position in the pipeline 
network is the main reason for Russia to keep control on Kiev. The Russian 
economy depends on energy sales to Europe, and Moscow can’t risk being cut off 
from Europe by an anti-Russian regime, at least until new pipelines are built.  
It is really hard to foresee how this conflict will be solved. Since 2014, Russian-
backed forces are fighting against regular and irregular Ukrainian troops, in an 
exhausting and bloody war.9 Through the analysis of this article, what is possible to 
                                                           
7 Proof of the direct involvement of Russian soldiers are in the events of capture of some of 
them by Ukrainian authorities on battleground. (Captured Russian troops… 2014; cfr. Harris, 
Dreazen, 2014) 
8 The direct involvement of the U.S. government in Ukraine crisis is proved by several 
sources. The idea of a new “Reagan Doctrine” is a reading of author, based on these 
sources. (Интересы РФ и США…2014: interview of George Friedman, CEO of Stratfor, 
calling the overthrow of Yanukovych the “most blatant coup in history”); (Kaylan, 2014; 
Ukraine crisis… 2014: transcription of leaked Nuland-Pyatt call); Milne S., 2014. 
9 According to VoaNews, United Nations estimates around 10,000 people have been killed 
and around 23,500 injured since 2014 to July 2017. (OHCHR: Deaths… 2017). 
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forecast is the possibility of a macro regional spread of the violence, and the 
potential involvement of certain regions in the operation, due to high levels of the 
instability factor. However, the instability factor could also be used to develop 
targeted policies in order to prevent this spread by intervening on economic, social, 
and cultural elements. For example, establishing policies that provide greater 
autonomy to Russian-speaking regions and develop proper laws for the protection 
and adequate representation of minorities, while also introducing measures to 
reduce economic disparities including autonomous energy policies for Ukraine with 
regards to both the European Union and Russia, could effectively mitigate against 
the spread of the crisis. In conclusion, geography matters, in Ukraine such as 
everywhere: the deeper the knowledge of the real situation of a country, through 
territorialized regional-scaled data, the deeper will be the understanding of real 
differences in territories and related problems, and the stronger will be the 
preventive action of national and international policy and decision makers.  
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Abstract 
 
Focusing upon the warming Sino-Russian relationship in general, this paper also 
examines in particular both countries interests in the Arctic region. The paper 
begins with a brief overview of the developing Sino-Russian relationship since the 
late 1980s. After discussing the blossoming of friendlier ties during the Putin-Xi 
era, it reviews some of the arguments and assumptions that scholars have held 
predicting either an ever closer relationship or an eventual rupture in those 
relations. The paper then analyzes both countries’ interests in the Arctic realm, 
using this case study as evidence supporting the view that the Sino-Russian 
relationship–despite its many difficulties–has been effectively managed in this 
arena for mutual benefit. As well, although it was not intended to be so, the 
sanctions regime imposed by America and her European allies has been a key 
driver in the closer Arctic relationship, in specific, and Sino-Russian relations, in 
general. 
 
 
The Russo-Chinese Relationship in Recent History 
 
Since the earliest interactions between Russians and Manchus in the 1650s to the 
summits between Russia’s post-communist leadership and China’s powerful 
communist brokers in the early years of the third millennium, borders, trade, and 
broader geopolitical strategic considerations have played a crucial part in the two 
great powers’ relationship. From the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) to the Treaty on 
Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation (2001), the relationship 
between the two countries has either broken down or blossomed on these issues; at 
the same time, during each successive era, historical experiences have played an 
important role in shaping each party’s strategic behavior (Rotnem, 2014). In the 
early 1980s, with the U.S.S.R. mired in the deepening Afghan struggle and Deng 
Xiaoping’s domestic reforms having borne fruit, the senior leadership in Beijing 
signaled a willingness to improve Sino-Soviet relations. In 1982, Beijing asserted 
that a more independent foreign policy would henceforth be followed, perhaps 
because the new Reagan administration indicated a more pugnacious U.S. foreign 
policy was in the offing or possibly because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
wished to re-balance their relationship vis-à-vis Washington by repairing relations 
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with Moscow. Whatever the rationale, the two former rivals began to consult 
regularly on a variety of items of mutual concern, including issues of scientific and 
technological exchanges, security, and trade. With Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s 
assumption of power in early 1985, further stimulus was given to the improving 
relationship. 
“Novye Myshlenie” or “new thinking” was the rhetorical, pragmatic 
cornerstone of Gorbachev’s foreign policy. Requiring a breathing space from the 
Cold War confrontation between East and West, the new General Secretary of the 
Soviet Communist Party devoted his energies to the domestic front, in order to re-
shape, re-balance, and transform the ailing command administrative economy. 
While Gorbachev eventually made significant compromises with Reagan over arms 
control and Soviet conventional forces in Europe, the General Secretary also made 
important concessions to the Chinese, such as ending the conflict in Afghanistan, 
reducing Russian troop commitments in Mongolia, and putting pressure on its 
Vietnamese allies to end their occupation of Cambodia.  
As a result, the first Sino-Russian summit in over 30 years was held. 
Gorbachev’s meetings with Deng in early 1989 signaled the normalization of 
governmental relations, as well as the renewal of ties between the “brotherly” 
communist parties of both states. Though little else grew out of this meeting–in 
large measure due to the ongoing and incipient democracy protests in Beijing that 
spring–nevertheless, these meetings were an important first rung on the ladder 
toward a more pragmatic, stable relationship, one in which both parties begged off 
interfering in one another’s domestic affairs and participating in ideological 
contestation, while also putting aside the potential for a renewed military alliance.  
In 1990, both parties agreed to reduce their military deployments and 
armaments along their lengthy border. In addition, military contacts were re-
established, as reciprocal missions visited one another’s capital. Thereafter, 
Moscow began its first of many sales of military equipment to the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), with an agreement signed that fall to offer the Chinese transport 
helicopters. Indeed, by the end of the Gorbachev era, trade in non-military goods 
had also increased, from $380 million in 1985 to over $6 billion in 1991 (Menon, 
2009, p. 11). 
The warming trend continued under President Boris N. Yeltsin’s leadership of 
the now democratic, post-communist Russia. Within months, Yeltsin made a state 
visit to China’s capital city, laying the initial groundwork for the eventual 
announcement in September 1994 that a “constructive partnership” had been 
established between Russia and China. Economic trade continued to surpass the $6 
billion mark annually into the mid- and late-1990s, with raw materials and energy 
products heading the list of Russian exports to China, and consumer goods topping 
China’s exports to Russia (Goldstein, 2001, p. 850). In addition, Yeltsin’s visit to 
Beijing concluded with a partial resolution of ongoing border problems; a 1992 
agreement signed between Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin delimited roughly 4,200 
kilometers along the eastern Sino-Russian border. This agreement was followed by 
increased sales of arms to China, with over $2 billion in deals struck yearly between 
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1992 and 1994 (Menon, 2009, pp. 10-12). Within several more years, Russia would 
become China’s largest supplier of munitions and military equipment. 
By 1996, both Russia and China began to realize their common interests in 
challenging the Ameri-centric, unipolar world order, with the potential expansion 
of NATO and the strengthened U.S.-Japanese relationship as partial motivating 
drivers. As a result, their “constructive partnership” soon blossomed into something 
more, i.e., the “strategic cooperative partnership.” Announced at the third Sino-
Russian summit meeting in April 1996, the new relationship heralded a series of 
agreements signed between the two powers. One of these effectively settled almost 
all remaining border issues, leaving a mere 400 kilometers still in dispute 
(Ferdinand, 2007, p. 850). Another critical result of the thawing trend was the 
Shanghai Agreement, a security-oriented arrangement that included not only China 
and Russia, but also the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Kyrgyzstan. The “Shanghai Five” met throughout the late 1990s to deal with 
various security items, including extremism, separatism, and terrorism, issues about 
which Moscow and Beijing surely held a shared interest (Tang, 2000, p. 371). 
Ultimately, this organization developed into the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, adding Uzbekistan to the original membership, while broadening the 
agenda to include economic cooperation. A major unstated goal of the organization 
was to frustrate U.S. foreign and defense policy in Central Asia.  
 
Strengthened Ties during the Putin Era 
 
Sino-Russian relations continued to improve under Vladimir V. Putin’s tenure. The 
two powers increasingly saw eye-to-eye on border and trade issues, as well as a 
number of other strategic concerns, e.g., human rights, treatment of ethnic 
minorities, as well as, perhaps most importantly, the U.S.’s role in the world.  
In July 2001, Putin and Jiang Zemin signed the “Treaty of Good Neighbourly, 
Cooperative and Friendly Relations.” The treaty established a variety of cultural 
and scientific exchanges, as well as opportunities for greater economic cooperation. 
The new treaty also included articles on security issues, among which were growing 
military-to-military weapons transfers, including a billion dollar contract to supply 
China with attack aircraft and a 15-year Military Cooperation Plan (Rangsimaporn, 
2006, pp. 478-479). Since then, the two powers’ militaries have increasingly held 
more frequent joint land and/or naval exercises, most recently in the Joint Sea 2017 
maneuvers in the Baltic Sea (Bhadrakumar, 2017).  
Outstanding border problems between the two countries were resolved in the 
“2004 Complementary Agreement,” with the remaining disputes regarding three 
islands in the Amur River dealt with amicably. Russia transferred the Tarabarov 
Island and portions of two others to China, and in return Beijing dropped remaining 
claims over other Russian-administered territories along their shared border. Both 
countries’ parliaments ratified the treaty and the official ceremony on transfer was 
later held in October 2008.  
In terms of trade, the relationship continued to bear fruit. Bilateral trade 
increased more than tenfold since the high-water mark of the late Yeltsin era, 
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reaching $88.8 billion in 2013. To be sure, much of Russia’s exports to China 
continue to be centered upon primary products, e.g., oil products, timber, ferrous 
and non-ferrous metallurgy, etc. At the same time, arms exports remain a sizeable 
portion of overall trade. The trade volume is set to rise much higher, though, in the 
aftermath of historic gas export agreements inked between Putin and Xi Jinping in 
Beijing in May and November 2014. The May agreement guaranteed Russian 
annual deliveries of at least 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China, via the 
“eastern route,” beginning in 2018 (“Russia-China to Sign,” 2014). In reality, with 
China’s desire to replace aging, polluting coal-burning plants with cleaner-burning, 
gas-powered generation in the near term, the size of Russian gas deliveries will 
undoubtedly exceed the contract specifications. And, according to President Putin’s 
statement on the May 2014 agreement, the level of bilateral trade was to exceed 
$100 billion in the year, with a doubling of that figure within five years 
(MacFarquhar & Herszenhorn, 2014.). The November agreement, signed during the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting in Beijing and adding 
an additional 30 billion cubic meters of Russian gas to China’s markets by 2019, 
virtually guarantees that (Panin, 2014b). 
 
A Confluence of Interests and a Marriage of Convenience … 
 
Besides improving prospects for trade and the resolution of border issues, what has 
spurred the very real warming as of late in the Sino-Russian relationship? To be 
sure, there are a variety of strategic reasons for the marked improvement, the 
Ukrainian crisis (and the sanctions regime) being only the most recent. 
For one, both China and Russia are engaged in a battle with terrorist groups on 
their peripheries. Although Ramzan Kadyrov’s oppressive dictatorship in Chechnya 
has kept Islamists in the tiny republic on their heels, the terrorist presence in the 
North Caucasus has by no means been extinguished, now and again creating 
opportunities for striking even within Russia proper. As well, China is confronted 
with its own Muslim separatist movement in Xinjiang, with numerous recent bloody 
incidents proving that the threat has not been managed very well by central 
authorities in Beijing. Indeed, one of the main rationales behind the formation of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was to create a region-wide organization 
that could deal with international terrorism in the Eurasian region, writ large, in 
addition to Central Asia, as both countries also fear the influence of terrorist forces 
emanating from the five former Soviet republics in that realm.  
The two countries have also been chafing at attempted (either alleged or 
perceived) U.S. “imperial” undertakings, particularly in the Middle East during the 
last decade. Russia sees its former client state regimes in Iraq, Libya, and Syria all 
having been affected adversely by U.S. foreign policy moves. Although Moscow 
was not wholly opposed to the U.S. invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein in 
2003, U.S. and European allies’ actions in Libya (acting ostensibly under a UN 
humanitarian mandate) that ended in regime transformation caused the 
Journal of Global Initiatives      108 
 
 
Medvedev/Putin tandem to feel betrayed.1 It can be argued that because of the 
Libyan action, the situation in Syria today is so bloody and a resolution so far 
removed. Similarly, “responsibility-to-protect-type” (R2P) proclamations from the 
U.S. administration worries China, which deems any U.S.-supported human rights 
actions as an unwelcome harbinger of potential outside interference in Beijing’s 
internal affairs.  
Closer to home, both Moscow and Beijing fear U.S. actions undermine these 
regimes’ domestic stability, as well as generate a more threatening international 
security environment. Russia believes that various “color revolutions” in its “near 
abroad” over the last decade have been influenced, if not directly inspired, by 
successive U.S. administrations, including the latest provocation in Ukraine in 
November 2013-February 2014; their goal, according to the Kremlin, is to 
undermine Russia’s leverage over these former states of the Soviet Union, if not to 
challenge Putin’s right to rule in Russia, itself.2 By the same token, attempts to 
expand NATO or the European Union eastward send similar alarm bells ringing in 
the towers of the Kremlin.  
For its part, China views America’s “pivot to Asia”–along with concomitant 
pledges of security assistance to its East Asian allies and recent U.S. basing 
agreements with the governments of Australia and The Philippines–as measures 
that reduce China’s freedom of strategic maneuver and ultimately reduce its ability 
to become a regional hegemon. As well, China fears the ability of the U.S. Navy to 
cut off its avenues of consumer exports, but especially impair its ability to import 
fossil fuels, thereby threatening its all-important economic potential–a potential that 
keeps the Chinese government firmly ensconced in power. This fear has also 
encouraged a deepening in the Sino-Russian relationship, as China invests heavily 
in oil and gas imports from Russia, along with pipeline infrastructure that would 
not necessarily be imperiled by U.S. naval re-deployments in the region. Most 
recently, President Putin allowed China to join Vankor, a huge oil production field 
in Eastern Siberia (Chazan, 2014). It is for the same reason–access to new sources 
of fossil fuels–that China has signed deals with Russia to jointly explore for oil and 
gas deposits in the deep Arctic waters in Russia’s Kara Sea (Jakobson, 2013; 
Mitchell, 2013.). 
As well, the two have recently entered into agreements to reduce U.S. (and 
Western) hegemony in the financial and trade arenas. At the sixth BRICS summit 
in July 2014, Russia and China, along with India, Brazil, and South Africa, signed 
agreements to create the BRICS Pool of Conventional Currency Reserves and the 
New Development Bank. Meant to counterbalance the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, the new financial structures will provide $100 billion 
for initiating a joint response to financial challenges and provide $50 billion in 
capital for priority long-term projects in the member countries, respectively 
                                                           
1 Much the same could be said regarding Nato-led actions in Serbia that eventually created 
an independent Kosovo. 
2 For example, the Kremlin views the demonstrations following parliamentary elections in 
December 2011 as having been linked in some way to “foreign influences.” 
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(Alexandrova, 2014). Moreover, Xi and Putin announced the creation of a $10 
billion Russian-Chinese development fund at a recent meeting (“Russia and China,” 
2017). In addition, China and Russia have set up ruble-yuan currency swaps on 
certain trade deals in an effort to bypass reliance on the U.S. dollar. (Indeed, China 
has inked numerous deals with other large trading partners, e.g., Brazil and India, 
which similarly push the greenback to the side.) Should China and Russia decide to 
drop dollar-denominated energy prices entirely in their relationship, this could 
undermine the U.S. dollar reserve currency status. The two are also attempting to 
slowly reduce the size of their U.S. denominated debt (Halligan, 2014). And, 
President Putin announced recently that Russia, alongside presumably China and 
other countries, is developing its own indigenous bank clearinghouse system, 
thereby replacing its reliance on the U.S.’s SWIFT clearinghouse system 
(“President Putin Pledges,” 2014). Besides these financial undertakings, Russia and 
China are also attempting to challenge U.S. control over transoceanic shipping and 
trade by constructing the Interoceanic Grand Canal through Nicaragua, creating an 
alternative to the U.S.-supported Panama Canal (Paniev, 2014.) 
 
… Or, an Embryonic Alliance in the Making? 
 
All of these events have caused some to wonder whether or not China and Russia 
are creating more than a mere “relationship of denial”–i.e., denying terrorists easy 
marks, denying challengers the opportunity to undermine authoritarianism in 
Eurasian states, and denying the United States its hegemonic position, worldwide. 
In other words, can the current marriage of convenience turn into an economic, 
military, and political alliance between Moscow and Beijing?  
Those who would discount this possibility point to the existence of many 
fundamental differences that exist between the two great powers. Perhaps most 
disruptive to a closer Sino-Russian relationship are the many geo-strategic issues 
that confront it, from Central Asia to Northeast Asia, from relationships with 
regional rivals of China’s to a potential contest between the two over access to the 
Arctic, its resources, and perhaps its lucrative shipping lanes.  
As for Central Asia, it looms large in both countries’ development plans. For 
historic reasons, of course, Russia has many political, economic, and security ties 
to the countries of Central Asia. Indeed, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tadzhikistan 
are integral to President Putin’s plans to create a greater Eurasian Economic Union, 
an entity that can vie with the EU, NAFTA, or ASEAN in global trade, while 
preserving Russia’s influence in such circles, and anchoring the non-Russian states 
of the former Soviet Union to Moscow’s orbit.  
However, immediately upon coming to power, Xi Jinping unveiled his “New 
Silk Road” (“One Road–One Belt”) policy–a strategy of massive Chinese 
investment in Central Asian countries’ transport and pipeline infrastructure, oil and 
gas field development, and consumer goods markets. To be sure, Xi’s move has 
much more to do with securing reliable supplies of fossil fuels–as currently much 
of China’s supply is vulnerable to the U.S. Navy–than it does replacing Russian 
influence in the region. China also wishes to stabilize its western borders and 
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develop its western regions in order to undermine support for domestic terrorism. 
Still, Xi’s visits to the capitals of Central Asian states is said to have frustrated 
Moscow to no end, concerned as it is about a wholesale reorientation of this realm 
toward Beijing and East Asia.3 
Northeast Asia is another theater of potential contest between the two Asian 
powers, in particular because the two share a lengthy border there. Although all 
outstanding border disputes had been officially settled in 2008, population 
dynamics along that border cause alarms to ring in some Kremlin quarters. Indeed, 
Russian lands east of Novosibirsk contain only 7 million citizens. However, over 
100 million Chinese live within 100 miles of the Russian-Chinese border. And, the 
fact is that the regions of Eastern Siberia and the Far East are full of resources 
needed by the Chinese manufacturing sector, all at the same time some Chinese 
maps reportedly portray lands to the south of the Ussuri River as “unreclaimed” 
Chinese territory. Those who argue that this demographic issue acts as a check on 
an ever-improving relationship between China and Russia point to Prime Minister 
Medvedev’s repeated calls to develop the Far East as a “national priority” as 
evidence of Russia’s heightened apprehension (“Russian Government,” 2017). 
Each power is also paired with regional rivals of the other in South and 
Southeast Asia, thereby further frustrating growing ties between the two, it is 
suggested. To be sure, Russia’s warm ties with Vietnam rankles the Chinese, 
particularly in view of the growing energy and defense agreements that have been 
signed between Moscow and Hanoi. In November 2013, Moscow agreed to a host 
of new energy and weapons projects, including those on manufacturing military 
technology within Vietnam and developing alongside Hanoi several gas fields in 
the disputed South China Sea (“Russia Strengthens,” 2013). As well, although India 
and China are engaged in ongoing talks to repair their fraught relations, border 
conflicts between the two and Chinese naval deployments in the Indian Ocean will 
continue to constrain real progress in the relationship, whereas India’s relationship 
with Russia is both enduring and multifaceted (Agrawal, 2014). To be sure, 
Moscow recently delivered to New Delhi its first aircraft carrier, with joint air force 
exercises completed in 2014. As well, Russia is negotiating with India for the 
purchase of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. 
Moreover, some argue that Russia’s elites–who are well aware of the country’s 
current and future global position and trajectory vis-à-vis China–do not wish to be 
considered as a junior partner or raw materials appendage of China’s, even after the 
sanctions imposed by the West over Ukraine have resulted in a more circumscribed 
Russian future. Indeed, just as much as Mao disliked the notion of deferring to the 
wishes of Stalin (or indeed Khrushchev), Putin and his entourage, it is argued, wish 
to avoid the same vis-à-vis Xi Jinping. As well, having felt a definite “second class” 
status at the hands of the West since 1991, the Russian leadership would certainly 
not wish to replace the West with China in such an unequal relationship. 
                                                           
3 One outgrowth of Moscow’s frustration has been its lobbying to gain India’s entry into 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which would act as a counter-weight to China’s 
growing influence in Central Asia. 
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Among the many scholars who take a dim view of the prospects for genuine 
Sino-Russian rapprochement are those who argue that such economic tensions, 
great power pressures, and even an emerging status/power differential will keep the 
two regional players from developing a closer relationship. Darden (2016) believes 
that a closer relationship between the two is unlikely unless China eschews a deeper 
integration with the world economy, and creates a much closer economic 
relationship with Russia. Indeed, Duben (2015) concurs with this view, stating that, 
despite statements to the contrary, little progress has been made on a host of bilateral 
economic, financial, and infrastructural projects between Russia and China, while 
arguing that the warming relationship is overstated and problem-laden. Ostrovsky 
(2015) and Kortunov maintain, too, that the vaunted economic link is problematic, 
but place the reasons for this in either lack of interest by the Chinese or in the mutual 
lack of contacts and business ties between the two countries’ business elites (Hille, 
2016).  
 Others point to non-economic concerns as major reasons for the absence 
of a closer connection between Beijing and Moscow. Putz (2016) argues that 
China’s economic, political, and military involvement in “Russia’s backyard,” i.e., 
Central Asia, will continue to frustrate closer political ties between the two. 
Similarly, Hartwell echoes this concern–both with respect to Central Asia (and 
elsewhere)–and claims that China’s hubris vis-à-vis Russian influence in the region 
is a significant impediment to further comity (Hartwell, 2015).4 Gabuev concurs 
that a stronger relationship between the two countries is difficult to conceive of, 
with Russia having to concede to China in both the economic and political realms. 
In other words, the status/power differential grates on both the Russian elites and 
masses, as they realize that “Russia needs China more than China needs Russia. 
Russia has nowhere else to go” (Hille, 2016).  
 On the other hand, other scholars disagree, arguing as Nadege Rolland 
does, that the Russia-China partnership is genuine, developing, and–that as it 
strengthens–has the potential to manage both long-standing and emerging problems 
that both would concede do in fact exist (Putz, 2016). To be sure, Farchy (2015) 
maintains that it is not at all apparent that Russia’s elite fears overt Chinese 
economic dominance in Central Asia and has ultimately accommodated itself to this 
eventuality, while reserving for Moscow definitive responsibility for Central Asia’s 
military and security policy realms.5 Some go further, arguing that China’s leaders 
willingly cede to Moscow’s pre-eminence in this domain, while encouraging closer 
cooperation between Beijing and the members of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) (Strokan & Mikheev, 2015; Vorobyov, 2017).  
 Others would argue the economic tensions that exist are subordinated to 
economic drivers that are beneficial to both sides. For example, Lukyanov (2015) 
                                                           
4 Hartwell states that “China may see itself having a partnership with Russia in the region, 
but it believes it–and not Russia–is the leader” (Hartwell, 2015). 
5 Farchy argues that another limiting factor to Chinese economic dominance in Central 
Asia are fears of that very eventuality that are held by citizens in the five Muslim states of 
this region (Farchy, 2015).  
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believes the Kremlin views China’s investments in the Silk Road projects of Central 
Asia and beyond ultimately serve Russia’s long-term interests for economic self-
development. Trenin, too, views China and Russia’s shared interests and goals–both 
economic and geo-political–as mutually beneficial and supportive of a continued 
closer association. As well, Trenin discounts both the “hubris” and the 
“power/status differential” as impediments to the relationship, as he views the 
Moscow-Beijing partnership as “coordination without a central command” (Trenin, 
2015).  
 Our own view lies closer to these optimists’ assessments of a continuing, 
closer affiliation between the two powers. Indeed, as it relates to the Arctic interests 
of the two states–i.e., a major focus of this paper and a subject to which we shall 
now turn–it is apparent that the two powers’ interests largely coincide. It is also our 
contention that besides the economic drivers behind the Sino-Russian collaboration 
in the Far North, U.S. and Western policy towards Russia since 2014 has 
unfortunately contributed to this developing Arctic collaboration. 
  
 Climate Change, the Arctic, and Russia’s Far North 
 
The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recently 
released its Fifth Assessment Report, entitled Climate Change 2013: The Physical 
Science Basis. Among the many findings outlined in the voluminous document, the 
IPCC establishes that climate warming is “unequivocal” and that the warming of 
ocean currents there accounts for “… more than 90% of the energy accumulated 
between 1971 and 2010” (Working Group I, 2013, p. SPM-4). The report also finds 
that Arctic Sea ice and snow cover in Northern Hemisphere areas continue to 
decrease in extent. More specifically, the report establishes that during the period 
of 1979-2012, the average loss of Arctic Sea ice very likely reached somewhere 
between 3.5% to 4.1% per decade (Working Group I, 2013, p. SPM-6). As well, the 
report concludes that the Arctic’s sea ice may vanish within 30-40 years (Clark, 
2013b).  
A more recent estimate by Peter Wadhams, an applied mathematics and 
theoretical physics professor at the University of Cambridge, indicates that by 2020 
the Arctic will essentially be free of ice in the high summer months, certainly 
enough to allow safe passage of container ships (Medred, 2014). Of course, should 
this occur, a host of environmental and economic problems will ensue, from 
dramatic increases in world ocean levels to the release of vast stores of methane 
deposits–a particularly virulent greenhouse gas–to loss of habitat for polar bears 
and other Arctic species. By one estimate, the total cost of a complete Arctic 
meltdown approaches $60 trillion (Clark, 2013a). 
To be sure, Russian Arctic waters–from the Barents Sea in the northwest to the 
Chukchi Sea in the northeast–have experienced considerable warming. Indeed, 
whole sections of Russia’s coastal Northern regions are ice-free for significant 
periods of time throughout the year, whereas all of it has become virtually ice-free 
during the early summer-through-October period (Crooks & Chazan, 2012).  
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Moreover, climate change is also causing Russia’s permafrost region–which 
totals some 69% of their territory overall–to melt, “… converting a large part of 
Russia into a swamp” (Vorontsova, 2013). According to the head of the Russian 
Emergency Situations Ministry Center for Predictions and Monitoring, by 2050 the 
Russian permafrost region will decline by over a third (Goble, 2013). Such an 
outcome will not only lead to the release of significant amounts of methane - 
perhaps 500 times as much methane gas is trapped beneath the Arctic Ocean as 
exists currently in the atmosphere (Medred, 2014) - but also create a transportation 
and infrastructure nightmare in Russia’s permafrost areas, as over 5,000 kilometers 
of railroad track and perhaps as much as 40% of infrastructure are at severe risk of 
collapse (Goble, 2013). Such developments will put enormous stress upon an 
already cash-strapped and fossil fuel-dependent federal budget.  
 
The Climate Change Windfall? 
 
A major discovery in late 2013 by the Austrian oil company OMV in a largely 
unexplored section of the Barents Sea demonstrates the massive potential for the 
five littoral states to the Arctic Sea; OMV claims to have found as much as 160 
million barrels of recoverable oil (and 10-40 billion cubic feet of natural gas) 
approximately 200 miles off the coast of northern Norway (Shotter, 2013). This find 
was followed by a joint ExxonMobil/Rosneft discovery in September 2014–this 
time in the Kara Sea–that holds upwards of 750 million barrels of oil (Kramer, 
2014).  
Indeed, according to the 2008 United States Geological Survey (USGS) study, 
the Arctic region could hold as much as 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural 
gas and 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil. Of these figures, approximately 240 
billion barrels of oil and oil equivalents (e.g., natural gas and methane, mainly) have 
already been found, a figure that constitutes nearly as much as the total proven 
reserves of Saudi Arabia. Beyond this, it is estimated that another 400 billion barrels 
of oil lay “undiscovered” still in the Arctic region (Emmerson, 2010). For its part, 
Russia’s federal geological agency claims the total figure of recoverable reserves–
both discovered and undiscovered–is far higher than the USGS estimate. One 
estimate puts the overall energy reserves in the Arctic regions of Russia at more 
than 1.6 trillion tons (Zamyatina, 2014). Of course, at today’s extremely low prices 
for oil and gas, a significant portion of these Arctic reserves are unrecoverable. 
A cursory perusal of the USGS study’s data on the likely areas for potential 
recoverable assets demonstrate that two of these areas lie immediately north of 
Russia, in the Barents Sea basin and the West Siberian basin (i.e., the Kara and 
Laptev Sea regions) of the Arctic Ocean (See Table 1 and Figure 1). By USGS and 
Russian estimates, therefore, the Arctic basins to the north of Russia constitute a 
huge potential for hydrocarbon extraction (Sale & Potapov, 2010). 
Although Russia has exploited natural gas and oil reserves in its Arctic regions 
since the early 1970s, offshore areas that the aforementioned USGS study argues 
hold promising hydrocarbon reserves have historically gained little attention for a 
variety of reasons, owing mainly to the extreme environment. Due to warming 
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climates, however, this is changing, with Putin’s administration turning its focus 
resolutely toward exploring and developing these offshore Arctic reserves. Indeed, 
President Putin recently stated at the International Arctic Forum in Salekhard, 
Russia (capital city of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region, Russia’s main gas 
producing region), that “… the time for an industrial breakthrough has come in the 
Arctic” (Kravtsova, 2013). 
Table 1: Arctic Basins with High Probability of Significant Fossil Fuel Deposits 
 
 
Petroleum Basin 
Natural Gas 
(trillion 
cubic ft) 
Natural 
Gas 
Liquids6  
(billion 
barrels) 
Crude Oil 
(billion 
barrels) 
Total (oil 
equivalent in 
billions of 
barrels) 
Yenisey-Khatang 
basin 
99.96 2.68 5.58 24.92 
West Siberian 
basin 
651.50 20.33 3.66 132.57 
East Barents basin 317.56 1.42 7.41 61.76 
East Greenland 
Rift basin 
86.18 8.12 8.90 31.39 
West Greenland-
East Canada basin 
51.82 1.15 7.27 17.06 
Amerasia basin 56.89 0.54 9.72 19.75 
Arctic Alaska 
basin 
221.40 5.90 29.96 72.77 
Source: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and 
Gas North of the Arctic Circle. Kenneth J. Bird, et al., United States Geological 
Survey, Fact Sheet 2008/3049, July 2008.  
 
Oil + Gas = National Security 
 
To be sure, the leadership of today’s Russia continues to view oil and gas exports 
as critical for the country’s future. Putin’s doctoral thesis of 1999 foreshadowed his 
attempt as president in 2000-2008 to gain control of privatized oil companies for 
the benefit of the Russian state, and its budget. As a result, a host of private oil 
companies–from Roman Abramovich’s Sibneft to Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s 
YUKOS–were bought or otherwise obtained by the Russian government during this 
period. It appears that Putin’s entourage has decided recently to accumulate even 
more private oil for state coffers; in September 2014 a Moscow court seized 
billionaire Vladimir Yevtushenkov’s shares in Bashneft’, a large Russian oil 
                                                           
6 Natural gas liquids include fuels and chemicals that are separated out from either natural 
gas or crude oil and include ethane, butane, propane, isobutene, and natural gasoline. They 
may also be used as feedstocks to make a variety of chemicals and plastics (Friedman & 
Puko, 2014). 
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company active in Bashkortostan (Weaver, 2014). By the end of 2008, fully 40-
50% of Russia’s budget was accounted for through either taxation of fossil fuels 
production or from oil and natural gas exports. 
Although attempts were made under Dmitrii Medvedev’s presidency to 
diversify Russia’s economy, it appears that Putin–now in his third term as 
president–jettisoned serious consideration of diversification and has returned to a 
fuller appreciation of the role of oil and gas production for Russia’s future. And, 
with declining oil and gas production in many of the country’s aging fields, Russia 
is naturally looking to the offshore regions of the Arctic to avoid a production crisis, 
even in the current era of extremely low oil/gas prices.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Basin Map. Source: Geology.com and 
MapResources. 
 
Such a production crisis would seriously undermine the country’s budget, the 
Russian economy, the country’s national security, and, ultimately, its leaders’ grip 
on power. As such, the Russian government has placed the Arctic near the center of 
its national security priorities to 2020. In addition, Russia is pressing its claims for 
undersea resources that lie beyond its 200-mile exclusive economic zone, and are 
allegedly extensions of its continental shelf. As well, the government had been 
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attempting for some years to lure Western oil majors’ interest in developing 
offshore oil and gas fields. 
And, Western oil majors–ExxonMobil, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Italy’s Eni, 
France’s Total, and Norway’s Statoil–were taking notice, as “state-directed 
resource nationalism” has reduced their range of investment and exploration 
opportunities in Venezuela, Brazil, and many states in the Middle East. For 
example, Shell returned to Russia in full force, after having been outmaneuvered by 
Russia in 2006, when it lost control over its Sakhalin-2 oil and gas development 
project in Russia’s Far East. Despite that loss in shareholder value, in April 2013 
Shell’s Chairman inked a joint exploration and development deal with Russia’s 
Gazprom that would allow Shell a 33.3% stake in the development of the Severo-
Vrangelevsky (North Wrangel) field in the Chukchi Sea and the Severo-Zapadny 
(North-West) field in the Pechora Sea (ITAR-TASS, 2013). Additionally, 
ExxonMobil signed an earlier deal with Russia’s largest oil company, Rosneft, to 
explore 150 million acres in offshore regions of the Kara Sea (Koranyi, 2013b; 
Crooks & Chazan, 2012). And, in early 2013, even China’s National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) got into the act, partnering with Rosneft to explore three 
offshore Arctic areas (in the Pechora and Barents Seas); this signaled the first Arctic 
offshore oil/gas deal that Russia has signed with an Asian company (Katakey & 
Kennedy, 2013). And, although offshore natural gas development projects have 
gained less interest recently by both the Russian government and Western oil 
companies, drilling for oil in the offshore Arctic continued to be of high interest to 
all parties, at least until the United States and the European Union imposed targeted 
sanctions against Russia’s energy sector in summer 2014.  
As stated previously, many Western oil majors view the offshore Arctic as a 
potential boon in terms of future bookable reserves, despite the formidable 
development barriers that exist. Moreover, unlike development of natural gas wells 
in the Arctic offshore, there are reportedly plenty of oil projects in that region that 
will breakeven even if oil prices continue to remain well under $80 per barrel 
(Crooks & Chazan, 2012). Additionally, Western oil companies with an interest in 
other, perhaps more lucrative onshore projects in Russia also felt pressure to invest 
in what the Russian government perceives as a prestige project–opening up the Far 
North to greater exploration and resource exploitation–in exchange for these same 
Western oil companies having the chance to gain a stake in less challenging oil and 
gas projects within Russia’s onshore regions, for example, on the Yamal peninsula 
or in the Bazhenov fields. 
For its part, Russia needs Western oil majors, both for their capital resources 
and their technology and expertise. Although President Putin has cited plans to 
spend as much as $500 billion on Arctic exploration over the next 30 years, Western 
oil companies ponied up tens of billions of dollars in recent times to jointly explore 
for oil alongside Rosneft in the Kara, Laptev, and Chukchi Seas (Amos, 2014; 
Emmerson, 2012; Kramer, 2014). Joint exploration with Western oil majors also 
made it easier for Russia to obtain loans from international banks. And, since 
exploring and drilling in the Arctic is particularly expensive, additional non-Russian 
financing of such activities is always welcome. As well, the Russian government–
117     Thomas E. Rotnem and Kristina V. Minkova 
 
 
prior to the sanctions regime–lured Western oil companies with tax concessions and 
other incentives in order to gain expertise in working in Arctic and offshore 
environments and for Western oil companies advanced technologies for finding and 
accessing such resources (Hamilton, 2012; Panin, 2014). Now, due to the sanctions 
regime, much of these technologies and hardware is off limits to Russian energy 
companies.  
It is important to note, however, that even if sanctions are removed and such 
joint development projects proceed in the near future, Russian capital and Western 
technology and expertise will still meet significant constraints in developing these 
offshore oil reserves. For one, with a time horizon of 20-30 years, it’s difficult to 
gauge the profitability of capital projects, as well as the price of oil upon which they 
must be based, that far out. Additionally, open sea conditions in the Arctic at this 
point will allow for only a short summer installation (July-October) season that 
frustrates attempts to make progress on such projects very quickly. Moreover, 
iceberg activity in the regions under exploration mandate that companies build 
extremely strong oil drilling platforms, each able to withstand in excess of six 
million tons of impact; as well, pipelines need to be buried very deep to avoid 
subterranean contact from the largest of these icebergs. Furthermore, at $120 
million per ship, available icebreaking vessels are in short supply; as well, the daily 
cost to operate a vessel today is more than $50,000. Lastly, of the four prime areas 
in the Arctic–that together allegedly hold 75% of the oil reserves there–these areas 
are also the most challenging because of ubiquitous ice floes (Hamilton, 2012). 
 
The Suez Alternative? 
 
“I want to stress the importance of the Northern Sea Route as an 
international transport artery that will rival traditional trade lanes in service 
fees, security, and quality.” – Vladimir Putin (Byers, 2013) 
 
Climate change in the globe’s northernmost latitudes may also produce another 
favorable consequence for the Russian Federation: an ice-free shipping route that 
holds significant potential for transoceanic shipping, rivaling other major routes and 
perhaps gaining Russia considerable transport revenues. Thus, the possibility of ice-
free cargo shipping for a considerable portion of the year across the Northern Sea 
Route (NSR)7 may provide competition to shipping alternatives, be they rounding 
the Cape of Good Hope or transit through the Suez Canal.  
                                                           
7 According to a July 2012 law passed by the Russian lower house, the NSR is defined as 
“The aquatic space adjacent to the northern coast of the Russian Federation, covering 
internal waters, territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone of the 
Russian Federation and bound by division lines across maritime areas with the United 
States and the parallel Cape Dezhnev in the Bering Strait, west meridian of the Cape of 
Desire to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, eastern coastline of the Novaya Zemlya 
archipelago, and the western boundaries of the Matochkin, Kara, and Yugorsky Straits” 
(Bennett, 2013). 
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Arctic sea ice achieved its lowest record ever in 2012, allowing travel that year 
along the NSR for more than half of the year. Indeed, the U.S. National Snow and 
Ice Data Center reported that Arctic ice covers only approximately 2,200 square 
kilometers, about half of the total area covered by ice in 1979 (Bering Strait, 2013). 
And, it is predicted that within a decade the ice-free season could extend for a full 
eight months annually (Koranyi, 2013a).  
The year 2009 marked the first commercial crossing of the fabled Northeast 
Passage, an earlier and alternate name for the NSR. In 2012, almost four dozen ships 
sailed from Norway to the Bering Strait. In 2013, 71 ships, including the first ice-
class tanker, carried 1.35 million tons of cargo through the NSR; to be sure, the 
Stena Polaris, owned by a Swedish transportation company, traversed the NSR with 
40,000 tons of naptha months ago and successfully delivered its cargo to a South 
Korean terminal (Dawson, 2014; Ice-class Tanker, 2013; Kramer, 2013). In another 
first, the Yong Sheng, a Chinese container ship, traveled from the Bering Strait to 
its destination in the Netherlands in September 2013 (Bering Strait, 2013). 
According to one study, trans-NSR shipping is set to grow by more than 30 times 
to 2020 (Koranyi, 2013a).8 Another, attributed to the South Korean Maritime 
Institute, estimates that the NSR may account for more than a quarter of Asia-
Europe transport by 2030 (Milne, 2013b). 
Why might shippers prefer the NSR, despite the need for Russian icebreakers 
to accompany vessels during even some of the warmer months? For one, the route 
between East Asia and Europe is much shorter than traversing the Suez Canal, by 
as much as 40%; delivering cargo from East Asia to Europe via the Suez Canal can 
take as long as 40 days, whereas the NSR is 7,000 kilometers shorter and requires 
only 25 days (Ice-class Tanker, 2013). Thus, a shorter distance saves a considerable 
amount of time that theoretically lowers shipping costs. Additionally, ships utilizing 
the NSR avoid pirate-infested waters in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the 
Straits of Malacca.9 Moreover, using the route circumvents the unpredictable 
impulses of an unstable Egyptian government, as well as the volatile Middle Eastern 
region, in general. As a result, both European and Asian states are beginning to note 
their interest in the route; among the most interested of these states are China, South 
Korea, and Singapore. Even tiny Iceland is getting into the act, having decided to 
build an Arctic port at the extreme northeast of the country, in Finna Fjord (Milne, 
2013). 
In response, the Russian government stepped up plans to invest in port 
infrastructure, railway construction, and its aging nuclear icebreaker fleet. Indeed, 
the Russian government and legislature passed appropriations bills worth billions 
of dollars to repair existing and/or build new deep water ports along the NSR, as 
                                                           
8 This is projected, despite recent stiff declines in trans-NSR shipments in 2014 and 2015. 
Reportedly, the uncertain opening of the NSR in 2014 was in part responsible for fewer 
inter-continental transits; as well, the slowing Chinese economy is another reason. 
9 China reportedly relies on the Strait of Malacca for delivery of upwards of 80% of its oil 
needs; the NSR is considered so important for the future of China’s development that it is 
referred to as the “Arctic Golden Waterway” in China (Byers, 2013).  
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well as plan for an impressive Arctic railway–the Belkomur Railway–which will 
run between Arkhangelsk to Perm (Bennett, 2013). Presently, Russia’s icebreaker 
fleet counts among it six nuclear-powered vessels, but most of these are obsolete 
and will have to be replaced in a few years. Long lead times for launching new 
nuclear-powered icebreaking vessels–as much as six to seven years–means that the 
world’s largest icebreaker fleet will be constrained for some time thereafter in terms 
of maintaining open seas above Russia’s northern regions in colder months (Goble, 
2013). Still, the government is investing in bringing new icebreaking vessels on line 
in the shortest possible timeframe; a next generation icebreaker is set to be built by 
the end of 2017 (Alexeev, 2013).  
Still, there are significant problems connected with the NSR. As noted 
previously, a larger icebreaker fleet is required if a substantial upturn in cargo traffic 
is to ply the NSR. Beyond the other infrastructure constraints mentioned above, 
there is also a definite lack of search and rescue facilities in the region that can 
support needed rescue attempts for ships in trouble. And, since warming seas means 
more icebergs the need for such facilities is not theoretical. Indeed, the head of 
Denmark’s shipping conglomerate, AP Moller-Maersk, claims that the continuing 
need for icebreakers, as well as the significant number of icebergs along the route, 
make traversing the NSR an expensive option, an option that will only become 
commercially viable in 20 years or more (Milne, 2013).10 
Moreover, the lack of reliable year-round scheduling of transit through the NSR 
also acts to reduce the route’s importance by international shipping companies, 
especially those carrying goods from China westward to Europe. Since the vast 
majority of Chinese products destined for Europe are of a containerized nature, the 
seasonality of the NSR and, therefore, its unreliability and unpredictability as a 
shipping route, will limit its use as an East-West conduit for Chinese consumer 
products. Furthermore, due to their extremely high time-charter costs per day, 
certain vessels–for example, seismic and LNG ships–would find prohibitively 
expensive any delay in transit through the NSR (Keil & Raspotnik, 2013). 
At the same time, however, the ruling Russian elite considers the NSR to be of 
significant economic value in the near- to medium-term, as evidenced by the quote 
from President Putin at the beginning of this section. The Putin administration has 
recently demonstrated its view that the NSR is a strategic asset as well, having made 
plans recently to inaugurate regular naval patrols along the northern route; in late 
2013 the Minister of Defense revealed the policy shift after sending the Russian 
Northern Fleet’s flagship vessel, the “Pyotr Velikiy” (“Peter the Great”), through 
much of the NSR. The stated reasons for the patrols include helping to stop the flow 
of unwanted drugs and migrants into the northernmost reaches of Russia, while also 
extending Russia’s sovereign claims to sparsely traveled coastal waters in its far 
                                                           
10 Additional expenses that must be factored in include extremely high insurance rates for 
shipping, as well as the environmental cost associated with an oil tanker being holed by an 
iceberg. According to Michael Frodl, an advisor to insurers from the consultancy, C-Level 
Maritime Risks, “It’s still simply too risky a proposition for standard commercial insurers 
…. And the risks haven’t been figured out enough to price insurance correctly” (Saul, 
2013). 
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north; it will also allow the country to exert sovereign claim to seabed resources in 
areas adjacent to its continental shelf.11 Thus, the result is an increasing 
militarization of the Arctic region.  
 
Russia’s Arctic Strategy to 2020 
 
Before discussing China’s Arctic interests, this article will briefly analyze Russia’s 
Arctic strategy. In support of Russia’s claims on Arctic resources and transport 
corridors the Putin administration published the second iteration of an 
acknowledged Arctic strategy. Entitled “The Strategy for the Development of the 
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security up to 2020,” the 
document mainly sets forth a conceptual foundation for the development of the 
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). As such, the document mostly 
discusses purely domestic concerns, e.g., investment in critical infrastructure in the 
region, protection of indigenous communities and their cultures in the AZRF, 
sustainable development in pristine Arctic environments, etc. (The Development 
Strategy, 2013). The strategy also discusses in detail possibilities for greater foreign 
scientific and geological cooperation in the region. Increased international 
cooperation in the areas of search and rescue, resource extraction, and 
environmental protection are all discussed.  
At the same time, however, portions of the new strategy raise certain questions 
or concerns. For example, Russia’s stated desire to develop numerous floating 
nuclear power stations is underscored in the document, apparently without regard 
to neighboring countries growing apprehension concerning nuclear power 
generation. Included as well are statements regarding Russia’s intent to legally 
define Moscow’s claims in the region, while making somewhat veiled attempts to 
support these claims with the “… provision of military security, protection, and 
protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” (The 
Development Strategy, 2013). 
Within a week of the adoption of the new Arctic strategy, President Putin 
addressed a gathering of Defense Ministry officials. His remarks there included “the 
militarization of the Arctic” as a new Russian security concern of the same order as 
perennial Russian concerns like a further eastward expansion of NATO or the 
continued deployment of a global missile defense system (Rasshirennoe, 2013). 12 
To be sure, Russia’s ruling elite deplores further NATO activities in the old northern 
                                                           
11 For example, these may include the Mendeleev and Lomonosov ridges, two seabed 
formations that, if recognized as part of the Russian shelf, would extend Russia’s claims to 
fossil fuel, additional non-hydrocarbon resources, and perhaps transport routes well into the 
Arctic Ocean. 
12 Putin’s exact words at the Defense Ministry Collegium were the following: 
“Одновременно предпринимаются методичные попытки тем или иным образом 
расшатать стратегический баланс. Фактически запущен второй этап создания 
глобальной системы ПРО Соединённых Штатов Америки, зондируются возможности 
для дальнейшего расширения НАТО на Восток, существует и опасность 
милитаризации Арктики” (Rasshirennoe, 2013).  
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flank of the Cold War, as well as a new arms race in the globe’s extreme north; 
however, according to one Russian defense analyst, it is the Russians who have 
made significant attempts to modernize their military facilities in the Arctic Circle 
region (Baev, 2013).  
Of course, Russia’s neighbors have long been worried about decaying nuclear-
powered submarines in the High North, as well as aging nuclear warheads in the 
Kola Peninsula. However, recent moves by Russia’s leaders are perhaps raising 
eyebrows among the Arctic Eight powers, as well as other states with an emerging 
Arctic presence of their own. For example, in September 2013 Russia reopened a 
military base in the New Siberian Islands that had been shuttered at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Commenting upon the re-christening of the Cold War-era base, 
President Putin declared that the facility was being re-opened as these islands have 
become an “… important point in the Arctic Ocean, a new stage in the development 
of the Northern Sea Route” (Russia Reopens…, 2013). Upon its re-opening Russia 
also conducted major naval exercises around the archipelago, while Defense 
Minister Sergei Shoigu proclaimed, “We arrived there, or, more accurately, we have 
returned there forever” (Russia Reopens, 2013).13  
Moreover, Russia’s Northern Fleet, tasked with protecting its Northern 
territories, will receive an additional 40 ships and logistics vessels by 2020, which 
include a destroyer, large landing vessels, and six multi-purpose nuclear and 
conventional submarines, among other vessels (Padrtova, 2014). Russia is also 
beefing up its coast guard along its northern frontier, and has taken a decision to 
form two Arctic motorized infantry brigades–totaling nearly 10,000 troops–to 
protect its sovereign claims in the Arctic (Pugliese, 2012). Furthermore, the Russian 
military deployed air defense forces and MiG-31 high altitude interceptors on the 
Novaya Zemlya archipelago, the main island of which served previously as a testing 
site for Soviet nuclear explosive devices (Russia Building, 2013). 
An additional airbase in the Franz Josef Land archipelago is also being rebuilt. 
Airfields at Naryan-Mar, Alykel, Vorkuta, Tiksi, Anadyr, and Rogachevo are all 
scheduled for renovation and modernization. According to Lt. General Mikhail 
Mizintsev, head of the new National Defense Control Center, Russia’s near-term 
Arctic plans involve “… the building of 13 airfields, one land test range for the Air 
Forces, 10 radar sites and direction centers” (Russian Army, 2014). 
To be sure, such developments have served to put some Western military 
analysts on edge, particularly when they are accompanied by alarming statements 
from high-ranking Russian government officials. As Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry 
Rogozin stated in mid-2013, “Active development of the Arctic shelf will 
unavoidably lead to a conflict of interest between states aspiring for resources. It is 
possible this conflict will exceed the diplomatic limits” (Rogozin: Active 
Development…, 2013). Even more precarious, the former Russian representative to 
NATO uttered, “It is also quite possible that Russian oil and gas production 
                                                           
13 In late 2012, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin stated that Russia risked its 
sovereign claims to the Arctic–its resources, transport corridors, etc.–by the mid-21st 
century, unless it asserted its national interests there (Russia Reopens, 2013). 
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facilities may become targets of secret acts of sabotage by rival countries” 
(Rogozin: Active Development, 2013). 
Still, perhaps many Russian government elites, specialists, and political pundits 
would rather aver that recent Western actions in the Arctic are the cause of Russian 
rearmament program in the region. As Tatiana Zamyatina (2014), a scholar at the 
noted Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies, recently remarked, 
 
As for the security of Russia’s Arctic shelf is concerned, the region has 
been largely unprotected in military terms: there were no tracking systems, 
radars, ground troops or naval forces. In the meantime, pretty close to it is 
the U.S. bastion in Alaska, with its intelligence means, missile defense 
systems and naval forces. Apart from that, the Scandinavian countries have 
created their own military bloc inside NATO to protect their interests in 
the near-Arctic zone. Anti-Russian exercises have been held regularly 
there. Therefore the measures being taken to enhance the security of 
Russia’s Arctic shelf are Russia’s proportionate response to Western 
challenges (n.p.). 
 
Sanctions and Russia’s Arctic Ambitions 
 
As a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern 
Ukraine, a series of sanctions were placed on Russian energy companies and banks 
by Western governments during the summer and fall of 2014. The sanctions’ intent 
was to punish Russia by robbing its fossil fuel-dependent treasury of revenues from 
future oil exports; by making it harder for government-controlled oil companies–
chiefly among these being Rosneft–to gain access to both Western bond markets 
and to advanced technologies and expertise associated with oilfield exploration, 
development, and recovery, particularly in hard-to-reach offshore deposits, the 
European Union, United States, Canada, and Norway hoped to discourage Russia 
from continued support of eastern Ukrainian separatism and efforts to undermine 
the fledgling, pro-Western government in Kiev. 
In response, Russia isn’t sitting idly by. For one, it is attempting to “Russify” 
offshore oil production–that is, developing an import substitution approach–to 
cultivate a domestic alternative to Western specialization in this area. For example, 
the government has established a “hierarchy of procurement placing domestic and 
Asian companies first, U.S. companies last,” according to Alexis Rodzianko, the 
head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (Kramer, 2014). Secondly, 
Russian companies have purchased stakes in Western oil exploration and servicing 
companies, in order to gain the technology and expertise from the inside.  
Importantly to this analysis, the Russian government entered negotiations with 
the Chinese to sail drilling rigs from the South China Sea to Russia’s offshore basins 
(Kramer, 2014). China may also provide Russia advanced technologies that Beijing 
“refines” as a result of its own ties with Western oil companies. And, it is certain 
that China’s state-owned banks will provide loans to Russia’s cash-strapped oil 
producers. Indeed, Rosneft itself, as well as the Russian banks VTB, VEB, and the 
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Russian Agriculture Bank all signed agreements recently with China ExIm bank to 
open lines of credit (Soldatkin, 2014).  
Thus, the sanctions regime has had several unintended effects, while not 
succeeding in deterring Russia in supporting the rebels in eastern Ukraine. To be 
sure, Russia’s activities in the Arctic have been more limited recently than expected, 
but this is surely more a result of lower hydrocarbon prices and a slowing Chinese 
economy than the sanctions effectiveness. Perhaps the main effect of sanctions has 
been to push Russia further into the arms of the Chinese–particularly in the Arctic 
arena as the next section will detail–thereby ultimately undermining both Western 
oil/gas majors’ positions in the Far North and U.S. foreign policy aims, more 
generally.  
 
China’s Arctic Interests: Origins 
 
Not being an Arctic littoral state, China’s involvement in the Arctic region is more 
recent than Russia’s or that of other Arctic states. China’s first polar interest 
appeared in 1984, the year it launched research expeditions to Antarctica, later 
founding three research stations on the icy continent. Its first scientific sojourn to 
the Arctic came more than a decade later, in 1995; the next year, China began an 
affiliation with the International Scientific Committee on North Pole Research, an 
organization that includes as members all five Arctic littoral states and three 
additional Arctic states (The Development of China’s, 2007). Three years later, the 
first state-led Chinese effort to scientifically explore the Arctic took place aboard 
the Ukrainian-built icebreaker, later renamed “Xue Long” (“Snow Dragon”) 
(Manthorpe, 2011); the three-month expedition included 124 members of China’s 
scientific community, traveling over 14,000 nautical miles through Arctic seas 
(Backgrounder: Chronology, 2008). 
In 2003, Beijing sponsored a second scientific expedition to the Arctic; a year 
later, China established its first (and only) scientific research station–the Yellow 
River (“Huanghe”) station–on the Spitsbergen archipelago.14 China concluded three 
additional Arctic expeditions in the ensuing years, in 2008, 2010, and 2012; during 
all of these expeditions, primary scientific emphasis focused on marine biology, 
climate change, and hydrographic and hydrologic research, with increasing 
involvement of foreign researchers.  
Since then, Beijing has quietly, but steadily, developed a growing interest in 
the region, particularly since scientific reports began predicting a greater likelihood 
of a substantially ice-free Arctic by the end of the current decade. In June 2013, for 
example, China announced the establishment of the China-Nordic Arctic Research 
Center (CNARC) in Shanghai; its purpose is to support scholarly exchanges 
between China and other littoral states, climate change research, and cooperation 
                                                           
14 Though sovereign control over Spitsbergen lies with the Kingdom of Norway, as a 
signatory to the Svalbaard (Spitsbergen) Treaty since 1925, China is allowed unfettered 
access to those islands lying north of the Arctic Circle. 
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for sustainable development of the Arctic region (Zhenghua, 2013).15 This 
development came shortly after China’s bid to become a permanent observer of the 
Arctic Council (AC), an intergovernmental body that seeks a common 
understanding on economic, environmental, and social issues affecting the area, was 
accepted by the eight members of the organization in May.16  
In July 2014, 128 scientists took part in China’s sixth Arctic expedition, one 
that placed eight short-term research stations on the Arctic ice (Wang, 2014). The 
next year, China revealed plans to build an observatory in Canada’s Northwest 
Territories; the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS), will support 
polar science and related technologies (Wang Ru, 2014). 2015 also saw Beijing 
send three separate research expeditions to the Arctic and near-Arctic regions 
(China’s Participation, 2015). More recently, China’s State Oceanic Administration 
announced plans for its seventh Arctic research expedition; this time their Arctic 
scientific sojourn was jointly planned and conducted with significant Russian 
participation (Pettersen, 2016b).  
 
China’s Arctic Interests: Cooperation with Nordic States 
 
By joining the AC in 2013, China demonstrated its desire for a much closer Arctic 
relationship with its Nordic partners in Europe. To be sure, China’s interests in the 
Arctic are not only limited to scientific research, climate change, and sustainability 
issues, but also include interests in resource development and new shipping routes 
through the NSR. Recently, China has negotiated a number of agreements with its 
Nordic partners and some of these will be examined before turning attention to 
China’s growing relationship with Russia in the Arctic region.  
Denmark was perhaps the earliest Nordic state to support China’s bid to join 
the AC. As early as 2011, the Danish ambassador to China suggested that Beijing 
has “… natural and legitimate economic and scientific interests in the Arctic,” 
including especially China’s interests in mining, fishing, and sea route development 
near or on Greenland (Denmark Welcomes, 2011). For its part, Greenland’s 
parliament facilitated foreign investment in uranium and rare earth minerals mining 
easier by lifting bans on these activities (Greenlandic Minister, 2013). In 2014, Erik 
                                                           
15 Based at Shanghai’s Polar Research Institute, the CNARC opened in December 2013 and 
coordinates its research activities with 10 research institutes from China, Iceland, Denmark, 
Norway, Finland, and Sweden. Besides research on sustainability and climate change, the 
CNARC explores issues related to Arctic shipping, resource exploitation, economic 
cooperation, and policy/legislative issues (China-Nordic Arctic Research, 2013). 
16 Besides China, India, South Korea, Japan, Italy, and Singapore also became permanent 
observers at the AC. Although not a full voting member of the body, becoming a permanent 
observer allows China to speak and offer testimony at AC meetings, as well as to take part 
in agenda-setting activities (Xinhua Insight, 2013). As Tang Guoqiang, former Chinese 
ambassador to Norway, stated the granting of permanent observer status allows China to 
“…strengthen its cooperation with countries surrounding the Arctic in scientific research, 
the opening of new shipping routes, and resource exploration,” all important areas of 
Chinese interest (Xinhua Insight, 2013). 
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Lorenzen, the Danish Arctic ambassador also re-iterated Denmark’s welcoming 
attitude toward greater Chinese investment in such endeavors (Bigger Chinese, 
2014). Within a year of Lorenzen’s statement, China’s General Nice Group 
negotiated a $2 billion plan to take over a large iron ore mine in Greenland, the first 
project of its kind by an Asian country in the Arctic (Du, 2015).  
Another first had come two years earlier, when Iceland became the first 
European country to sign a free trade deal with China in April 2013 (Xinhua Insight, 
2013). Within months of the landmark treaty, the Icelandic prime minister stated 
that Iceland “… seeks opportunities to work closer with China when it comes to 
doing research and even doing business in the Arctic” (Interview: Iceland, 2014).  
Iceland followed up by allowing China’s China National Offshore Oil Company 
(CNOOC) to operate oil and gas exploration projects off its northeast coast, the first 
time Chinese exploration in the Arctic was undertaken (Du, 2015); as a result of the 
deal CNOOC Iceland, a subsidiary of CNOOC, will hold a 60% share in the 
offshore projects. Though Norwegian-Chinese relations had been cool since 
Norway awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to the Chinese dissident, Liu Xiaobo, 
China apparently warmed to involving Norway’s Statoil in plans to exploit the 
Icelandic lease (Fouche, 2013).17 
Although China’s involvement in the Nordic Arctic is still in its early stages, it 
seeks opportunities to play a constructive role in this region, according to Jia Guide, 
Deputy Director General of the Department of Treaty and Law in the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry. Cooperation at the Arctic Council with its Nordic partners has 
expanded beyond scientific research and cultural arenas to include resource 
development and shipping (China Seeks, 2014). Indeed, speaking to the third Arctic 
Circle Assembly in late 2015, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming 
exclaimed Beijing’s intent to be a “major stakeholder in the Arctic” (China’s 
Participation, 2015).  
 
China’s Arctic Interests: Cooperation with Russia 
 
Due to the sanctions imposed upon Russia by Western governments, Moscow in 
recent years has hurriedly negotiated a host of offshore extraction agreements and 
infrastructure projects with companies from China, a country that now declares 
itself a “near Arctic state” (Higgins, 2014). Yet, these agreements were not the first 
demonstrating a higher level of association between Russia and China in the Arctic.  
Back in late 2009 Moscow and Beijing struck a joint investment agreement for 
the construction of a huge shipyard in the Russian Far East to produce offshore oil 
and gas rigs for the Yamal and Shtokman (now shuttered) gasfields (New Mega-
                                                           
17 For its part, China views the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed with Iceland as a 
model for future opportunities between China and other European countries. In the 
meantime, the Iceland FTA allows the tariff-free export of Chinese products to other EU 
countries. It also encourages additional Chinese investments for developing production 
facilities in Iceland, as well as for those in upgrading Iceland’s transport infrastructure, as 
China views Iceland as a key Arctic trans-shipment hub (FTA Offers, 2014). 
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Shipyard, 2009). China reportedly also joined Russia in 2010 in constructing a 
satellite project (“Arktika”) to monitor developments in the Arctic region. Several 
months later the two inked a long-term arrangement concerning the transit of oil 
and gas through the Arctic (Manthorpe, 2011). 
For their part, Chinese oil companies have little experience operating in harsh, 
Arctic-like climates, but their excellent financial position–and the absence of 
sanctions against Western investment–provides them a unique ability to team up 
with Western oil majors that do have such knowledge, and thereafter invest in key 
technologies needed for offshore oil/gas exploration under Arctic conditions.  
Thus, on his first trip abroad as President, Xi Jinping visited Moscow, signing 
a number of agreements, including one that created a cooperative association 
between Rosneft and CNPC, the first Arctic oil or gas deal signed with an Asian 
country (Zhou, 2013). As part of the deal, Rosneft and CNPC will explore three 
fields in the Barents and Pechora Seas. Later the same year, PetroChina gained a 
20% stake in the giant $27 billion Yamal LNG project.18 
Two developments, however, spurred heightened Chinese interest in the Arctic 
in 2014. The first has been mentioned before, i.e., Western sanctions against the 
Russian oil and gas industry. The second was the 2014 annual strategic assessment 
issued by the Chinese military in which it was noted that “the Arctic region has rich 
oil and gas resources and quick and convenient shipping conditions, which has 
important meaning for ensuring the sustained development of China’s economy” 
(Chinese Army, 2014). 
Within months, China’s CNOOC signed a major exploration and development 
deal with Russia’s Rosneft to explore waters deep into Russia’s Kara Sea. As well, 
CNOOC signed another agreement, this time to build equipment for the liquefaction 
process on Novatek’s Yamal LNG project (China Signs, 2014). PetroChina, whose 
parent company is CNPC, also stated their interest in further oil/gas extraction 
projects with other oil/gas companies in the Arctic (China’s Energy Giant, 2015).  
It’s believed that the company is interested in oil exploration in the Dolginsky field 
in the Pechora Sea; the tract is licensed to Gazprom Neft’, whose general director, 
Aleksandr Dyukov, noted, “We continue to look for a partner. We need a financing 
partner, who will share the risk with us. More than likely, this will be an Asian 
company that will partner with us” (Gazprom Neft’ Opredelitsia, 2014). 
Furthermore, Russia also declared their interest in China’s participation in LNG 
projects in the Gydan peninsula; Novatek’s Arctic LNG-1, Arctic LNG-2, and 
Arctic LNG-3 projects were announced in late 2014, with an estimated construction 
start date of 2018 (The Arctic Dimension, 2014).  
Then, in early 2015, Arkadiy Dvorkovich, Vice-Chairman of the Russian 
government, announced that the government would allow Chinese investors to hold 
a majority stake in strategic oil and gas fields. Existing restrictions require foreign 
                                                           
18 The French oil company, Total, also has a 20% stake in the LNG project, with the 
remaining 50.1% share held by Novatek, Russia’s largest privately held gas company. (The 
Chinese Development Bank obtained an additional 9.9% share in the Yamal project in 
2015; this gives China ownership of almost one-third of the total project.) 
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investors to hold minority shares in oilfields that might produce more than seventy 
million tons of oil or in gasfields that may yield more than fifty billion cubic meters 
of gas. However, Dvorkovich stated then that “… if there is a request for control, 
we will consider it” from our Chinese partners (Russia May Accept, 2015).19 
Moreover, China reportedly has made significant investment stakes in two 
additional Arctic endeavors, the Belkomur railway, linking the Urals to the White 
Sea via the hydrocarbon-rich, northern Komi Republic, and Arkhangelsk port 
facilities, which would serve as the final transit stop along the Belkomur (Thompson 
& Ohanyan, 2017).  
In other developments, Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest shipping company, 
maintained that only one of its LNG carriers will serve the Yamal LNG project; the 
rest of the project’s LNG carriers will be owned and operated by Chinese concerns 
(Staalesen, 2015b).20 Another area in which China was given a key role in the 
development of the Arctic shelf was a late 2015 agreement in which China would 
produce much of the technology needed for offshore oil and gas development 
projects in Russia. Since Western sanctions have affected Russia’s ability to acquire 
more than 65% of the equipment needed for offshore oil/gas production, Russia is 
now looking to China to replace this technology. The only caveat, according to 
Deputy Prime Minister Arkadiy Dvorkovich is that such technologies must be 
produced in Russia proper (Made in China, 2015). These significant developments 
come on the heels of an agreement for CNPC to increase its share in the Yamal 
LNG project by 9.9%, for a combined 29.9% total share.  
 
China’s Shipping Interests 
 
With approximately 90% of its traded goods shipped by sea, the Chinese 
government stands to save billions of dollars in costs, if reliable transit through the 
NSR (or the Central Arctic Shipping Route [CASR]) becomes a possibility.21 An 
Arctic transit route would save shipping companies $7 to 12 billion in insurance 
premiums (Zhou, 2013). Thus, China is very keen on helping Russia to develop the 
NSR infrastructure.  
China first mentioned in 2010 its intention to significantly “boost” its Arctic 
presence for use as a potential shipping route. As we have seen with regard to Arctic 
resource exploitation, the Chinese government early on was much more skeptical 
                                                           
19 Western oil partners were specifically excluded from this same consideration. Indeed, 
Western oil majors haven’t been given majority (or equal) control of Russian oil/gasfields 
since the demise of TNK-BP in 2013.  
20 China’s Sinotrans Shipping and Merchants Energy Shipping struck a joint venture 
agreement with Greek Dynagas in 2015 to build five Arctic LNG vessels to ship gas from 
the Yamal LNG project to China; the year prior, China LNG and Teekay LNG Partners 
signed an agreement to build six LNG carriers for the route (China Shipping Firms, 2015). 
21 For example, Beijing projects their trade to grow to almost $8 trillion by 2020; according 
to these estimates, if 10% of that figure is shipped via the Arctic, transportation cost 
savings would equal tens of billions of dollars per year (Zhou, 2013). 
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about the role of Russia as a partner in its Arctic shipping exploits. For example, a 
Chinese government researcher commented in 2010 that, “China is geographically 
disconnected to the Arctic, which is a large disadvantage compared with littoral 
countries. China would not like to see it (the shipping route) controlled by a country 
or a certain group” (Yu, 2010). 
For its part, Russian naval forces warily accompanied the “Snow Dragon” in 
September 2012, as the Chinese research vessel transited the entire length of the 
NSR for the first time (Chinese Icebreaker, 2012). When the Chinese cargo ship, 
“Yongsheng” completed a similar journey in August 2013, Russian press releases 
displayed a certain degree of skepticism regarding the transit.  
Since the imposition of sanctions by the West in 2014, however, and Russia’s 
resulting “pivot to the East,” the two governments have slowly begun to see more 
eye-to-eye on the importance of mutual development of the NSR and related 
infrastructure projects. For example, in May 2015 Chinese authorities noted keen 
interest in buying the Arkhangelsk Sea Port, as well as the Yenisey River Shipping 
Company from Norilsk Nickel (Staalesen, 2015a).22 In addition, the Jilin provincial 
government foresees teaming with both Russia and North Korea to ship products 
from its manufacturing centers to Europe, via the NSR. Russia and China also 
signed an agreement more recently that grants the Chinese company, Poly 
Technologies, a concession to build 712 miles of the Belkomur railway (Pettersen, 
2015).  
All of these developments were followed in the winter of 2015 by two other 
important developments. After the Yongsheng cargo ship completed a record-
setting 20,000 mile round-trip journey from Rotterdam to Tianjin, the China Ocean 
Shipping Group Company (COSTCO) manager Cai Meijiang stated that the 
company is “… considering increasing the number of ships sailing via the new path” 
(China Mulls Routine Navigation…, 2015). This was followed in December by a 
statement from Dmitriy Rogozin, the Vice-Chairman of the Russian Government 
(and Chairman of Russia’s Arctic Commission), in which he explained that a new 
“cold Silk Road” was under development and desired further Chinese investment 
in order to bring it to fruition (Rogozin: Severnyi, 2015; Staalesen, 2015c).23 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
22 These sales of important Russian infrastructure assets mirror similar Chinese interests 
elsewhere; Beijing is interested in port facilities at Kirkenes, Norway, as well as a rail line 
from Kirkenes to Rovaniemi, Finland (Staalesen, 2015b). 
23 These events were important, despite the fact that NSR transits witnessed a 
sharp downturn in the 2014 and 2015 shipping seasons. 
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Conclusion: Russia and China in the Arctic,  
Cooperation or Competition?  
 
With regard to the Arctic, China and Russia have in the past viewed each other’s 
activities in the Arctic with some degree of suspicion. In particular, differing 
perspectives on commerce and shipping in the region, as well as seabed resource 
extraction, have earlier caused the two countries’ overall warming relationship to 
undergo some significant strains. 
For one, Beijing was initially rather wary of Moscow’s attempts to extend its 
claims to the Arctic shelf under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) in 2007. Apparently, Beijing was concerned when Russia began an 
attempt to extend its shelf, perhaps as far as the North Pole in some areas. Some 
Chinese scientists saw these claims as a Russian overstep in sovereignty extension, 
viewing these claims to the Arctic shelf as a “challenge” to Beijing (Terekhov, 
2010). 
For its part, Russia was concerned with China’s perceived intent to assert 
control over the 12% of Arctic hydrocarbon reserves not claimable by littoral states. 
As one Russian expert mentioned in 2010, “They (China and other non-littoral 
states) want their slice of the pie, i.e., in the open part of the Arctic basin” 
(Terekhov, 2010, p. 2). More recently, Igor’ Sechin, Chairman of Rosneft and close 
ally of President Putin, uneasy about China’s Arctic ambitions, remarked in 2013 
that Russia faced “plenty of competition,” not only from littoral states, but also from 
“… countries which seem to be far from the Arctic …. The struggle for resources 
is getting tougher” (Glava Rosnefti, 2014).  
As a major exporter, China was also engaged in the debate early on regarding 
access to potentially lucrative Arctic shipping lanes. China proclaimed its 
commercial interests in the north Pacific and Arctic Oceans, worried as it was (as 
Wu Zhenfu, a professor from the Dalian Maritime University, stated concerning 
China’s interests), that “(W)hoever has control over the Arctic route will control the 
new passage of world economics and international strategies” (Manthorpe, 2011, p. 
A6). Apparently, China’s leaders worried that, should the NSR become a normal 
route for trans-oceanic shipping, Russia’s control over the region might make 
traversing the NSR prohibitively expensive; therefore, Beijing forcefully 
proclaimed its interests in keeping transit costs reasonable and shipping lanes open 
(Jakobson, 2013; Mitchell, 2013). 
However, although the two countries have not seen eye-to-eye in the past in the 
Arctic, since mid-2014 a significantly closer relationship has indeed developed 
between China and Russia there. Since that time–a time that obviously coincides 
with the imposition of sanctions against Russia’s energy industry and Russia’s 
“pivot to the East”–no longer does one often read in the official Russian press of 
fears of Chinese economic or military intentions in the region (or beyond). Instead, 
Chinese investment and involvement in infrastructure projects all along the “cold 
Silk Road” have been announced with great fanfare. What is more, as we have seen, 
hydrocarbon exploration and project development has been an especially important 
and high profile arena of activity in the new Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic. 
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To be sure, Russia’s goal of “mastering the Arctic”–a vital part of the Russian 
leadership’s plan for the country’s economic resurgence–requires significant capital 
investment; without the possibility of attracting Western capital for the vast 
majority of these projects, China’s financial participation balances Russia’s 
investment need. 
Thus, this Arctic case study suggests that not only is it possible for China and 
Russia to move beyond an uneasy association of convenience toward a genuine 
partnership in areas of mutual interest–despite several continued difficulties 
confronting the overall relationship–but also that the Western-backed sanctions 
regime has acted as a catalyst for closer Sino-Russian relations. 
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Political Homophobia  
as a State Strategy in Russia 
 
Nikita Sleptcov 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the current state strategy of political homophobia used by the 
Russian government to create a sense of national identity by scapegoating Russian 
homosexuals as "foreign agents," reinforcing the power of the governing elite, and 
distracting people's attention from government misconduct.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
“West will fall in the same way as the Roman Empire fell before it, because 
in the Roman army it all started with the fact that the soldiers were no 
longer engaged in battles and indulged in “the charms of homosexual 
love.” (State Duma deputy Vitaly Milonov in an interview to the Russian 
News Service)1 
 
Political homophobia as a state strategy is a phenomenon that has attracted 
scholarly attention at the beginning of the 21st century as more states across the 
globe resort to it in their domestic policies.2 In the case of Russia discussed below, 
I show that political homophobia as a modular oppressive strategy has been used 
to legitimize the current authoritarian political regime, to unify national identity, 
and to present the country’s particular values as distinct from those of the West. 
In order to show what Wiess and Bosia call the “modular” character of political 
homophobia, I rely on current research in the area of political homophobia, 
analyze Russian homophobic legislation, and compare Russia to Poland , a country 
that also previously introduced similar legislation and employed similar rhetoric 
of political homophobia.  
In this paper I argue that political homophobia as a state strategy is embedded 
into Russian history and since 2012 has been actively employed by the Russian 
authorities. This paper is an opportunity to look at the current homophobic 
outburst as a deliberate political strategy carefully crafted in Russia. In my 
                                                           
1 Previously being a member of St. Petersburg city hall, Milonov was the main sponsor of 
the city “gay propaganda law.” 
2 See. Weiss, M. L., & Bosia, M. J. (2013). Global Homophobia: States, Movements, and 
the Politics of Oppression. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
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understanding of political homophobia, I will rely on the work of Wiess and Bosia 
(2013) who understand political homophobia as a 
 
purposeful [strategy], especially as practiced by state actors; as embedded 
in the scapegoating of an “other” that drives processes of state building and 
retrenchment; as the product of transnational influence‐peddling and 
alliances; and as integrated into questions of collective identity and the 
complicated legacies of colonialism. Specifically, we target the overt 
deployment of homophobia in political rhetoric and policy as a remarkably 
similar and increasingly modular phenomenon across a wide range of cases. 
(p. 14) 
 
In their definition, Bosia and Weiss highlight the modular nature of political homophobia, 
that is, exhibiting similar characteristic across cases where present. I argue that the new 
round of political homophobia that was launched approximately in 2012 with regional and 
federal legislation exposes the modular character of Russian political homophobia. 
Approaching homophobia as explicitly the deliberate and modular political strategy offers 
a different way to understand the power dynamic that goes beyond one case, one country. 
Homophobia as a political strategy in not unknown to Russian politics. During the 
Soviet period, Stalin skillfully used homophobia to attack political opponents and 
consolidate power (Healey, 2002; Healey, Baer, & Stella, 2008). With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain, the young democratic 
government in Russia was more focused on stabilizing the economy than on 
building political participation. “Shock therapy” aimed at changing the economy 
and “the initial impoverishment that came along with it had more of a 
‘demasculinizing’ effect, as many men could not meet the new market-derived 
standards for masculine achievement” (Sperling, 2014, p. 60). The effect was so 
profound that some scholars called it “crisis in gender identities, and particularly 
masculinity” (Goscilo & Strukov, 2010, p. 11). Together with the loss of the status 
of superpower and, as a result, diminishing role of the country in international 
affairs, led to the fact that “Russia in the 1990s was quite often portrayed not as a 
mother but rather as a woman of easy virtue; prostitution became a metaphor for 
the country’s foreign policy” (Riabov & Riabova, 2014, p. 25). Therefore, one of 
the earliest political acts undertaken by Putin when he became president in the early 
2000s was the change of discourse to include patriotic terms and images to 
reinstate Russian masculinity on the political level and consolidate public support.  
The state strategy of political homophobia, among other policies of nation 
building, was deployed in 2012 as a response to the ideological vacuum that had 
been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. I argue that modern Russia under 
the rule of President Vladimir Putin has deployed political homophobia as part of 
a range of policies aimed at (re)creating a sense of national identity that is not 
based on western liberal values.  
Being essentially an “imagined community” of separated individuals, nations 
are constructed through language and discourse (Anderson, 1983, p. 15; Martin, 
1995; De Cillia, Reisgl, & Wodak, 1999). Because they are “mobilized into 
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existence through symbols invoked by political leadership” (Dryzek, 2006, p. 35) 
discourses are powerful tools in constructing, perpetuating, transforming, or 
dismantling national identities (De Cillia, Reisgl, & Wodak, 1999). Therefore, 
discursive practices of homophobia used by the political leadership in laws and 
public speeches constantly recreate a sense of national identity distinct from the 
West with its emphasis on liberal values (Healey, Baer, & Stella 2008, pp. 6-7).  
To denote the gradual shift toward a politics of nationalism, I introduce the 
term “conservative heteronationalism”. Analogous to Jasbir Puar’s (2007) 
homonationalism, heteronationalism deploys heterosexuality as a modular type of 
sexual behavior forming the basis of nation where queer sexualities are not 
included into the process and become marginalized as unproductive sexualities 
(Foucault, 1990).3 The conservatism is expressed by the desire to look for role 
models of sexual behavior in history, which is selective and biased. Conservative 
heteronationalism is a state strategy that occurred in the Russian Federation under 
Putin. A main objective in the deployment of modular political homophobia is to 
create a collective identity for Russian nationalists.  
For Bosia and Wiess (2013), political homophobia is connected to the legacy 
of colonialism. Russia has never been colonized by a foreign power. However, the 
period of the 1990s was characterized by the majority of common people as the 
country’s ‘quasi-colonialization’, turning it into ‘a raw material appendage of the 
West’ (Kotz, 1999). I argue that the feeling of lost sovereignty and independence 
was the trigger that contributed to the formation of a public demand for a new type 
of leadership that would not be directly associated with the West, and therefore in 
the public eye would not look dependent. The people were searching for a hero, 
someone who could bring the lost pride and political status back to them. Putin 
was such a figure, whose “self-assertion as a tough, strong, masculine, and, above 
all, patriotic leader protecting Russia” was seen as capable of rectifying the status-
quo (Sperling, 2014, p. 78). 
I associate the deployment of political homophobia in Russia with the impact 
of internal as well as external factors. The introduction of conservative rhetoric 
into Russian domestic politics is closely related to the international milieu around 
Russia in the mid-2000s. The relations between the West and Russia started to 
deteriorate after the famous Munich speech the Russian president Putin delivered 
during Munich Security Conference in Germany on 10 February 2007. Putin 
criticized the West in general and the USA in particular for “monopolistic 
dominance in global relations” (Lekic, 2007). The speech marked the beginning 
of a policy of deterrence in the relations between Russia and the West and the 
further events (the Russian-Georgian war, the chain of color revolutions in the 
countries of the former USSR and so on) laid the foundation for mutual distrust 
(Koshkin, 2016, p. 6). The speech reignited the suspicion of the NATO 
enlargement among Russian elite as well as Russian population (Jégo, 2008; 
                                                           
3 Thus heteronationalism is based, in part, on the idea that the result of the sexual behavior 
is pleasure and not the birth of children. 
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Kryshtanovskaya, 2008; Neef, 2016). Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who 
replaced Putin in early 2008, in his address to the Federal Assembly the same year 
expressed the concerns saying that “Russia’s strength is being tested” by the 
NATO members (Medvedev, 2008). 
The Putin administration changed its rhetoric toward a more critical position 
on the West (Shimov, 2017). Confrontation with Western countries required a 
change in internal discourse, which happened with the gradual introduction of the 
language of traditional values. People impoverished and humiliated in the 1990s 
politics of “shock therapy” welcomed the changed course. “Russia is getting up 
from its knees” became a slogan of growing anti-westernization in the country 
(Rubov, 2008). The new ideology of conservative traditional values involved 
many actors such as the ruling United Russia party, Cossacks, and most 
importantly the Russian Orthodox Church, whose position on homosexuality has 
traditionally been hostile (Zorgdrager, 2013). The Russian Orthodox Church, 
politically disempowered during the soviet times, became engaged in politics after 
the collapse of the USSR in 1991 but did not gain political prominence until the 
late 2000s when the newly invigorated Russian Orthodoxy has been deployed to 
play a crucial part in the new politics of conservatism (Anderson, 2007; Mitrokhin, 
2009; Willems, 2006).  
I argue that the launch of political homophobia in Russia has been closely 
connected to changes in the country's foreign policy due to deteriorating relations 
with Western countries and the necessity to legitimize the current political regime 
inside the country. Conservative heteronationalism, enshrined in the legislation, 
excludes queer Russians from the definition of a truly Russian citizen. LGBTQ 
advocacy groups, funded from abroad, are deemed “foreign agents” serving 
interests of Russian adversaries. Such a hostility from the government promotes 
societal homophobia within the nation and marginalizes the status of Russian 
queers.  
 
Literature Review 
 
Homophobia as a social phenomenon has been a scholarly focus from many 
different perspectives. Scholars have been studying the interconnections between 
states and the homophobic attitudes of the population and their effect on LGBTQ 
rights activists (Frohlich, 2011). Homophobic attitudes have been also scrutinized 
from the position of relations between Christianity and homophobia (Birken, 
1997) and homophobia and masculinity (Stein, 2005). Bosia and Weiss (2012) 
pioneered the study of homophobia as a modular and deliberate political strategy 
that has taken place in different parts of the world. 
There is a growing body of scholarship focused particularly on examining 
homophobia in Russia from the political standpoint. There is scientific research in 
the area of history (Ashwin, 2000; Engelstein, 1995; Healey 1993, 2002, 2003; 
Healey, Baer, & Stella, 2008) and the sociology of homosexuality in Russia (Baer, 
2002, 2009). This literature suggests a perpetuated feeling of homophobia within 
Journal of Global Initiatives      144 
 
 
the Russian population due to the historical legacy of homosexuality in Soviet 
times and negative discourse produced by the state today. 
There is also a significant amount of research in the area of masculinity and 
its nexus to the political regime, attitudes, and culture (Clements, Friedman, & 
Healey, 2002; Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015; Riabov & Riabova, 2014; 
Sperling, 2014). Sperling (2014) argues that masculinity plays a key role in 
legitimizing the Russian political regime. She writes, 
 
In the contemporary Russian case, the Kremlin deployed a legitimation 
strategy that included stressing Putin’s machismo–a strategy that bled over 
into popular cultural productions of the same ilk.[…] Traditional 
masculinity, therefore, enables male political leaders (and some female 
ones as well) to assert their power over others who can be identified or 
characterized as traditionally feminine.[…] Political actors employ widely 
familiar cultural notions of masculinity, femininity, and homophobia 
(heteronormativity) as political tools in their performance of legitimacy. 
(Sperling, 2014, p. 3) 
 
Researchers also note a growing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church as an 
authoritative actor in producing homophobic discourse and reinforcing traditional 
gender roles (Sperling, 2014; Stähle, 2015; Zorgdrager, 2013). Taking into 
consideration the fact that the majority of the population identify as orthodox 
Christians, the Church’s position on social issues has a significant impact on 
societal perception. 
Scientists have studied the role media plays in the construction of homophobia 
within the Russian context (Persson, 2015). Media has a significant influence on 
people’s attitudes toward such social issues (Gainous, 2007; Venzo & Hess, 2013). 
Gomillion and Giuliano (2011) have examined how the media has influenced self- 
realization, coming out, and current identities of American homosexuals “by 
providing role models and inspiration” (p. 330). There is also a body of research 
on discursive practices within local LGBTQ communities developed in response 
to societal homophobia in Russia (Kondakov, 2011, 2013a, 2013b). The use of 
such discrete language helps Russian queers stay unnoticed in the hostile 
environment. For example, the usage of the phrase “byut v teme” (“to be in the 
theme”) which means to belong to the LGBTQ+ community. For a person who 
does not know, this phrase does not carry any obvious semantic load, for an 
initiate, this kind of “fluid” identity allows one to avoid the daily hostile and 
homophobic environment (Kondakov, 2013b).  
In my research, I place Russia within a broader international context in order 
to show that current homophobic discourse and “anti-gay” legislation passed in 
2013 is not unique to Russia and represents a wider attempt of different 
authoritarian states to use homosexuality politically to their advantage. 4 However, 
                                                           
4 The federal law “For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for 
a Denial of Traditional Family Values” of June 11, 2013 and enacted on June 30, 2013. 
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unlike in places like Uganda or Egypt, Russian homosexuals are hostages of 
complicated foreign policy games between Russia and the West. I argue that the 
politics of homophobia launched by Putin is a direct consequence of deteriorating 
relations with the United States and Western Europe. 
 
Methods 
 
In this study, I analyze regional as well as federal legislation that was developed 
between 2006 and 2013 in Russia and which were aimed at regulating queer public 
visibility. An examination of legislation is particularly important because it 
denotes both the will of the legislator and demonstrates the perpetuation of 
political homophobia in the law. For example: the Law of the Region of Ryazan 
dated June 15, 2006 N 66-03, “On the Changes in the Law of the Region of 
Ryazan”; “On the Administrative Violations”; and several other nearly identical 
bills adopted by Arkhangelsk in 20115, Kostroma6, Saint Petersburg7, 
Novosibirsk8, Magadan9, Samara10, Baskortostan11, and Krasnodar12 in 2012, and 
Irkutsk13 and Kaliningrad14 in 2013. In addition to these, I consider the federal law 
“For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial 
of Traditional Family Values” which was unanimously passed on June 30, 2013. 
                                                           
5 Law of the Arkhangelsk Region of December 15, 2009 N 113-9-OZ “On certain measures 
to protect the morality and health of children in the Arkhangelsk region” 
6 Law of the Kostroma Region of February 15, 2012 N 193-5-ZKO “On Amendments to the 
Law of the Kostroma Region “On Guarantees of the Rights of the Child in the Kostroma 
Region and the Code of the Kostroma Region on Administrative Offenses” 
7 Law of St. Petersburg of February 29, 2012 N 238 “On Amendments to the Law of St. 
Petersburg" On Administrative Offenses in St. Petersburg” 
8 Law of the Novosibirsk Region of June 14, 2012 N 226-OZ “On Amendments to Certain 
Laws of the Novosibirsk Region” 
9 Law of the Magadan Region of June 9, 2012 N 1507-OZ “On Amending Certain Laws of 
the Magadan Region in the Protection of Minors from Factors Negatively Affecting Their 
Physical, Intellectual, Mental, Spiritual and Moral Development” 
10 Law of the Samara region of July 10, 2012 N 75-GD “On Amendments to the Law of the 
Samara Region” and “On Administrative Offenses in the Territory of the Samara Region” 
11 Law of the Republic of Bashkortostan of July 23, 2012 N 581-з “On Amending the Law 
of the Republic of Bashkortostan,” “On Basic Guarantees of the Rights of the Child in the 
Republic of Bashkortostan.”. 
12 Law of the Krasnodar Krai of July 3, 2012 N 2535-KZ “On Amendments to Certain 
Legislative Acts of the Krasnodar Region in Part of Strengthening Protection of Health and 
Spiritual and Moral Development of Children.” 
13 Law of the Irkutsk Region of April 24, 2013 N 29-OZ “On Amendments to the Law of the 
Irkutsk Oblast “On Certain Measures to Protect Children from Factors Negatively Affecting 
Their Physical, Intellectual, Mental, Spiritual and Moral Development in the Irkutsk Region”  
14 Law of the Kaliningrad Region of January 30, 2013 N 199, “On Amendments and 
Additions to the Kaliningrad Oblast Law “On Protection of the Population of the Kaliningrad 
Region from Information Products Harming the Spiritual and Moral Development,” and Law 
of the Kaliningrad Region of January 30, 2013 N 196, “On introducing amendments to the 
Kaliningrad Oblast Law ‘The Kaliningrad Oblast Code of Administrative Offenses’” 
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All of these laws. I argue, are discriminatory and anti-democratic nature. The 
legislative measures establish social disparity in traditional and non-traditional 
relations by prohibiting public displays of affection between same-sex partners, 
which contradicts the principle of non-discrimination of international human 
rights law (explain further, cite references). Homosexuality is defined as 
corrupting the youth. The aforementioned Ryazan law directly states that it creates 
“measures aimed at ensuring intellectual, moral and mental safety of children in 
the Ryazan region” (Law of Ryazan oblast, dated June 15, 2006 N 66-03). The 
state hierarchizes sexuality by defining homosexuality as an influence that 
corrupts minors. Such a discourse produces a notion of the correct sexual behavior 
that transcends into the political realm, reinforcing the heteronationalistic nature 
of the nation-building. Discuss more. 
The laws contain outdated, explicitly offensive language. Instead of using 
internationally appropriate term “homosexuality,” the laws utilize the Russian 
term “homosexualism,” which pertains to a set of ideas or ideology. The term is 
often used by policy-makers to dismiss same-sex relations as a deliberate strategy 
to undermine their inclusion in Russian society. The Kaliningrad law is to some 
extent unique. Not only does it use the word “sodomy” and put homosexuality 
together with pedophilia, it also forbids “propaganda” related to “non-traditional 
relations” among all the citizens of the region, not just minors. The St. Petersburg 
law also uses the word “sodomy” to denote same-sex practices among men.  
The language utilized by the legislators aims at restructuring sexuality on a 
political scale, subjugating homosexuality to heterosexuality. It allows for 
deployment of political homophobia in order to create a sense of national unity 
based on sexuality. Conservative heteronationalism reflected in the legislation 
portrays the Russian nation as purely heterosexual. Russians who do not fit the 
category are deprived of recognition and representation.  
 
Political Roots of the Institutionalization of Homophobia in Russia 
 
Political homophobia as a strategy of the Russian state cannot be understood 
without reference to the destructive experience of the demasculinization of the 
country that eventually led to the welcoming of authoritarianism. In this case, 
Vladimir Putin used sexual minorities in order to construct an image of an external 
threat and its internal “agents.” However, not only homosexuals were portrayed 
that way. Russian NGOs that receive funding from foreign sources were also 
marginalized and labeled as “foreign agents.” 
Historically, the Soviet regime used the political ideology of communism to 
lessen anxiety about the future of the society by creating and sustaining a stable 
hierarchy of gender roles where masculinity was a central organizing norm. In 
many ways, the current conservative turn and the emergence of the authoritarian 
regime of Vladimir Putin find their political inspiration in the earlier periods of the 
Soviet history (Cannady & Kubicek, 2014; Lukin, 2009; Prozorov, 2005). The use 
of an external threat helped the government to demand loyalty within the country 
and provided a sense of unity to the nation. A perpetuated feeling of paternalism 
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placed the state in a position of decision-maker in every aspect of human life. 
Adrian Ashwin (2000) speaking about governing gender norms, notes that 
 
in the case of women, their role was defined as worker-mothers who had 
a duty to work, to produce future generations of workers, as well as to 
oversee the running of the household. Men, meanwhile, had an at once more 
limited and higher-status role to play. They were to serve as leaders, 
managers, soldiers, workers–in effect, they were to manage and build the 
communist system–while the state assumed responsibility for the 
fulfilment of the traditional masculine roles of father and provider, 
becoming, in effect, a universal patriarch to which both men and women 
were subject. In this way, masculinity became socialized and embodied in 
the Soviet state, the masculinity of individual men being officially defined 
by their position in the service of that state. (p. 1) 
 
The fall of communism and disintegration of the country resulted in a deep 
feeling of de-masculinization and loss of identity. The previously existing gender 
roles carefully crafted and transmitted through generations were shaken by the 
significant economic and political turmoil. Additionally, the abrupt and substantial 
impoverishment of the population and the decline in male life expectancy 
negatively affected the ability of men to provide not only for their families but to 
the nation as well (Riabov & Riabova, 2014). The loss in the Cold War with the 
West left a deep wound in the consciousness of the population. It also led to a 
sense of demasculinization which, as Riabov and Riabova (2014) argue, had two 
effects, 
 
first, there was a significant weakening of the country’s international 
position because of the nation’s defeat in the cold war, the collapse of the 
USSR, and the Russian army’s defeat in the war in Chechnya in 1994–
1996. Second, human trafficking reminded Russian men that they were 
unable to take care of their nation’s women. Moreover, Russia in the 1990s 
was quite often portrayed not as a mother but rather as a woman of easy 
virtue; prostitution became a metaphor for the country’s foreign policy. (p. 
25) 
 
The weakening economy of the country compelled Russian leaders to turn to 
Western countries in order to seek financial support. This reinforced the image of 
an impoverished country begging from its neighbors with an outstretched hand 
and painfully harmed the national pride of Russians. The lost status was further 
reinforced by Western countries expansion of NATO and the bombing of 
Yugoslavia despite protests from Russia. No longer acting from a position of 
strength (a traditionally masculine notion), Russian society harbored some 
resentment against Western democracies. 
Flush with victory in the Cold War, in the early 1990s Western European 
countries failed to fully engage Russia in the democratic process and the work of 
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European institutions. Weak ties between the European institutions made it 
unfeasible to influence the Russian government on issues such as gay rights15 
(Ferrari, 2016). However, some European institutions such as the Council of 
Europe in the early 1990s demanded decriminalization of homosexuality before it 
could welcome Russia (Bohan, 2014). The Yeltsin administration in 1993 
excluded “muzhelozhestvo” (male-to-male sexual practices) from the Code of 
Criminal Offence.16 The emergence of LGBT activism in post-Soviet Russia could 
have been a first step towards the inception of a statewide LGBT movement. Yet, 
as Laurie Essig (1999) notes, it was not the birth of the movement, but rather a 
miscarriage (p. 67). After the abrupt emergence of the LGBT movement in the 90s 
by the beginning of the 2000s, it was almost invisible (Essig, 1999; Nemtsev, 2008). 
Decriminalization did not lead to de-stigmatization of Russian gays and 
lesbians. Baer (2009) writes, “Western-style homosexuality, or what Altman has 
referred to as the “global gay,” has become a convenient symbol of Western 
cultural imperialism, involving the encroachment of Western values (overt 
sexuality, non-reproductive sex, and consumerism) and Western political concepts 
(tolerance, diversity, and civil rights)” (p. 6). For the government, juridical 
decriminalization of homosexuality was a tool in negotiations with international 
organizations and foreign governments. Therefore, homosexuality was used 
politically in two ways. In domestic affairs, the government was silent about rights 
of homosexuals in order not to attract unnecessary criticism of the public. In 
foreign affairs, homosexuality was used to show ongoing democratization of the 
country. 
The growing visibility of sexualities on TV and on the streets of Russian big 
cities quickly ignited a feeling of domestic homophobia within the population. 
Homosexuality, in particular, was seen as “a foreign import, that is, a direct effect 
of Western influence” (Healey, Baer, & Stella, 2008, p. 6). As Massad (2002) 
observes, “by inciting discourse on homosexual and gay and lesbian rights and 
identities, the very ontology of gayness is instituted in a discourse that could have 
only two reactions to the claims of universal gayness: support them or oppose them 
without ever questioning their epistemological underpinnings” (p. 374). The 
majority of Russians show strong animosity toward same-sex practices and 
visibility of homosexuals. 
It is important to emphasize that the decriminalization of homosexuality in 
Russia was not a response to a growing LGBT activism. On the contrary, Russian 
gay and lesbian groups, that started emerging as early as 1993, were weak and 
disorganized nationally. As Bosia and Weiss (2012) suggest there is a clear pattern 
of the diffusion of global homophobia because “in no context in the world are 
LGBT citizens the threat they are made out to be; the ubiquitous specter of married, 
child‐rearing gay men or lesbians inflates a tiny, often meek and nearly–or fully 
invisible minority, to nation-destroying stature, much as anti-semitism has done, 
                                                           
15 Russia decriminalized homosexuality in 1993 while excluded it from the list of mental 
illnesses in 1999.  
16 Here and after all translations from Russian into English are mine. 
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and frequently at the same time” (p. 20). This is certainly true for the Russian 
Federation of the 2000s when domestic homophobia became a strategic political 
tool. When this happened, the homophobic discourse and policies received 
overwhelming support from the general public for whom gays and lesbian were a 
symbol of Western liberalism (Koshelev, 2012; Levada-Center, 2015). 
Therefore, the 1990s became a lost period for LGBT activism in Russia. In 
the circumstances of a weak and dependent state, LGBTQ activists failed to push 
the government to deliver rights to Russian gays and lesbians. The society, feeling 
deprived of their masculine nature, associated homosexuality with 
demasculatinity. As a result, a politics of compliance with the West in exchange 
for scarce resources turned the Russian population against Western values. The 
government later used such attitudes to support a carefully crafted state strategy 
of political homophobia. 
 
Putin’s Conservative Turn  
and Institutionalization of Homosexuality in Russia 
 
At the beginning of his presidency in the 2000s, Vladimir Putin attempted to 
combine politics of “friendly relations” with the West and “patriotism” for his 
domestic constituencies. Although Putin’s Russia was allowed into many 
European and international political institutions, the country’s voice was barely 
heard by the Western counterparts. The last straw was a round of NATO expansion 
in 2007 with the inclusion of South and East European nations bordering Russia. 
This move was perceived as unfriendly and even aggressive by the Russian 
political elites. The offensive character of NATO and the reluctance to treat Russia 
as equal pushed the Putin administration into isolation and the search for a new 
ideology for domestic consumption. To unite the nation, the Kremlin turned to the 
ideology of conservative heteronationalism.  
Conservative heteronationalism in its Russian version represents an attempt to 
create of sense of national identity based on the construct of traditional values and 
heteronormativity. In such a social construct “nontraditional (that is, non-
heterosexual and non-heteronormative) sexual relationships are understood to be 
socially inferior” (Wilkinson, 2014, p. 372). 
With the growing conservative heteronationalism, homosexuals again 
appeared to be the focal point of the policies of exclusion. In order to posit Russia 
against the West, the government needed to identify a Russian group of people 
that would represent non-Russian values influenced by the West and serving as 
agents of Western corrupt influences within the country. Such tactics of carefully 
crafted state homophobia facilitates the state’s objective of uniting the society 
around its national leader. Writes Stähle (2015), “feared, condemned and 
demonized, homosexuality has been used for contesting power relations, 
articulating Russia’s sovereignty and defining the Self and the Other” (p. 52). 
Politically, it allowed the government to shift public attention to the minor 
problem, whereas the real social and economic issues remained without substantial 
public criticism. The parastatal media effectively accomplished the task. LGBTQ-
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rights organizations, in particular, became an exclusive aim of governmental 
criticism as agents of the western countries, especially the Unites States. It found 
support among the population. 
Russian researcher, Igor Kon, connects the initial conservative turn in 2005-
2006 that started when Ryazan Regional Assemble (Ryazanskaya Oblastnaya 
Duma) adopted a supplement to the local Law on Administrative Offenses to the 
current round of homophobia, claiming that it is organically linked to other forms 
of Soviet-Russian xenophobia (Kon, 2010; Nagel, 1998).17 The law used the 
Soviet derogatory term “homosexualism” combined with the outdated term 
“sodomy” that has religious connotations and the relatively new “lesbianism” 
which was not used previously.18 The law was contested in the Constitutional Court 
in 2009. In its decision the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on 
January 19, 2010, declared, that 
 
… as such the prohibition of the propaganda–as a purposeful targeted and 
uncontrolled activity of the dissemination of information that may damage 
the health, moral and spiritual development, including misconceptions 
about the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional marriage–
among persons deprived due to their inability to critically evaluate such 
information cannot be considered as violating the constitutional rights of 
citizens (Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 2014). 
 
In 2012, the decision was appealed to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC). 
The Committee decided that “the applicant’s conviction under the Ryazan Law on 
Administrative Offenses (Ryazan Region Law) which prohibits public actions 
aimed at propaganda of homosexuality among minors violated her right to freedom 
of expression, read in conjunction with her right to freedom from discrimination, 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)” 
(International Justice Resource Center, 2012). However, that decision did not 
                                                           
17 Zakon Ryazanskoi oblasti ot 15.06.2006 N 66-03 “O Vnesenii izmenenii v Zakon 
Ryazanskoi Oblasti “Ob Administrativnih Pravonarusheniiah” [Law of the Region of 
Ryazan dated 15.06.2006) N 66-03 “On the Changes in the Law of the Region of Ryazan 
“On the Administrative Violations”] Retrieved May 27, 2013 from the Region of Ryazan 
website: http://ryazan.news-city.info/docs/sistemsj/dok_oeqrlo.htm 
18 It should be noted that The Russian language often uses words “homosexualism” and 
“lesbianism” while in relation to heterosexual practices the word “heterosexuality” is 
used. The suffix “-ism” in many languages (Russian is not an exception) is used to create 
ideological concepts (socialism, capitalism, feminism, etc.). I would argue that artificially 
made mistranslation of homosexuality aims at showing political nature of the homosexual 
practices as if homosexuality was an ideology. 
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change the situation since the UN HRC does not have an effective leverage to 
pursue Ryazan Administration to change the law. 
Several other Russian regions followed the example – Arkhangelsk in 2011, 
Kostroma in 2012, St. Petersburg in 2012, Novosibirsk in 2012, Magadan in 2012, 
Samara in 2012, and Krasnodar in 2012–and adopted similar regional gay 
propaganda laws. Some of them are particularly important for analysis. St. 
Petersburg, considered the most European among Russian cities, adopted anti-gay 
law “On Amendments to the Law of St. Petersburg On administrative offenses in 
St. Petersburg” on March 30, 2012. Being homophobic in its very nature, the law 
also uses the outdated repressive language, interpreting the “LGBT” acronym as 
“sodomy, lesbianism, bisexuality, transgenderism” (Sperling, 2014, p. 299). 
The federal law “For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information 
Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values,” that unanimously passed 
the State Duma (one deputy abstained) put an end to regional legislative initiatives 
on June 30, 2013. The law became known as the “gay propaganda law” or the 
“anti-gay law.” It mainly faced criticism from abroad, while inside the country 
only a small number of democratically oriented organizations and human rights 
groups opposed the legislation and tried to appeal it but did not succeed. 
The vagueness of the language of the legislation opened up the possibility for 
authorities to eliminate almost all actions related to LGBT community–not only 
pride parades and other public marches, but also festivals, seminars, conferences, 
publishing, even the organizations themselves could be closed. Potentially, these 
legislative changes aim to erase all non-normative sexualities from the public 
sphere to sustain the Russian nation as purely heterosexual. As Healey (2003) 
argues, “Russians created a national sexual mythology that celebrated their own 
natural purity and located Russia between the dangers of a neurasthenic Europe, 
and a depraved and ‘backward’ East” (p. 4). 
The state explicitly politicized homosexuality, thereby making it a political 
force that is capable of influencing politics and hence change it. Homophobia lifted 
to the level of state policy created a scapegoated group of Russian homosexuals 
who became “representatives” of the Western culture, alien and dangerous to 
Russian state and society. Now they were the agents of the foreign government, 
traitors, and spies. The accusation of homosexuality deprives oppositional 
politicians of a chance to be elected. Governmental and Orthodox groups are often 
used to attack NGOs that work to shed light on government misconduct. Suspicion 
of promoting LGBTQ rights is utilized as an excuse for such actions. The Putin 
Administration uses homosexuality and those groups to blame the West for 
attempts to change the current political regime in Russia. It allows the leadership 
to intensify censorship and to suppress protest activity. 
 
Human Rights Regime 
 
Another major factor facilitating the creation of state homophobia policy is 
Russia’s indifference toward international norms and its own commitments. 
Russia is not part of the European Union, an organization that imposes some 
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legislative regulations on its members including regulations aimed at the 
prevention of homophobia. Even within the EU, there are cases like Poland, which 
attempt quite successfully to defy the EU recommendations and launch state 
homophobia after nationalists came to power in the mid-2000s. The United 
Nations institutions of human rights are weak and powerless in their ability to 
impose any kind of policies protecting people from deliberate policies of state 
homophobia. As Picq and Thiel (2015) insist, there has been no global treaty that 
would explicitly recognize rights of gays and lesbians within the worldwide 
context. This is not least due to countries such as Russia, where homophobia 
received state policy support. The only institute that can influence Russian 
legislation is the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), decisions of which 
Russia has to respect by the virtue of being a part of the Council of Europe and 
signing the treaty sanctioning superiority of the Court’s decision in respect to 
domestic laws. However, I argue that the dearth of legal and political mechanisms 
that are at the disposal of the international community leaves Russian homosexuals 
vulnerable to the machinery of the state. The state effectively uses Western 
critique of Russian LGBTQ policies to strengthen its own power by exposing 
interests of foreign governments as interfering with Russian domestic affairs and 
attempts to change the political regime inside the country. Homophobia is an 
excuse used to weaken an already faint Western influence in Russia that creates 
more severe conditions for homosexuals while strengthening the power and 
influence of the leadership, and diverting public attention from domestic problems. 
The Russian Constitution of 1993 declares that “in the Russian Federation 
recognition and guarantees shall be provided for the rights and freedoms of people 
and citizens according to the universally recognized principles and norms of 
international law and according to the present Constitution” (The Constitution of 
the Russian Federation, 1993). The recognition of and the emphasis on “universally 
recognized principles and norms” de jure puts Russia within a broader context of 
human rights regime embraced by the countries of Europe. In Article 15, it states 
that “the universally-recognized norms of international law and international 
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its 
legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation 
fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the international 
agreement shall be applied” (The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993). 
This means that where the domestic laws are silent, international norms should be 
used to clarify blind spots. The provision would allow what Kollman (2013) calls 
socialization of international norms in Russia. Socialization is a “staged process 
of norm creation, promotion and internalization” that facilitates dissemination of 
same-sex unions and marriage laws within the European continent (Kollman, 
2013, p. 73). She notes an important role of national and international human rights 
activist groups in the socialization of norms and adoption of national legislation 
protecting rights of homosexuals. However, unlike in Europe, Russia’s weak 
LGBTQ community lacked the organizational and financial support necessary to 
successfully campaign for the promotion of gay rights legislation or set aside 
same-sex union laws until the mid-2000s when it faced a backlash from the 
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government in the form of state homophobia. As discussed, the state perceives 
attempts to define any human rights regime as an encroachment on its sovereignty. 
Timid attempts by gay rights activists to hold public events were not just banned 
by the government, but were also used as evidence of how corrupt and dangerous 
Western influences are at undermining the country’s moral and family values. The 
traditional value discourse that was subsequently produced sought to justify a 
departure from the policy of Europeanization. 
On February 28, 1996, the Russian Federation joined the Council of Europe. 
Its entry meant that the country became part of the continental legal space with 
commitments arising from the generally recognized norms of European law. 
Today Russia is involved in more than 30 European conventions, among them the 
European Convention on Human Rights of November 4, 1950. Despite the fact as 
Kollman (2013) notes that the Convention never explicitly stated gay rights as 
human rights, it nevertheless imposes some restrictions and obligations on 
countries that signed it. For Russia, its provisions with some reservations started 
applying in 1998. One of the major provision installs jurisdiction of ECHR.  
Since its creation, Russia along with Turkey and Poland have all had lawsuits 
filed against them. After the mayor of Moscow banned gay parades in the city in 
2006, 2007, and 2008, Russian gay rights activists filed a lawsuit against Russia. 
In 2010, the ECHR upheld the claim of one of the leaders of the Russian gay 
movement, Nikolai Alekseev. The Court found a violation of articles of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights: Article 11 (“Freedom 
of assembly and association”), Article 13 (“The right to an effective remedy”), and 
Article 14 (“Prohibition of discrimination”). In its decision the ECHR ordered the 
Russian side to pay Alekseev 12,000 euros and reimburse the costs in the amount 
of 17,500 euros. 
These and other human rights cases that Russia lost compelled the authorities 
to publicly denounce the court’s decision as political and deliberately anti-Russian. 
In 2007, the chairman of the Constitutional Court Valery Zorkin stated that “the 
European Court of Human Rights, replacing the Supreme Court, the Arbitration 
Court and the Constitutional Court of Russia, performs the role of national 
authority, which is contrary to its nature and purpose” (Savina & Ivanitskaya, 2007, 
p.1). In 2010 Chairman Zorkin and then President Dmitry Medvedev said that 
Russia did not give the ECHR power over Russian sovereignty to make decisions 
about Russian legislation. Zorkin (2010) emphasized that, 
 
having no direct precedent, the decision on the granting a parental leave to 
a male soldier for child care, the Strasbourg Court, in this case, used the 
legal position from the case of “Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom,” 
which granted the dismissal from the armed forces of homosexuals. Of 
course, in the Russian Federation, as in any modern country, sexual 
minorities are protected by the principle of legal equality, that all are equal 
before the law and the courts; State guarantees equality of rights and 
freedoms, regardless of sex (Art. 19 of the Constitution). However, the 
“enthusiasm” of the modern European legal systems in protecting rights 
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and freedoms of homosexuals acquired grotesque forms. Sometimes this 
can lead to a tragedy, as it happened recently in Serbia, where rejection of 
the gay pride parade in the traditionally Orthodox country resulted in riots. 
(p.1) 
 
The position of the Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court presents Europe 
as aiming to change Russian values and impose a gay agenda. Regardless of the fact 
that most of the cases in the European Court against Russia did not concern rights of 
gays and lesbians, the justification used to criticize the Court was often connected 
to homosexuality. Even slight, timid attempts to promote gay rights within the 
country caused a massive backlash used to justify not only tougher measures 
towards Russian homosexuals but a massive criticism of European institutions and 
their human rights doctrines. 
In 2014, the ECHR again attracted criticism when President Putin highlighted 
that gays and lesbians may threaten national security. He responded that just like 
the United States, Russia has the right to comply or not comply when “it is 
advantageous and necessary to ensure our interests” (Putin, 2014). He also noted 
that the Court’s decisions are most often political. In 2015, a group of State Duma 
deputies appealed to the Constitutional Court to assess the possibility of 
recognition and enforcement of judgments of the ECHR that contradict the 
provisions of the Constitution and the legal positions of the Russian legislation. 
The court decided that “Russia may exceptionally depart from the execution of 
entrusted obligations if such derogation is the only possible way to avoid the 
violation of fundamental constitutional principles” (Mikhailova & Makutina, 
2015). On December 15, 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill 
allowing the Constitutional Court to wholly or partially ignore the ECHR’s 
decisions.  
Despite the fact that the Russian Federation is a member of many European 
political institutions including the Council of Europe, the EU as a whole as well 
as its individual members have very limited mechanisms of influence over 
Russia’s attitude towards Russia’s gay community. Unlike in the case of Poland 
that at the beginning of the 2000s had to go through the EU inspection and change 
its laws in order to become a member, Russia did not experience such pressure. 
However, similarities exist in the cases of Russia and Poland. Both countries have 
experienced the impact of totalitarian communist ideology. Communism in its 
Soviet version was an ideology “where ‘the other’–any other–is reflexively 
identified as hostile and created by immutable forces of history, something to be 
feared and ultimately crushed” (Hayden, 2016). The sense of suspicion of “the 
other” and the fear of the overthrow of the regime from abroad deeply penetrated 
the ruling class psychology in Russia which was socialized during the Soviet 
period (Hmelevsky, 2014; Shevtzova L.F., 1996). 
There are also some peculiar similarities in the positions of churches in both 
states. In the Russian Orthodox Church as well as the Roman Catholic Church in 
Poland, both Churches stressed national identity in opposing gay rights. In Russia, 
as Stähle (2015) argues, “the Russian Orthodox Church made a significant 
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contribution to the articulation of traditional family values and moral standards, 
arguing that Russian society was endangered by individualism, consumerism, 
secularism, and homosexuality” (p. 52). The position of the Russian Orthodox 
Church was outlined by Patriarch Kirill (2013) who depicted attitudes toward 
homosexuality in Western Europe as “dangerous apocalyptic symptom” and 
highlighted the necessity to “ensure that sin is never sanctioned in Russia by state 
law because that would mean that the nation has embarked on a path of self-
destruction” (p.1) . 
Poland used the rhetoric of “propaganda of homosexuality” approximately 
five years before the same homophobic discourse was deployed by the Russian 
politicians. In the case of Poland however, there was a response and efforts of joint 
actions of European institutions and community to pursue the government to soften 
their homophobic rhetoric and policies. But those efforts proved weak even within 
the EU boundaries. The nationalist-led government did not stop using homophobia 
to oppose the EU until it fell in 2007 (Weiss & Bosia, 2013). The weakness of the 
European legal and political systems does not allow them to influence Russian 
politics. This is especially true of verbal attempts to point out any Russian 
government misconduct with respect to homosexuals. Even an eminent 
intergovernmental organization such as the UN lacks the capacity to drive its 
members to adopt national legislation prohibiting homophobia and promoting 
rights of gays and lesbians. There is no “legal binding global treaty” that would 
explicitly recognize rights of LGBTQ community worldwide and by the virtue of 
the UN, authority prohibits homophobic policies of certain states (Picq & Thiel, 
2015, p. 54) 
Lack of the enforcement power of the UN is due to its origin as a post-world 
war institution, perpetuating the realist political vision of countries as winners and 
losers. The only body that has the power of decision-making–the Security 
Council–does not concern itself with human rights or LGBTQ rights. Even if it 
had to deal with such issues, the Council is divided between two often opposing 
forces of the Western democracies on the one side and Russia and China on the 
other. 
The General Assembly consisting of all member-states is an even more 
polarized institution. It became clearly visible in 2008 when only 66 of the 192 
countries “mainly from Europe and Latin America endorsed a non-binding 
declaration of human rights, sexual orientation, and gender identity” (Picq & 
Thiel, 2015, pp. 54-55). The Declaration faced opposition from Russia and some 
other countries. The United Nations Human Rights Council, the body whose main 
goal is to oversee and protect human rights around the globe, also adopted a 
resolution on June 30, 2016, on “Protection against violence and discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, and gender identity” (Human Rights Watch, 2016, p. 
1) Russia, which lost its seat in the Council in 2016, voted against the resolution 
(Roth, 2016). The symbolic victory of LGBTQ community perpetuated by the 
adoption of the resolutions, has, unfortunately, little power to change homophobic 
legislation that exists in Russia. 
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Thus it is evident that the international human rights regime, created by 
multiple institutions, has little impact on Russia. In the absence of significant 
leverage over Russian politics, attempts by European and international 
organizations to combat the state homophobia are either neglected by the state or 
used to justify tougher measure to protect national sovereignty and identity. Voices 
of human rights advocacy groups, international institutions, and politicians are not 
heard in Russia. On the contrary, the state by the means of controlled media 
produces a homophobic discourse that portray gay rights as part of a larger attempt 
to undermine national sovereignty from abroad. 
 
Conclusion 
 
State homophobia in Russia is being used to create a sense of national unity in the 
face of “the other” portrayed as the collective West with its values, discourses, and 
policies. The regional “anti-gay propaganda” laws that were finalized by the 
enactment of the federal law banning so-called propaganda of non-traditional 
sexual relations among minors follows from the idea that the Russian nation is a 
heterosexual nation, and homosexuality is non-Russian. However, homosexuality 
is not simply non-Russia, it is Western. This anti-Western homophobic discourse 
produced by politicians has existed within public consciousness since the Soviet 
times. Accompanied by societal homophobia, the government scapegoats LGBTQ 
rights activists within the country. Any attempts by international groups and 
governmental bodies from abroad to point out government misconduct is criticized 
as the desire to influence the internal politics of the country, undermine the 
foundations of its constitutional regime, and violate the democratic will of the 
Russian people. This strategy is used primarily as an excuse for non-fulfillment of 
decisions from the International Court of Human Rights in confrontation with UN 
decisions to protect the rights of LGBTQ people. Domestic audience perceives it 
as a sign of strength rather than weakness. 
The government also uses such state homophobia to divert public attention 
from domestic problems. Blaming the West for the struggling economy is 
currently one of the main strategies the government employs (Polunin, 2017; 
Rapoza, 2014). In this situation, Russian homosexuals are presented as Western 
agents that are paid to destroy family values and national identity. The current 
Russian policy is to build the nation based on conservative heteronationalism 
characterized by stable gender norms, traditional family values, the aggressive 
rejection of non-normative sexuality, and opposition to the West. That approach 
helps stabilize the regime during difficult times of international instability. 
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Is “This Guy” a Dictator? 
On the Morality of Evaluating Russian 
Democracy under Vladimir Putin 
 
Amir Azarvan 
 
Abstract 
 
Is it morally defensible to single Russian president, Vladimir Putin, out as a 
dictator? The popular impression that he is a dictator has been used to legitimize a 
dangerously adversarial policy towards what a U.S. Army general described as “the 
only country on earth…that could “destroy the United States.” I argue that this 
perception is in some ways misleading, and has contributed to escalating tensions 
with Russia, which is both unnecessary and harmful both to Russia and the U.S. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Vladimir Putin is a dictator. He's not a leader. Anybody who thinks 
otherwise doesn't know Russian history and they don't know Vladimir 
Putin. Hillary Clinton knows exactly who this guy is. John McCain said, 
I look in his eyes and I see KGB.  
Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) 
 
On five separate occasions during the 2016 vice presidential debate, Senator Kaine 
referred to Russian President Vladimir Putin as a dictator (White, 2016). Such 
remarks, expressed by those who form what I call the “American anti-Putin 
community” (or AAPC), are becoming increasingly commonplace in American 
politics. The popular impression that Russian President Vladimir Putin is a dictator 
has been used to legitimize a dangerously adversarial policy towards what a U.S. 
Army general described as “the only country on earth” … that could “destroy the 
United States” (KyivPost, 2015). I argue that this perception is morally indefensible, 
misleading, and has contributed to escalating tensions with Russia, which is 
unnecessary and harmful both to the United States and Russia.  
In the next two sections, I will introduce my working definition of 
“dictatorship” and will explain the moral framework employed in this study. I then 
situate (in the following sections, Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Soviet 
Russia and What Public Opinion Can Tell Us) the Putin regime in its relevant 
context by examining trends in the areas of human rights repression, democratic 
change, corruption, and public opinion. Next, I address (in Sincerity or National 
Security: Must We Choose?) the question of whether Russia poses a threat to U.S. 
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national security, in which case some may argue that our moral requirements in 
foreign policy ought to be relaxed. I conclude (in A Call for International Empathy) 
with a brief summary, as well as the suggestion that a foreign policy that is more 
ethical and beneficial to our national security may depend on our willingness to 
acquire greater international empathy.  
 
Defining Dictatorship 
 
There are political contexts in which certain words connote far more than - or, in 
some cases, express something quite different from – what their denotative 
meanings indicate. This is certainly true of the term dictatorship. While it formally 
denotes “a form of government in which one person or a small group possesses 
absolute power without effective constitutional limitations” (“Dictatorship”, 2017), 
modern society takes it to mean a lot more. In its contemporary usage, dictatorship 
can be defined as a political regime characterized by “extraconstitutional authority 
seized for selfish purposes and exercised over unwilling subjects” (Harris, 1938). 
In this paper, my use of the term corresponds to the latter, more clearly pejorative 
meaning. 
 
The Moral Starting Point of My Analysis 
 
Before continuing, I wish to state a key working assumption informing this 
investigation: In foreign affairs, we should act in accordance with our stated moral 
values as consistently as possible. I write “as consistently as possible” because there 
may be occasions on which our values are in tension with one another, and we are 
forced to prioritize among these conflicting values. For instance, one might argue 
that although leaders should not generally mask their true intentions while 
conducting foreign policy, it may be necessary to make insincere appeals to 
democracy in order to generate public support for a policy of hostility towards a 
country that poses - or is perceived as posing - a national security threat. In other 
words, when leaders are compelled to choose between sincerity and security, the 
latter ought to be preferred (be that as it may, I will briefly explain why I do not 
believe that Russia actually does pose such a threat to the United States). 
Also, given the moral requirement to apply our values consistently, we must, 
if we wish to determine whether this requirement is being met, be able to 
systematically compare cases, in this case, between Putin and his contemporaries 
and/or his predecessor. Acting on the belief that Putin is a dictator is, therefore, 
morally indefensible unless we are willing to behave similarly towards other leaders 
who are equally or more dictatorial.1 I suggest that each time we condemn President 
                                                           
1 Suppose I unfriended someone on Facebook on the grounds that he supported Donald 
Trump–whom I depicted as a vile racist–while remaining friends with those who are just as 
or more openly supportive of him. Aside from the question of whether my characterization 
of the president is accurate, most people would rightfully view my inconsistency as morally 
problematic.  
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Putin as a dictator we open ourselves up to the moral criticism that we are not 
applying our professed moral principles in a consistent manner. 
 As for the particular bases of comparison that I will be examining, I have 
chosen to focus on trends in the following areas: human rights repression, 
democratic consolidation, corruption, and public opinion. I will explain how these 
areas relate to the connotative meaning of dictatorship discussed earlier.  
 
Democracy and Human Rights in Post-Soviet Russia 
 
Human Rights Under Putin 
 
In its most recent yearly report, Amnesty International (AI) painted a grim picture 
of human rights conditions in Russia, marked by increased restrictions on civil 
liberties, torture, and other ill-treatment in prisons, failures to respect the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers, and abuses in Chechnya, Ukraine, and Syria (Amnesty 
International, 2017). Since 2004, the country has been classified as “not free” by 
Freedom House in its annual Freedom in the World report.2 Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) puts the matter quite boldly: “Today, Russia is more repressive than it has 
ever been in the post-Soviet era” (Human Rights Watch, 2017).  
This last statement is particularly germane to this discussion, as it points to a 
comparison. As I argued, it is necessary to be able to compare cases systematically 
in order to determine whether we are applying our values consistently across them. 
Qualitative reports issued by organizations like AI or HRW do not lend well to such 
comparisons. Fortunately, however, the Political Terror Scale (PTS) numerically 
codes annual human rights reports published by AI and the U.S. State Department 
(SD) according to systematic criteria.3 Countries are scored from 1-5, where 5 
means that “terror has expanded to the whole population,” and that “the leaders of 
these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue 
personal or ideological goals” (Political Terror Scale, 2016).  
Have human rights’ conditions improved under Putin, or worsened? The 
answer depends on which series of coded reports one turns to. As Table 1 reveals, 
AI’s average score was higher in the first eight years of Putin’s presidency than over 
the corresponding length of time under Yeltsin - pointing to an increase in 
repression - while the SD’s score was lower.  
Of course, the PTS is but one indicator of human rights repression, one that 
focuses on “personal integrity rights,” examples of which include political 
imprisonment, extrajudicial executions, torture, and disappearances. Among other 
categories of human rights (and time does not permit to exhaust all of them), it does 
not measure the repression of civil liberties. Under the latter category, press 
freedom merits special – but by no means – exclusive attention. Between 2002 (the 
                                                           
2 To access Freedom in the World data, visit https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/freedom-world-2017  
3 To access Political Terror Scale data, visit 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Download.html  
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first year that Freedom House began collecting data on this variable) and 2016, 
Russia’s press freedom score steadily worsened from 60-83 (100 being the worst 
possible score).4  
 
Table 1: Average Political Terror Scale Scores Under Presidents Yeltsin and 
Putin 
 
Source of Coded Reports Under Yeltsin  
(1992-1999) 
Under Putin  
(2000-2007)5 
Amnesty International 3.4 4.1 
More repression 
U.S. State Department 4.1 3.9 
Less repression 
Source: Political Terror Scale. 
 
One factor that is often emphasized concerning this trend is the murder of 
journalists. According to data provided by the Committee to Protect Journalists 
(CPJ), an American-based NGO, 24 journalists have been murdered under 
presidents Putin and Medvedev (as of May 28, 2017).6 While it ought to go without 
saying that one death is one too many, it is helpful to put this figure in a comparative 
context. A direct comparison would involve contrasting the number of murders 
during the length of Yeltsin’s tenure analyzed by the CPJ with the number slain 
over the same length of time under Putin.7 The Yeltsin and Putin periods did indeed 
differ, but only by one life: 13 journalists were murdered under Yeltsin, and 14 
under Putin. However, if the length of Yeltsin’s tenure analyzed by the CPJ were 
contrasted with the Putin and Medvedev presidencies combined, we would discover 
that the yearly average number of journalists slain diminished, albeit slightly, from 
1.6 to 1.4.  
The American anti-Putin community (AAPC) will naturally be inclined to 
question the relevance of the latter comparison by noting that Yeltsin ruled during 
a very different, tumultuous period, in which all manner of socioeconomic and 
political evils were supposedly inevitable. But this seems to presuppose that Yeltsin 
does not bear much of the responsibility for the tumult itself, as well as its varied 
consequences. The difficulties of the 1990s were not, at least in their entirety, the 
necessary growth pains of transitioning from the Soviet political and economic 
model, but were to some extent the result of policies actively pursued by Yeltsin. 
                                                           
4 To access Press Freedom data, visit https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/freedom-press-2016  
5 In 2015, the latest year in the PTS dataset, the AI variant of the PTS dropped to 3. 
Otherwise, neither the AI and SD score has changed from 4 since 2008. 
6 Although the CPJ’s database compiles all documented killings, I restrict my attention to 
murders. To access the CPJ’s database, visit https://cpj.org/killed/  
7 Thus, the periods investigated were 1/1/1992-December 30, 1999 (under Yeltsin), and 
December 31 2000-May 6, 2008 (under Putin). I included Putin’s time as acting president 
in the latter period. 
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Indeed, as Stuckler and Basu (2013) point out, the dramatic increase in poverty and 
reduction in life expectancy witnessed in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union “did not occur everywhere in the former Soviet sphere. Russia, Kazakhstan, 
and the Baltic states … which adopted economic shock therapy programs … 
experienced the worst rises in suicides, heart attacks and alcohol-related deaths” 
(para. 12). 
By no means do I wish to suggest that journalist killings have ceased to be a 
problem, and it is to be admitted that a more thorough comparison would involve a 
careful examination of the circumstances of each documented murder. Having said 
that, the AAPC’s representation of the problem brings to mind the following 
hypothetical scenario. Imagine two pairs of friends. In each pair there is a drug 
addict. In the first pair, the addict's friend is responsible for nurturing his addiction, 
or at least does little to free him from it. In the second, the friend is helping the 
addict slowly wean himself from his addiction. The AAPC tends to liken Putin to 
the addict’s friend in the first pair. Perhaps, however, it is time to consider the 
possibility that he is in certain regards comparable to the addict’s friend in the 
second.  
 
Democratization Under Putin 
 
To what extent is Russia governed democratically? To arrive at an answer, I relied 
upon a modified version of the Polity score, which is based on the openness and 
competitiveness of elections and institutional constraints on the chief executive’s 
power (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016). This measure takes on values ranging 
from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). As Figure 1 shows, 
Russia’s Polity score has never exceeded 6, and persisted at its most recently-
recorded level of 4 since 2007 (see Figure 1). 
Two points are worth noting with respect to this data. First, although Russia 
has, by Western standards, a very low Polity score, it is not ruled by an absolutely 
autocratic government (as are U.S. allies Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia). Thus, 
if one remains faithful to the actual meaning of dictatorship, which, again, involves 
absolute political power, then it would be absurd to describe Russia’s government 
as dictatorial. Nor will it do to opt for “partial dictatorship,” as this term would be 
an oxymoron (perhaps “democratically challenged” is more fitting). 
Second, while singling Putin out as a dictator seems to imply that his regime is 
more authoritarian than that of his U.S.-allied predecessor, the fact is that Russia’s 
Polity score has been higher under the former than under the latter. As Sakwa (2008) 
notes, “although the aim of Yeltsin’s reform was the creation of a capitalist 
democracy, his methods were divisive and on occasions flouted basic democratic 
norms and appeared to be an inverted form of the authoritarian order that he sought 
to overcome” (p. 49). And yet, as we will soon see, this fact does not appear to have 
invited stronger condemnations of the more “dictatorial” Yeltsin. 
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Figure 1. Regime Trends in Russia (1992-2015). Source: Polity IV Project. 
 
Furthermore, one of the first things one notices upon reading Polity IV 
Country’s Report (Center for Systemic Peace, 2010) is that its negative assessment 
of Russian democracy rests largely on appearances: “it appears as if the Unified 
Russia bloc is using its current situational advantages to effectively restrict 
competition and establish itself as a dominant party” (p. 5); “Although Putin’s 
manipulation of the 2008 presidential elections did not directly violate the 
constitution, he did appear intent on circumventing the mechanisms that ensure 
competitive executive recruitment” (p. 2); and “[His] apparent indifference to 
democracy continues” (p. 2). Such appearances all too easily translate into objective 
facts in the minds of those who are predisposed to criticizing the Putin government. 
But what is to be made of conclusions drawn by those assigned to monitor 
Russian elections? Do they not speak to the absence of genuine democracy in the 
country, despite the façade of electoral institutions? Although observers from the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that the 
2016 parliamentary vote “was more transparently administered than previous 
elections,” it was marred by “an array of shortcomings” (Radio Free Europe / Radio 
Liberty, 2016, para. 1). As for the most recent presidential election, the OSCE 
(2012) alleged that, in spite of the government’s effort to improve electoral 
transparency, Putin’ victory was predetermined. 
Following Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s (2010, p. 69) classificatory 
scheme, by which a regime is categorized as either democratic or dictatorial, one 
might conclude that Russia’s recent electoral experiences demonstrate that the 
country’s regime falls under the latter group. “For a regime to be democratic,” they 
argue, “both the chief executive office and the legislative body must be filled by 
elections. Contestation occurs when there exists an opposition that has some chance 
of winning office as a consequence of elections” (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 
2010, p. 69; see also Przeworksi, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000, p. 16). Such 
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“contestation” did not seem to have transpired in the latest presidential election.  
According to an OSCE observer, “there was no real competition and abuse of 
government resources ensured that the ultimate winner of the election was never in 
doubt” (Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe, 2012, para. 6). 
But even if one accepts Cheibub et al.’s dichotomous classification, it remains 
to be determined whether Russia is less democratic under Putin than under Yeltsin. 
As I have explained above, this, too, is a morally relevant issue. Although the OSCE 
did not monitor the 1996 presidential election, evidence suggests that it was no less 
problematically run. It was widely reported that Yeltin’s campaign “was secretly 
managed by three American political consultants who on more than one occasion 
allegedly received direct assistance from Bill Clinton’s White House” (Wilson, 
2016, para. 4). Further, Russia’s notorious oligarchs stated on record that their 
objective was to get “Yeltsin a second term by any means necessary” (Shuster, 
2012, para. 7). His victory is all the more suggestive given that his approval rating 
was initially at 6% at the start of his campaign; lower even than Joseph Stalin’s 
(Randolph, 1996). 
 
A Question of Sincerity 
 
Although the U.S. government, assisted by the media’s “generally uncritical 
coverage of U.S. foreign policy” (Hook, 2010; see also Aday, 2014), seems to have 
more or less successfully promoted the notion that Russia is being governed by a 
dictator, the United States has maintained friendly relations with a number of 
countries that are also deemed unfree (e.g., see Ritter, 2014). Several of these have 
even lower Freedom House scores than Russia. These countries, together with their 
parenthetically noted Freedom House scores, include the following: Azerbaijan 
(14), Bahrain (12), Ethiopia (12), Tajikistan (11), Saudi Arabia (10), Equatorial 
Guinea (8), and Uzbekistan (3).  
This invites the charge that Russia’s real or perceived authoritarianism is 
merely a smokescreen, a ruse to legitimate a policy of hostility towards a country 
that is increasingly challenging U.S. hegemony. At a minimum, it does not appear 
that democracy promotion tops the list of the U.S. government’s foreign policy 
priorities, nor does it seem to be a top priority for the general American public 
(Drake, 2013). We have seen how Yeltsin can scarcely be described as a less 
“dictatorial” president than his successor. Nevertheless, the former’s U.S. 
counterpart “was strongly inclined not only to like Yeltsin but also to support his 
policies, in particular, his [supposed] commitment to Russian democracy” (United 
States Department of State, n.d.). Even after the bloody standoff with the Russian 
Duma in 1993, when “tanks set fire to a Parliament filled with civilians” (Cockburn, 
1993, para. 6), President Clinton “vowed that the United States would not waver in 
its backing for the Russian President as he sought to restore order,” pinning the 
blame for the violence on Yeltsin’s political opponents (Jehl, 1993, para. 1). 
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Corruption in Russia 
 
That I would dare to use corruption data in order to partially redeem Putin might 
leave the reader gasping for air in a fit of hysteric laughter. However, while Russia 
is consistently rated among the world’s more corrupt countries in Transparency 
International’s annually-updated Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), our 
indictment of Putin, in particular, appears to presuppose that corruption overall has 
worsened under him.8 However, this does not appear to be the case. On a 1-10 scale, 
whereby the higher the country’s score, the less corrupt it is, Russia’s average CPI 
score was no lower during the first four years of Putin’s presidency than under the 
last four years of his predecessor’s, but was in fact slightly higher (see Figure 2).9  
 
 
Figure 2. Russia’s Corruption Perception Index Score (1996-2016). Source: 
Transparency International. 
  
The AAPC may prefer to stress the fact that Russia was near the bottom 25% 
of countries in the 2016 CPI, but it is at least equally helpful to point out that its 
most recent score – while still comparatively low - was its highest on record. “The 
Yeltsin period,” Sakwa (2008) argues, “was one of rampant corruption, despite 
several desultory attempts to halt the frenzy” (p. 165). Yet, as far as CPI scores are 
concerned, the most that Putin could be faulted for, perhaps, is not presiding over a 
more rapid and steady improvement. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
8 To access Corruption Perceptions Index data, visit 
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016  
9 The scores were 2.45 and 2.41, respectively. The reason for this particular temporal 
comparison is that Transparency International’s data covers only the last four years of 
Yeltsin’s presidency. 
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What Public Opinion Can Tell Us 
 
To reiterate its connotative meaning, the term dictatorship signifies absolute power 
over unwilling subjects. To call Putin a dictator is, therefore, to imply that he 
governs against the will of the Russian people. The best way to test this claim – the 
best available means of ascertaining the willingness of a people to be ruled by a 
particular regime – is to consult public opinion data. 
According to the World Values Survey, no more than 45% of Russians believed 
that having a democracy was a good thing,10 lending credence to the notion that 
Russians are not culturally prepared for a democracy.11 However, this figure jumped 
to 66% in 2006, and increased by another percentage point in 2011. In other words, 
it appears that a democratic culture is developing, even if Russians still trail behind 
Americans in their support for democracy. Interestingly, while Russia’s Polity score 
dropped from 6 to 4 in 2007, Russians’ perception of their level of democracy 
increased somewhat between 2006 and 2011. It could, therefore, be argued that 
Russians’ conception of democracy differs from that on which traditional measures 
are based. 
Table 2 displays less encouraging data. Americans express much greater 
confidence in their justice and law enforcement systems. The difference between 
Russians and Americans is especially stark with respect to the police. Twice as 
many Americans as Russians have had confidence in their police. With respect to 
the judiciary, Russia’s already low level of confidence declined from 2006-2011. 
 
Table 2: Institutions in which Confidence is Comparatively Lower in Russia 
 
Confidence in the Police 
 
Confidence in the Justice System 
 
  2006 2011   2006 2011 
  Russia US Russia US   Russia US Russia US 
A 
great 
deal or 
quite a 
lot 32 68 32 68 
A 
great 
deal or 
quite a 
lot 36 55 32 68 
Not 
very 
much 
or not 
at all 64 29 64 30 
Not 
very 
much 
or not 
at all 58 41 64 29 
Source: World Values Survey. 
                                                           
10 To put this in perspective, the comparable figure in the United States was 85%. 
11 For a critique of this view, see Out of Order: Russian Political Values in an Imperfect 
World, by Ellen Carnaghan, 2007, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. 
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However, Russians have had greater (and growing) confidence in their national 
government and legislature than Americans (see Table 3). Of course, in both Russia 
and the United States, confidence in each of these institutions falls below a majority. 
Nevertheless, while there is no cause for celebration in either country, the implicit 
assumption that Russians are more politically dissatisfied than their American 
counterparts is by no means entirely correct. 
 
Table 3: Institutions in which Confidence is Comparatively Higher in Russia 
Confidence in the National 
Government 
 
Confidence in the Parliament 
 
  2006 2011   2006 2011 
  
Russi
a US 
Russi
a 
U
S   Russia 
U
S Russia US 
A 
great 
deal 
or 
quite 
a lot 43 37 47 33 
A 
great 
deal 
or 
quite 
a lot 27 20 31 20 
Not 
very 
muc
h or 
not 
at all 52 57 47 65 
Not 
very 
muc
h or 
not 
at all 63 75 59 77 
Source: World Values Survey. 
 
If the data presented in Table 3 on perceptions of confidence speaks to the 
willingness to be governed, and if such willingness is understood to be a defining 
trait of a dictatorship, then, in particular regards to these two political institutions, 
the inescapable conclusion is that the United States bears this dictatorial trait in 
greater measure than Russia. 
 
The Popularity of President Putin 
 
Special attention must be devoted to the notorious popularity of President Putin 
himself. For having cited Putin’s remarkably high level of support among Russians, 
President Trump was mocked by his predecessor:  
 
“When the interviewer asks him [Trump], ‘why do you support this guy 
[Putin]?’ He says, ‘He is a strong guy. Look, he’s got an 82 percent poll 
rating.’ Well, yes, Saddam Hussein had a 90 percent poll rating. If you 
control the media and you’ve taken away everybody's civil liberties, and 
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you jail dissidents, that's what happens,” Obama claimed, addressing the 
crowd at a Hillary Clinton campaign event in Philadelphia (RT, 2016, 
para. 3). 
 
While suspecting that the Kremlin’s “tight control over the media” may 
influence Russian public opinion, Politifact (which cannot reasonably be accused 
of serving as a mouthpiece for either Trump or Putin) acknowledges that Trump 
correctly estimated Putin’s popularity (Carrol, 2015). Even after adjusting for the 
“possibility that respondents have been lying to pollsters out of fear or social 
expectations,” Western pollsters confirm that Putin’s high public approval is not a 
myth (Carrol, 2015, para. 23). The truth is that Russians are happy under their 
president, at least much more so than Americans are under theirs. This adds another 
wrinkle to the claim that Putin governs an unwilling populace and is, on that 
account, a dictator. 
 
Sincerity or National Security: Must We Choose? 
 
Not only is “dictator talk” misleading, but it arguably renders our country less 
secure. Earlier, I noted that there may be occasions on which we are compelled to 
choose among conflicting values. While it is generally true that we should not 
employ double standards in the area of foreign policy, might it be necessary to do 
so in order to generate public support for hostile actions against a supposedly 
aggressive Russia? While Keene (2017) believes that Putin is “a modern-day 
Russian czar,” he is skeptical of the claim that he heads “a regime wedded to an 
ideology bent upon dominating and transforming the world into its own image” 
(para. 8). Indeed, Putin’s military actions have been restricted to areas in which 
there is a large population of ethnic Russians or Russian citizens. While these 
actions may undermine America’s hegemony in the region, they do not appear to 
pose a threat to its national security, at least no more so than the West’s vilification 
of Putin has done. According to Cohen (2017),  “demonizing Putin is gravely 
endangering America” (para. 2). For one thing, “by treating the Russian president 
as a ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ leader, it is ruling out Putin as an essential U.S. national 
security partner, which any Kremlin leader should be” (Cohen, 2017, para. 2).  
 
Conclusion: A Call for International Empathy 
 
While both sides of this debate may agree that Russia is not a posterchild for 
democracy, I have argued that ascribing the term “dictator” to Vladimir Putin is 
misleading and unnecessarily and dangerously polemical. The American public 
should therefore resist the demonizing narrative put out by the AAPC. We should 
abandon our self-righteous views on Russia, as well as other countries whom (we 
are told) are our adversaries. Rather than viewing Russia’s actions through a 
Manichean prism of world politics, we should opt for a more sophisticated and less 
manipulative lens, one that places these actions in their appropriate and 
continuously evolving contexts. Ignoring the historic, socioeconomic, and political 
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contexts in which Russian behavior is situated may entail the effect of reducing 
public empathy for our (supposed) adversary; facilitating the adoption of a 
simplistic view by which Russia’s actions are attributed mainly to the evil that is 
believed to be inherent - or at least more pronounced - in it. Empathy requires the 
development of a deeper more nuanced understanding of others that certainly goes 
beyond the overt demonization that has often characterized U.S.-Russia relations. 
Research has demonstrated the positive role of empathy in resolving interpersonal 
conflict (e.g., see Navidian, Bahari, Kermansaravi, 2014). Future studies should 
explore its potential in mitigating conflicts at the international level.  
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Stanislavsky:  
Acting Lessons for Life and Leadership 
 
Harrison Long 
 
Abstract 
 
An artist’s creative work can become the primary lens through which he or she 
sees the world; it is a fundamental tool for interpreting life. But artistry can also 
teach a great deal about effective leadership. Based on the principles of Konstantin 
Stanislavsky, the father of modern acting, this essay reflects on five important 
lessons for life and leadership: The Power of Purpose, The Power of Context, The 
Power of Listening, The Power of Partnerships, and The Power of Community. 
After a year of studying Russian culture, history, and foreign policy, I believe these 
lessons can be applied on the international level as well as the personal. How might 
a Russian actor advise our leaders in Moscow and Washington? Read and find out. 
 
 
A Brief History of the Stanislavsky System 
 
European and American culture of the late 19th century touted science as a social 
panacea. As early 19th century Romanticism gave way to modern science, 
overblown, melodramatic acting began to fade, and a new dramatic form emerged: 
Psychological Realism. For the first time, theatre artists were social scientists, 
recreating life on stage to examine and diagnose society’s ills (Bert, 1991, p. 363). 
In March 1906, Konstantin Stanislavsky, co-founder of the world-famous 
Moscow Art Theatre (MAT), experienced a crisis on stage that would forever 
change the direction of modern acting. While playing the role of Dr. Stockmann in 
Henrick Ibsen’s Enemy of the People (Benedetti, 2000, p. 35), Stanislavsky found 
himself thinking of business matters rather than living fully “in the moment” 
(Tcherkasski, 2007). Disturbed that he was cheating the audience, Stanislavsky 
nearly retired from the stage. Thankfully, he did not. Instead, he began to formulate 
an objective, scientific approach to performance, one that addressed the 
psychological complexities of the latest dramatic forms. Before that time, actor 
training consisted of “tricks of the trade” taught by experienced actors who merely 
indicated the results they wanted, but not the means to achieve them (Benedetti, 
2000, p. 4). Stanislavsky’s ideas, research, and his resulting actor training “System” 
transformed the art of acting and continues to do so in the present day.  
Stanislavsky experimented with the actor’s craft for over 60 years, attempting 
to identify an empirically derived, unified theory of acting. In theory, any actor can 
apply Stanislavsky’s practices to achieve a highly developed, emotionally truthful 
embodiment of a living character. As Stanislavsky’s ideas developed, his students 
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began teaching what they knew of “the System” throughout Europe and America 
(Bartow, 2006, p. xxiv). 
In 1923, when the MAT appeared on Broadway, American acting schools 
slowly began to proliferate, each offering its own version of Stanislavsky’s System; 
thus American “Method” acting was born (Gordon, 1994, p. 188). While there are 
many American branches of the Stanislavsky System, the three main schools were 
formed by Lee Strasberg, Stella Adler, and Sanford Meisner (Bartow, 2006, p. 
xxiv). All three teachers began with the intention of revealing Stanislavsky’s 
System rather than developing their own. In truth, each highlighted a different 
developmental stage of Stanislavsky’s 60-year process (Judd, Long, Maloof, 
Patillo, Wallace, & Wiernik, 2008). 
Through the years, the Stanislavsky System has continued to evolve through 
teachers like Jerzy Grotowski, Michael Chekhov, Uta Hagen, and others. Sergei 
Tcherkasski (2007) of the St. Petersburg Theatre Arts Academy, suggests that 
studying various American acting techniques is like taking your family to Disney 
World: one day you might visit the Magic Kingdom, the next the Epcot Center, the 
next Animal Kingdom, but it’s all Disney World! Similarly, the techniques of Adler, 
Strasberg, Hagen, or Meisner are all “Stanislavsky World!” (Tcherkasski, 2007). 
 
Transferrable Skills 
 
The benefits of Stanislavsky training reach far beyond the classroom or the 
proscenium arch. Actor training encourages students to observe the social forces 
governing the roles they play from day-to-day, both on and off the stage. Acting 
exercises sharpen a student’s ability to critically observe the world. A foundation 
of solid performance skills not only helps students understand the fundamentals of 
theatrical artistry, it teaches the social consequences of human behavior. 
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that actor training, and other arts-based curricula 
cultivate transferrable skills that are highly sought after in the marketplace. 
According to Steven Tepper (2014), dean of the Herberger Institute for Design 
and the Arts at Arizona State University, arts training develops the skills business 
leaders desire most, including creative problem solving, critical thinking, 
collaboration, the ability to deal with ambiguity, the ability to adjust or revise work, 
and associational and analogical thinking. A study conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Global (2016) reported that 77% of CEO’s surveyed 
consider it difficult to find employees who possess essential creativity and 
innovation skills, skills we develop every day in artistic training. The Strategic 
National Arts Alumni Project (2011-2013) reports that, of 92,113 arts alumni 
surveyed, 80% believe artistic technique is important to their work, regardless of 
the nature of that work. The survey also notes that those who have worked or are 
currently working as professional artists score higher on a list of important 
professional competencies and skills, especially in the areas of business and 
entrepreneurship.  
In 2016, the Chronicle of Higher Education published a popular essay by 
Tracey Moore entitled “Why Theatre Majors are Vital in the Digital Age.” The 
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article, which celebrates the broad value of Stanislavsky training, points out that 
many theatre majors find their livelihood teaching presentation skills, conflict 
resolution, and collaborative problem-solving to corporate clients. Moore’s 
argument in support of actor training, however, goes deeper than artistic merit or 
even the marketability of actor skills: “The actor’s ability to envision multiple 
outcomes or motivations in a play must be based on the character’s circumstances, 
not the actor’s. That requires a kind of stepping into another person’s shoes that 
social scientists say is dwindling among college-age students” (Moore, 2016, p. 2). 
As technology increasingly dominates our ways of relating in the world, actor skills 
such as concentration, self-reflection, imagination, and empathy help us to 
remember what it is to be human.  
 
Powerful Lessons for Life and Leadership 
 
Like many people who are passionate about their work, I see my craft as a metaphor 
for my place in the world; my identity as an actor and acting teacher shapes the way 
the world appears to me, and the means by which I function within it. Stanislavsky’s 
ideas are the core of what I teach regardless of textual style or period. The wildly 
different plays of Tennessee Williams, George Bernard Shaw, Bertolt Brecht, 
Shakespeare, and Moliere all come to life effectively through Stanislavsky’s 
approach. Moreover, Stanislavsky’s lessons for actors provide a vehicle for self-
examination and human understanding, as well as a way of interacting and 
collaborating with greater awareness. For me, the System has become far more than 
a method to approach my work as a teacher and professional theatre artist; it 
permeates all of my interactions, both in life and in the workplace. Simply put, actor 
training can teach us a lot about life and leadership.  
The following five lessons are derived from Stanislavsky’s System with 
examples of their efficacy provided from my own experiences as an actor, director, 
teacher, and administrator following in the footsteps of numerous theatre 
professionals trained in the Stanislavsky System.  
 
Lesson One: The Power of Purpose 
 
“Whatever happens on stage must be for a purpose.” (Stanislavsky, 1964, p. 35) 
One of the first things a new actor has to contend with is stage fright, the fear of 
looking foolish in front of an audience. We’ve all experienced this at one point or 
another - your knees shake, your mouth gets dry, your palms sweat. You’re so 
worried about how you’re doing you can’t focus on what you’re doing. Sometimes 
a less experienced actor allows his ego to take over: he gets so involved in trying to 
be the best actor on the stage, he loses track of his purpose for being up there in the 
first place.  
Nerves are a natural physiological response to perceived stress. We all get 
nervous. So how do we harness our nerves onstage? It’s simple: we take action. We 
focus on our purpose in the scene and take action to achieve it. Stanislavsky called 
our purpose the character’s goal or objective.  
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Objective: What the character is trying to achieve, the character’s goal or 
purpose. 
Here’s the irony: In order to play a character convincingly, an actor has to care 
more about achieving the character’s goals than he does about impressing the 
audience with his talent. In other words, an actor must be committed to something 
more meaningful than protecting his own ego. On stage or off, our character is 
defined by our actions.  
Action: the greatest acting teachers in history have always focused on action. 
Sanford Meisner (1987), who taught Robert DeNiro, Alec Baldwin, Robert Duvall, 
and Tina Fey said when “[you] are working to achieve a task, you’re not focused 
on yourself,” instead, “you’re attached to something outside yourself.” (Meisner, p. 
24). The great Uta Hagen (1973), who also taught DeNiro (along with Whoopi 
Goldberg, Mathew Broderick, and Jason Robards), said "The sum total of your 
actions (what you do from moment to moment) reveals your character” (Hagen, p. 
185).  
The same can be said of leaders. A leader’s goals and the way she goes about 
achieving them, can tell you everything about her character. A good leader is 
dedicated to something more important than her own ego; good leaders always keep 
the objective in mind.  
In his Ted Talk entitled “The Walk from No to Yes,” William Ury (2010), one 
of America’s top conflict mediators, tells about the time he brokered a tough 
negotiation between Russia and Chechnya. The talks got off to a rocky start when 
the vice president of Chechnya insulted the United States in front of all the other 
negotiators. At first, Ury said he wanted to defend the United States, but then he 
remembered his objective. He hadn’t come there to defend the United States, but 
rather to facilitate a peace agreement. So, he took a deep breath and thanked the 
vice president for his candor. Then, Ury gently reminded the group that the reason 
they had come together was to stop the war in Chechnya. Because Ury remembered 
his purpose, negotiations got back on track and they accomplished their objective.1 
Good leaders and good actors know the power of a clear purpose. Leaders keep 
the objective in mind in order to know what action to take. But how do they 
determine that objective in the first place? They examine motives - their own and 
others. They engage in self-reflection. They gather the facts. Good leaders know: if 
you want to determine a strong purpose, if you want to make sure you’re fighting 
for what you really need, you have to know the context.  
 
Lesson Two: The Power of Context  
 
Context is everything in the theatre. When I start work on a play, the first thing I do 
is sit down and read the script again and again. I research the history and events 
around when and why the play was written. I do this so I can understand the play’s 
                                                           
1 I learned about Ury’s Ted Talk from Melanie Martin Long’s (2015) video: Mastering 
Stage Presence: How to Present to Any Audience, Lecture 10: Playing Status 
Relationships. 
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context. In the theatre, we call context the Given Circumstances.  
Given Circumstances–All the relevant facts that influence a character’s 
behavior (Barton, 1993, p. 115). 
Knowing the given circumstances means you’ve gathered all the facts. And 
those facts, that context, can make all the difference in how an actor chooses to play 
the scene. To illustrate, my fellow acting teacher, Allan Edwards, conducts a simple 
acting exercise. He asks his students to say the Pledge of Allegiance twice: the first 
time they recite the pledge just as themselves sitting in his acting class. The second 
time, however, the students are asked to imagine they are refugees from a land of 
oppression, immigrants who have worked many years to become naturalized 
citizens. With this new set of circumstances, the students speak the Pledge of 
Allegiance for the very first time as American citizens. 
As you can imagine, the additional circumstances make a big difference in the 
way the actors speak. The first time through the pledge, the students seem slightly 
embarrassed and a little bit awkward. That’s because they haven’t been given a clear 
purpose. But the second time through the students seem reverent and committed, 
sometimes even emotional. It’s very dramatic, and very interesting to watch.  
Like good actors, good leaders must understand the power of context. Effective 
leaders make it a point to learn the relevant facts before deciding what action to 
take. Currently, the world is experiencing a critical time of change characterized by 
increased divisiveness on the global, national, and local levels. With the 
proliferation of electronic media sources, sources with varying levels of credibility 
and little accountability, gathering the facts has never been more difficult. 
Unfounded personal accusations, assumptions, and “fake news” obscure our ability 
to understand context.  
An extreme example of misunderstanding context happened in December 
2016. Edgar Maddison Welch burst into a Washington, D.C., pizza joint armed with 
a semi-automatic rifle. Welch was convinced children had been imprisoned in the 
restaurant’s basement as part of a child sex ring run by Hilary Clinton (Haag & 
Salam, 2017). When no children were found, Welch surrendered to police revealing 
he had been spurred on by radio host Alex Jones, who also runs the website 
InfoWars.com. Apparently, Jones, a conspiracy theorist, had publicized the false 
“pizzagate” allegations and encouraged his audience to investigate for themselves 
(Killelea, 2017). 
Voltaire once said, “Anyone who has the power to make you believe 
absurdities has the power to make you commit injustices.” It has never been more 
important for leaders to get the facts straight, and to communicate those facts 
accurately. Knowing the facts means knowing the truth. Good actors are in touch 
with the reality they inhabit and react truthfully to it, even if that reality is a fictitious 
one.  
“You may play well or you may play badly; the important thing is that you 
should play truly.” (Stanislavsky, 1964, p. 14) 
If a leader wants to determine the best course of action, she needs to get all the facts 
on the table.  
181      Harrison Long 
 
 
What’s the best way to understand context in this age of questionable 
information? You study the issue from every trusted angle, you consult the people 
who will be affected by your decision, and you consider every credible opinion on 
the matter. That means you have to listen.  
 
Lesson Three: The Power Listening 
 
Along with understanding the given circumstances, the larger context, it’s important 
to understand personal context as well. After I’ve studied the play to learn all the 
given circumstances, after I’ve examined the script to determine all my objectives, 
it’s time to start working with the other actors. The most important thing you can 
do at this point is to listen … really listen. If you do, you’ll discover some important 
things about the play that never would have occurred to you on your own.  
Actors have to listen to stay on track. If they don’t, they forget the next line or 
even which scene comes next. (I can tell you from personal experience how 
terrifying it is to forget your lines!) When an actor is truly listening, she is 
spontaneous, unpredictable, authentic, and interesting! But when an actor isn’t 
listening, her performance is stale, mechanical, and lifeless; she has all the dramatic 
appeal of a cinder block. But what makes us listen? We listen because we need to 
find out more information. We listen so we can decide what to do next. 
We all want to be good listeners, but what does that really mean? Real listening 
is an active process, not a passive one. It means living in the “here and now.” 
Listening means being open to the influence of the other person. Listening means 
taking the time to hear the whole thought rather than waiting impatiently until it’s 
your turn to speak or present your agenda–that’s the mark of the self-centered actor. 
The best acting is reactive. The best actors respond to the reactions of their partner. 
In other words: the best actors listen!  
Of course, effective listening is a quality of good leadership too. That’s one of 
the best ways to gather the given circumstances, the relevant facts. But even the 
most credible sources of information are subject to bias. For that reason, good 
leaders must consider more than one point of view. Sometimes the most valuable 
information comes from the least expected source or is discovered in the least 
expected ways.  
A few years ago, while serving as Interim Director of our School of Art and 
Design, the elevator broke down. Far from being an uncommon occurrence, this 
had been happening every two or three weeks for quite some time. This was an 
enormous problem because, on a few occasions, injured or disabled students or 
faculty had to be carried up or down the stairs to get to their next class.  
The problem persisted, and every time the elevator stopped working our 
administrative assistant would kindly call the maintenance department who 
eventually sent over the repairman. This happened over and over again, but nothing 
seemed to permanently solve the problem.  
One day, out of desperation, I asked the assistant to tell me when the elevator 
technician arrived. When I introduced myself as the School Director, his defenses 
shot up. It was clear that the poor fellow was used to being badgered and complained 
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at whenever he showed up to fix a campus elevator. It was clear that there was a 
history here. In the theatre, we call this history the character’s “backstory.” 
Backstory: a character’s offstage history that explains her/his behavior in the 
scene. 
Sensing there was a backstory, I quickly reassured him that I only wanted more 
information. Once he knew I was willing to listen, he was happy to show me around 
and teach me about the problem.  
By the end of our conversation we discovered something: all that was needed 
to fix the elevator was a simple maintenance check each month, which he kindly 
agreed to do. Do you know what? There hasn’t been a problem with the elevator 
since! 
Good leaders understand the power of listening. Good leaders know that 
everyone has a backstory. They try to understand the whole person and not just the 
surface issues. No matter how difficult or defensive a person may seem, it is 
important to remember that everyone is the hero of his own story.  
But in order to understand personal context, you have to do more than hear the 
words someone is speaking, you have to empathize, you have to imagine what the 
other person is feeling. Sometimes the actor knows more than the character she is 
playing. Sometimes the actor may not even approve of his character’s behavior. But 
in order to play the scene truthfully, Stanislavsky insisted that his actors avoid 
judging a character and choose to empathize with him instead. In essence, the actor 
has to listen deeply to the character. To accomplish this, Stanislavsky used a simple 
trick he called the “magic if.” 
Magic If: When the actor simply asks himself: “What would I do, if I were 
actually in the situation that the character is in?” (Stanislavsky, 1964, p. 46). 
While they may not know the term “magic if,” good leaders use it all the time. 
They listen so well they can imagine what it is like to be in the other person’s shoes. 
Whether on the local, national, or international level, good leaders make it their 
business to study every side of an issue and learn how it impacts different 
constituents. Empathic listening is an important step in building the kinds of 
positive relationships that foster collaboration.  
 
Lesson Four: The Power of Collaboration  
 
Theatre is a collaborative art form; the director, writer, actors, designers, and 
technicians all work together to create a unified production. Every moment on stage 
is a collaboration between actors who, according to Stanislavsky, must respond 
authentically and spontaneously to one another. In fact, every performance is a 
collaboration between the actors and the audience (Stanislavsky, 1964, pp. 178, 
180, 193, 294-295). Theatre simply can’t exist in a vacuum. But … collaboration 
isn’t always easy. Sometimes it is a tug-of-war, a battle over supreme authorship. 
No one understood this better than Stanislavsky, who constantly shifted roles from 
producer, to director, to designer, to actor, to teacher. Yet, Stanislavsky also knew 
that collaboration can magnify our creative efforts in astonishing ways.  
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The challenges of producing a play based on historical events illustrate how 
theatrical collaboration goes beyond the stage. Examining the past can be a difficult 
and painful process, but it is an essential one, especially when it unearths local 
history that many would like to forget or ignore. One particular production, Parade, 
conjured two of our most destructive, local demons: antisemitism and racism. Yet, 
despite the volatile subject matter, divergent communities came together to examine 
the past, understand the present, and envision a better future. 
On the night of April 26, 1913, 13-year-old Mary Phagan was found dead in 
the basement of the National Pencil Company in Atlanta, Georgia. After a highly 
publicized trial Leo Frank, the factory’s Jewish manager, was convicted of murder 
on sketchy evidence. After studying the case carefully, Governor John Slaton 
commuted Frank’s sentence. But on August 17, 1915, a group of men abducted 
Frank from his prison cell and lynched him from an oak tree on the outskirts of 
Marietta, just a few miles from our campus. This true story inspired the Tony 
Award-winning musical, Parade.  
As a resident of the town where Frank was lynched, I had been interested in the 
musical for a long time. I became even more interested when I realized two things: 
first, the musical had never been performed in Marietta. Secondly, 2015 was to be 
the centennial of Leo Frank’s death. I began to see Parade as an opportunity to 
explore local history and perhaps generate some healing discussions in the process. 
But I knew what an ambitious project it was, and that our theatre department 
couldn’t do it alone, so I began looking for partners.  
It didn’t take long to find others interested in exploring the Frank case. The 
resulting Seeking Justice Initiative, of which Parade became a part, was much more 
exciting than anything I could have conceived on my own. Our impressive list of 
partners included: The Southern Museum of Civil War and Locomotive History, 
The Bremen Jewish Heritage Museum, The Museum of History and Holocaust 
Education, our own College of Humanities and Social Sciences and the Temple, 
Atlanta, Leo Frank’s home congregation. Through this experience, I learned that 
collaboration can prove powerful for several important reasons.  
The first and most obvious reason is that sharing resources means you can do 
more with less. In the current economic climate, topflight organizations are eager 
to forge partnerships with like-minded collaborators. Parade benefitted enormously 
in this way. For example, one of our partners, the Bremen Museum, provided high-
resolution slides of obscure historical images at no cost. These became an essential 
production element.  
The second reason collaboration can be powerful is that it helps make the case 
for additional resources. Our university, like many other institutions, likes to fund 
projects that include more than one group. In this way funders get more bang for 
their buck. The fact that we were collaborating with several units on and off campus 
helped me convince our president to contribute an additional $5,000 to the project. 
As a result, we were able to have a marketing budget, hire sound support for our 
Temple performance, and fund a campus residency for Pulitzer Prize, Tony and 
Academy Award-winning playwright Alfred Uhry (Parade, Driving Miss Daisy).  
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Thirdly, collaboration opened our work to a much wider audience. Because 
each of our partners has a separate patron base, we were able to reach more people. 
In fact, our Marietta performance was completely sold out, far exceeding our box 
office projections. Because of our increased exposure, Playwright Alfred Uhry and 
I were invited to interview on Georgia Public Radio. Broadwayworld.com 
published a feature article on Parade and we even got a good mention in the 
international magazine The Economist.  
The final reason partnerships are so powerful is that they increase impact. 
Reaching a wider audience certainly meant increased visibility for our College of 
the Arts. Furthermore, audience members who had attended the previous Seeking 
Justice events were primed to experience our work in a much more meaningful way. 
Most importantly, however, the student experience was enriched. As a part of the 
Seeking Justice initiative, our students were active participants as performers and 
technicians. They and other students attended panel discussions by experts, and 
were given a curator-led, private tour of the Southern Museum’s Leo Frank exhibit. 
Parade became powerful experience for many reasons, but most of all because 
collaboration helped us connect with our community in new ways. This leads me to 
my fifth, and final lesson. 
 
The Power of Community 
 
On June 22, 1897, Russian theatre critic and playwright Vladimir Nemirovich-
Danchenko asked Konstantin Stanislavsky to meet him at a restaurant in Moscow, 
where they talked, uninterrupted for 18 hours. Both men were deeply concerned 
about the lack of discipline in the Russian theatre. That night, the two formed a 
partnership to create one of the world’s greatest theatre companies, the MAT. Early 
on, company members lived communally at an estate in Pushkino, where they 
alternated between rehearsals and housekeeping duties (Gordon, 1994, p. 18). 
Living together so closely meant there were few distractions from the work. It also 
contributed to the collaborative spirit of the ensemble. Stanislavsky’s goal was to 
create a true ensemble of players with no stars (Benedetti, 2000, p. 24). His goal 
was to create a community.  
What is a community? Is it the town we live in? Is it our neighborhood? People 
often refer to the academic community, the online community or the arts 
community. For me, community is something that binds us together.  
In 2011, I directed a play called Splittin’ the Raft, an adaptation of Huckleberry 
Finn as told by Frederick Douglass. A generous grant from the National 
Endowment for the Arts made it possible to tour seven North Georgia communities, 
ranging from inner-city schools to rural mountain towns. The struggles we faced 
and the conversations we encountered prove the lasting and devastating legacy of 
American slavery.  
Ours was the first production of Splittin’ the Raft to be staged in the Deep 
South. Months of struggling to arrange tour dates taught me why. Some 
communities and schools were reluctant to host our production fearing the same 
kind of backlash Twain’s novel has provoked since its publication (Long, p.136). 
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Still, this highly entertaining production allowed people to open up and approach 
difficult issues with a spirit of mutual respect. One student responded: “This 
production is a call to action.” In an interview with the Douglas County Sentinel, 
Laura Lieberman of the Douglasville Cultural Arts Council, stated: “The message 
of Splittin’ the Raft and the outstanding quality of this production are too important 
and relevant for our community to miss” (2011). Despite early resistance, Splittin’ 
the Raft prompted productive, community-building dialogue about race, gender, 
and economic equity wherever we went. 
On November 11, we loaded up the truck and drove over miles of winding 
mountain roads to our final tour stop at the Sautee Nacoochee Cultural Center in 
White County, Georgia. As more than one White County resident put it, “the name 
of our county speaks for itself.” Today, much of the area is still owned by the 
descendants of the slave-owning Williams family. Only a few miles down the road 
from the center stands Bean Creek, a community largely still inhabited by 
descendants of the Williams family slaves. One Bean Creek resident told me, 
“There's a long and painful history of discrimination, some of which is relatively 
recent” (Long, H., 2015, p. 146). 
At curtain time, the theatre filled quickly. There was a wide cross-section of 
locals in attendance (both white and black, rich and poor, from Sautee Nacoochee 
and Bean Creek). Kathy Blandin, the center’s director, was pleased to see some of 
the “old families” in attendance, along with several people from the Bean Creek 
community, some who hadn’t set foot in the building for several years because of 
recurring racial tensions.  
The performance that night was among our most powerful. After the applause 
died down only a few people left the room. The audience needed to talk. The post-
show discussion was particularly passionate. People who wouldn’t typically find 
themselves in the same room with one another were having a serious discussion 
about race and class in their community.  
At one point, however, a local white woman became agitated. She couldn’t 
understand why we were going on and on about slavery, something that had 
happened so long ago. Strangely, she kept using the phrase “Am I living with Santa 
Claus or …..” For example: “Am I living with Santa Claus or hasn’t that all been 
dealt with? Am I living with Santa Claus or are those people just avoiding 
responsibility? Am I living with Santa Claus or are they simply trying to live off my 
taxes rather than pay their own way?” 
The air went out of the room. Everyone was stunned into silence. I was 
embarrassed for the woman and for all of us. Most of all, I was ashamed to face the 
Bean Creek folks who had reached out in good faith. How could someone hear so 
many stories of discrimination from her own neighbors and still miss the point? 
Then, something changed: Sabrina Dorsey from Bean Creek smiled at the woman. 
With humor and with gentleness, she raised her head and said, “Ma’am, with all 
due respect …. you’re living with Santa Claus!” (Long, H., 2015, p. 146). 
The room erupted with good-natured laughter and suddenly the woman began 
to relax and really listen. I’m not suggesting “Mrs. Santa Claus” underwent a full 
conversion that night, but there had been a clear turning point. By the end of the 
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conversation she understood something about the experience of her black neighbors 
that she hadn’t considered before. For me, that understanding is “community.”2 
In order to build community, we have to let our true and imperfect selves come 
out into the open. We have to acknowledge what we really think and feel. We have 
to be open to opinions different from our own. We have to be relaxed enough and 
trust enough to let down our defenses. Only then can we risk being influenced by 
one another.  
What does it take to build community? It takes respect. It takes trust. It takes 
commitment. It takes the courage to react with honesty. Interestingly, that’s a lot 
like what Stanislavsky told his actors. You see, you build community in the theatre 
the same way you build it in life. Good actors and good leaders build community.  
 
The Year of Russia 
 
In May 2017, I had the opportunity to visit Russia for the first time with a faculty 
delegation from our university. This extraordinary trip was the culmination of our 
“Year of Russia” celebration which included weekly lectures, concerts, films, food, 
and panel discussions focused on various aspects of Russian culture, history, and 
foreign policy. These events were eerily relevant because they coincided with the 
2016 presidential campaign and the early months of the troubled Trump 
administration. By the time we left for Moscow, many Americans were convinced 
Russia had meddled in the presidential election, but to what degree? I was eager to 
hear the Russian point of view. Despite my fascination with all of this, however, 
my primary preoccupation was, of course, Stanislavsky. After all, this was my 
pilgrimage to actor Mecca! 
Russian culture is rich and beautiful. We strolled the streets of stately St. 
Petersburg and stood slack-jawed in astonishment at the masterworks housed in the 
Hermitage. I toured Anton Chekhov’s estate, and, of course attended an outstanding 
production at the MAT! I was impressed by the pulsing vitality of modern Moscow 
with its sparkling skyline of glass superstructures. Whatever my personal feelings 
about Vladimir Putin, I understood his popularity; for many, Putin has restored 
Russian national pride and a general feeling of hope for the future.  
We visited several universities where we attended lectures and panels on 
Russian foreign policy, domestic policy, and economic strategy. We toured the 
Kremlin, the American Embassy, and Russia Today, one of two top government-
run news agencies. Everywhere we went, we were welcomed graciously and 
respectfully. Through all of this, Stanislavsky sat perched on my shoulder. 
I was struck by how much we have in common with the Russian people, and 
by a few fundamental differences in the way we perceive the role of our nations in 
the world. Perhaps American playwright Lee Blessing explains it best in his cold 
war drama, A Walk in the Woods, about a series of fictitious conversations between 
                                                           
2 This story was first recounted in my article Theatre across Communities: A Tale 
of Two Slave Cabins in the Journal of Higher Education Outreach and 
Engagement, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 146-147. 
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Soviet and American negotiators in Geneva between 1984 and 1985. In 2013, I 
directed a production of the play at Atlanta’s Serenbe Playhouse, a professional 
theatre company. To put this in historical context, the play ends a few months before 
Gorbachev courageously announced a unilateral moratorium on intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles, and proposed a freeze on all nuclear weapons testing (Tsygankov, 
2016, p. xiv). 
 
A Walk in the Woods 
 
BOTVINNIK: … Americans and Russians are just the same. But their 
history is different. What is history? History is geography over time. The 
geography of America is oceans–therefore no nearby enemies. The 
geography of Russia is the opposite: flat, broad plains–open invitations to 
anyone who wants to attack. Mongols, French, Germans, Poles, Turks, 
Swedes, anyone …. So, what is the history of America? Conquest without 
competition. What is the history of Russia? Conquest because of 
competition. How best to be America? Make individual freedom your god. 
This allows you to attack on many fronts–all along your borders, in fact–
and maintain the illusion that you are not attacking at all. You don’t even 
have to call your wars, wars. You call them “settling the west.” … How 
best to be Russia then? Fight collectively. Know that you are trying to crush 
those around you. Make control your god, and channel the many wills of 
the people into one will .… Americans, who never had to confront 
themselves as conquerors, are still under the delusion that they are 
idealists. And Russians, who did have to confront themselves, are under 
the equally powerful delusion that they are realists. I’m speaking now of 
those in power. Common Americans and common Russians share a much 
simpler delusion: that they are peace-loving people. (Blessing, 1988, pp. 
26-27) 
 
A Walk in the Woods seems more resonant than ever, partly because we know 
what the characters do not: that the Berlin Wall would crumble, that the end of 
communism would give way to unforeseen freedoms - of markets, of technology, 
of information. On June 19, 2013, a few days before the opening night of our 
production, President Obama publicly stated that the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
had brought “a sense that the great challenges have somehow passed.” In order to 
“move beyond Cold War nuclear postures” Obama called for reducing the number 
of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear warheads by one-third if the Russian government 
agreed to a similar cut. In Moscow, however, Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
Dmitry Rogozin quickly responded, saying, “How can we take seriously this idea 
about cuts in strategic nuclear potential while the United States is developing its 
capabilities to intercept Russia’s nuclear potential?”  
Sadly, four years later, it is clear that President Obama was incorrect. In fact, 
the divide between our countries, it seems, is widening by the day. Despite our 
respective progress in the realm of individual freedoms, issues of poverty, 
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ecological devastation, and a possible nuclear disaster continue to threaten global 
stability. Homegrown terrorists and sophisticated cyber-warriors undermine 
democracy across the globe. In short, world peace seems just as tenuous now as it 
was then, if not more. 
 Recently, the U.S. Congress passed sweeping economic sanctions, which 
prompted a game of one-upmanship as both countries downsized each other’s 
diplomatic corps (Gordon & Schmidt, 2017). While sanctions can be an important 
foreign policy tool, I wonder how much these are motivated, not by their potential 
effectiveness, but by the need of national leaders to appear powerful to their own 
people - to at least appear as if they are taking action? Wouldn’t we accomplish 
more if our leaders began engaging more rather than less? After all, we are dealing 
with people here, people similar to ourselves. This is community at its broadest, 
most global level. 
In his book titled Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National 
Identity, distinguished professor of international relations, Andrei Tsygonkov, 
explains the complex framework of forces that influence Russia’s fluctuating 
foreign policies in the post-Soviet era. Tsygankov concludes his text by advising 
Russia and the West to remain engaged and resist the tendency toward isolationism. 
Rather, they should: 
 
 ... double their efforts to explain their international policies as consistent 
with their vision of the global world. … Isolationism cannot be practical 
in a world that has grown increasingly global in terms of both new 
opportunities and new threats. … staying engaged is not just an option, 
but a foreign policy imperative.” (Tsygonkov, 2016, pp. 269-271)  
 
Make no mistake, I find much of Russian foreign and domestic policy 
objectionable. Admittedly, it is as hard for me to set aside my judgments as it is for 
anyone. Still, like Tsygankov, I am just as skeptical that stifling communication, 
rather than promoting it, will have the desired effect. Our leaders must not lose track 
of their purpose. Our leaders must remember we can’t move forward without 
listening to each other in empathy and respect. 
As members of the world-wide community, there are many circumstances that 
provide the context for continued collaboration. Russia and the West are unified by 
our common global responsibilities, economic opportunities, the need for natural 
resources, and our shared efforts to counter terrorism. While I only spent two weeks 
in Russia, my experiences there have convinced me we share many common values.  
How can we achieve lasting progress without trust, without the ability to look 
across the negotiating table and recognize ourselves in one another? How can we 
break through the gridlocks, both at home and abroad, brought on by our individual 
and collective need for power and security? With increased globalization, our 
futures are linked together more now than they have ever been. For that reason, 
there are no lasting unilateral solutions. Whether on the global, national, or local 
level, our leaders will do well to remember what Stanislavsky taught: 
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• the wisdom to choose a purpose greater than our own egos;  
• the diligence to gather and accurately represent the facts in their full and 
complete context; 
• the character to choose actions of integrity; 
• the empathy to listen deeply and understand another’s point of view; 
• the understanding that, by working together, we can become greater than 
we are on our own; and  
• the courage to reveal our true selves and to risk being influenced by one 
another. 
 
Imagination refers to the actor’s ability to accept new situations of life and 
believe in them. (Adler, 1988, p. 20) 
At the center of Stanislavsky’s System is perhaps the greatest lesson of all: the 
power of imagination. Imagination is important because it allows each of us, as 
leaders, to see beyond our current limitations and to visualize what we are capable 
of becoming. As Albert Einstein observed, “Imagination is more important than 
knowledge. For knowledge is limited to all we now know and understand, while 
imagination embraces the entire world, and all there ever will be to know and 
understand.” The opportunity to study Russia and engage with Russian students and 
scholars has inspired me to better understand today’s shared global context as an 
interdependent community in need of greater collaboration. Imagine that! 
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